Appropriation and counter-appropriation: the case of Roquentin by LeBlanc, James Dennis
APPROPRIATION AND COUNTER-APPROPRIATION: 
TEE CASE OF ROQUENTIN 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
by 
James Dennis LeBlanc 
August 1984 
*/^~-L-K^ 
APPROPRIATION AND COUNTER-APPROPRIATION: 
THE CASE OF POQUENTIN 
James Dennis LeBlanc, Ph*D« 
Cornell University 1984 
As the title suggests, there are two principle 
aspects of this dissertation* The first concerns a par-
ticular notion of appropriation} as well as its reverse, 
what is terned in this study , fcounter-appropriation. M 
This first aspect consists of theoretical considerations 
and draws on a body of information which permits the use 
of a kind of ontologicai psychoanalysis* The second 
aspect of this study is an application of these theoreti-
cal views to the character of Roquentin, the existential-
ly—ill protagonist in Jean-Paul Sartre's novel, LA H ^ § ? ? « 
On the whole, the discourse and behavior of Sartre 1 s char-
acter are used to both illustrate and confirm the various 
facets of the psychoanalytic structure that is proposed in 
this text — a dissertation which is, therefore, a study 
of both theory and literature* 
In the first section, the focus is on a particular 
moment in La. Nausée: Roquentin's narration of his inabil-
ity to pick up a piece of paper which lies on the ground 
in front of his hotel* His documentation of bis usual 
fondness for handling, staring at, destroying, and even 
bringing the trash to his mouth is explicated in ^reat de-
tail* 
The main thrust of the second chapter is towards a 
reading of Freud against Sartre. although Sartre sees his 
own work as fundamentally opposed to that of Freud, the 
positions of the two theorists are used here in a comple-
mentary fashion to support a certain notion of desire that 
is appropriâtive in nature. Sartre 1s L'Etre et le géant» 
Lacan 1 s "Signification du phallus,11 Laplanche fs Vje e_l 
mort e_n. psychanalyse
 y and several of Freud9 s works are 
cons idered» 
The third and final chapter of this study reveals the 
importance of Roquentin's interest in handling discarded 
scraps of paper, and his recent inability to engage in 
this activity, in relation to the rest of the novel. The 
concept of apropriation, which is introduced in the pre-
ceding chapter, is extended to include "counter-appropria-
tion#" In addition, the idea of a "playful" attitude is 
introduced and Juxtaposed with Sartre's esprit de sérjLeux 
in an effort to analyze and explain the nature of Roquen-
tin's nausea. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Je l'ai» la saleté» la Nausée*" 1 The nausea in Sar-
tre's novel is something Roquentin !>as • or so the protago-
nist maintains early on in his Journal* Later in the 
text, however» we read: "La Nausée ne m'a pas quitté et 
je ne crois pas qu'elle nie quittera de sitôt; nais je ne 
la subis plusf ce n'est plus une maladie ni une quinte 
passagère: c'est moi*" 2 "La Nausée • • • c'est moi"; the 
nausea in Sartre's novel is something Roquentin i_s_* It is 
this interrelation of having and being and Roquentin 1s 
shifting awareness of the roles of these two predicative 
modes that will concern us in the following pages* Lô. 
flausee. we shall maintain, is a novel about appropriation 
— appropriation of material objects, appropriation of the 
world one experiences, appropriation of oneself* More-
over, this desire for possession is founded on a desire 
for being — not just any being, of course, but a specific 
notion of being (one which, unfortunately, is unattaina-
ble)* This desired ontological status is what Sartre 
terms elsewhere the ep-soi-pour-soi• the in-itseIf-for-it-
self* Consciousness seeks the kind of solid, inmutable 
1
 Jean-Paul Sartre, La Causée (Paris: Sallimard, 1938), p. 
32* 
2
 Ibid*» p. 161. 
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being of the in-itself — the being of a stone, for exam-
ple — while at the same time wishing to remain the con-
tinuous creator» the free foundation of its existence: be-
ing-for-itself• It is towards this end that an individual 
engages in appropriative behavior. 
In an effort to elucidate this concept of appropria-
tion and its role in Roquentin's diary» we shall need to 
focus both on theoretical considerations and on Roquen-
tin's discourse itself. Regarding the latter» we shall 
see that one moment» in particular» in Roquentin's text 
seems to contain the entire universe of the writer's ap-
propriative behavior» and functions as a dense» microcosm-
ic kernel of psychological factors that serve to inform 
his journalistic project as a whole. For this reason» we 
shall spend considerable time examining this crucial point 
in the text: Roquentin's description of his pastime of 
picking up scraps of paper from the street» followed imme-
diately by his recounting of his recent inability to pick 
up a particular sheet of paper. Later we shall turn our 
attention to the ramifications of our discoveries as they 
apply to other points in the text. In conjunction with 
this aspect of our inquiry» we shall need to establish a 
certain theoretical groundwork on which to base our con-
clusions. We shall draw from both the theoretical works 
of Sartre ( LLEÎXÊ. ê± 1^ - P e W * » f o r "the most part) and from 
Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory (Bache-
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lard, Lapianche, Lacan)* Although Sartre often claims to 
be in severe opposition to Freud, «re hope to show that the 
systems of the two thinkers can be utilized in a comple-
mentary fashion, in spite of their occasionally glaring 
points of contention» Sartre's ontological considerations 
may be made to serve as a beneficial tool for the clarifi-
cation and elaboration of Freud's psychoanalytic theories, 
just as Freud's point of view will be shown to provide an 
interesting perspective from which to extend and highlight 
the phenomenological conclusions of Sartre 1s work. 
Thus, the scope of the following study will be two-
dimensional: ( 1 ) ,,£*e tenter une psychanalyse des çhos-
e^,« 3 as Sartre describes what he calls "la psychanalyse 
existentielle," and (2) to propose a psychoanalytic read-
ing of Roquentin's existential anxiety and of the factors 
which contribute to its arising and ultimate resolution in 
the mind of Sartre's protagonist. 
Roquentin announces early on that his Journalistic 
project will be an attempt to organize his day-to-day 
life. In fact, he states his resolution with the first 
words of the "feuillet sans date": "Le mieux serait d'éc-
rire les événements au jour le jour . . . surtout les 
3
 Jean-Paul Sartre, J^jgtre e_£ le n.jaflt (Paris: Gallimard, 
1943), p. 690. Sartre attributes this notion of a phe-
nomenological psychoanalysis, quite rightly, to Bache-
lard. 
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classer»"4 As the reader discovers, Roquentin's enterprise 
is more easily resolved than carried out, for the writer 
has difficulty deciding what is and is not an "event." 
Among the first "incidents," however, that appear in Ro-
quentin's papers are two which the writer seems inclined 
to consider the sort of occurrence which requires classi-
fication: the episode of the stone and that of the piece 
of paper* For the time being, we will forego an examina-
tion of the former event and concentrate on the latter, 
for it is through a thorough investigation of Roquentin's 
quirky interest in handling discarded scraps of paper that 
his experience with the stone can best be elucidated» 
It is one-thirty and Antoine Roquentin is sitting at 
a table in the Café Mably. "Rien de nouveau," he writes 
as an introduction to his diary entry of the day.5 He lat-
er realizes! however, that he was wrong in stating that 
nothing was new and that such a statement was, more or 
less, a lie: "je n'ai pas dit la vérité — du moins pas 
toute la vérité." 6 There is indeed something new in Ro-
quentin's world, but he is not sure what it is, for the 
newness manifests itself as little more than a vague su-
perfluity. Eyeing his gloss of beer, he senses an odd, 
new quality in the object: "il y a autre chose. Presque 
* Sartre, Là. Causée t P» 11» 
5
 Iklrf-» P* IS. 
lbjd., p. 21. 
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riep»" 7 Moreover, something has happened in the nature of 
an event. Roquentin's justification of the eventfuiness 
of the event runs as follows. He feels qualms about hav-
ing written "rien de nouveau": "'Rien de nouveau.' J•ad-
mire comme on peut mentir en mettant la raison de son 
coté." 8 However, Roquentin is still hesitant to admit what 
he has tried to deny. The event, as such, appears in the 
text and its status as an event is promptly questioned: 
"j'ai voulu et je n'ai pas pu ramasser un papier qui traî-
nait par terre» C'est tout et ce n'est même pas un événe-
ment."9 Nonetheless, Roquentin cannot deny the impression 
that the incident has made on him — an impression that 
leads him to a somewhat startling conclusion: "j'ai pensé 
que je n'étais plus libre." 1 0 This sense of the loss of 
his freedom haunts Roquentin to the point of being the 
main impetus behind the writing of his diary entry for the 
day: "C'est elle [cette idée] qui m'a dicté les pages qui 
précèdent." 1 1 We note the writer's suggestion that the 
idea of the loss of freedom is so strongly at work that it 
is, in fact, responsible for his very discourse. More-
over, any incident with the power to trigger such an idea 
Ibid.« emphasis added. 
8
 Xfeipt. 
9
 Xkid* t P» 22 . 
1 0
 i b i d . 
1 1
 Xfeitf-
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must be classified as an event, for the classification of 
events anrf the decision to write are one and the same pro-
ject ("Le mieux serait d'écrire les événements au jour le 
jour • • • et surtout les classer")» Roquentin has final-
ly admitted the eventfulness of his inability to pick up 
the piece of paper. He can now only make excuses for his 
reluctance to recount the event in the first place: 
Pourquoi n'en ai-je pas parlé? Ça doit être par 
orgueil, et puis, aussi, un peu par maladresse. 
Je n'ai pas l'habitude de me raconter ce qui m'-
arrive, alors je ne trouve pas bien la succes-
sion des événements t je ne distingue pas ce crui 
est important. 1 2 
Roquentin concludes his apology with abrupt precision: 
11
 II n'y a pas grand-chose a dire: je n'ai pas pu ramasser 
le papier, c'est tout." 1 3 
The unstable nature of Roquentin's ramblincçs deserves 
d o s e r scrutiny» Whyf for instance, is he impelled to 
suppress the "event" through the use of a discourse which 
manifests itself as a kind of stalling tactic — "dix 
Pages" of parenthethicai journalism between the lie ("Rien 
de nouveau") and the confession ("je n'ai pas dit la vér-
ité")? What does Roquentin find so sinister and threaten-
ing about an "event" and about this "event" in particular? 
These are questions we must eventually answer. 
1 2. 
Xkid., emphasis added. 
1 3
 Ifei^. 
Chapter I 
THE SCRAPS OF PaPER 
(L1 imagination n'est rien autre que le sujet 
transporte dans les choses* Les images portent 
alors la marque du sujet* Et cette marcrue est 
si claire que finalement c'est par les images 
qu'on peut avoir le plus sur diagnostic des 
temperaments [ Bachelard» La. Terre et les rever-
ies çtu reoosi p. 3 ]• 
Tf our strategy is to "tenter une psychanalyse des 
choses» " perhaps our first question should be: what is the 
significance» for Roquentin» of the piece of paper? For-
tunately» for us» Roquentin answers this question: 
J1aime beaucoup ramasser les marrons» les vi-
eilles loques» surtout les papiers* Il m'est 
agréable de les pr&ndir&f die fermer ma main sur 
eux; pour un peu je les porterais a ma bouche» 
comme font les enfants. anny entrait dans des 
colères blanches quand je soulevais par un coin 
des papiers lourds et somptueux» mais probable-
ment salis de merde. En ete ou au début de l 1-
automne» on trouve dans les jardins des bouts de 
journaux que le soleil a cuits» secs et cassants 
comme des feuilles mortes» si jaunes qu'on peut 
les croire passés à l'acide picriqae. D'autres 
feuillets» l'hiver» sont pilonnés» broyés» ma-
culés» ils retournent a la terre. D'autres tout 
neufs et mêmes glacés» tout blancs» tout palpi-
tants» sont posés comme des cygnes» mais déjà la 
terre les englue par en dessous. Ils se tor-
dent» ils s'arrachent a la boue» mais c'est pour 
aller s'aplatir un peu plus loin» définitive-
ment. Tout cela est bon à prendre. Quelquefois 
je les palpe simplement en les regardant de tout 
près» d'autres fois je les déchire pour entendre 
leur long crépitement» ou bien» s'ils sont très 
humifies» j'y mets le feu» ce qui ne va pas sans 
peine; puis j'essuie mes paumes remplies de boue 
- 7 -
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a un mur ou a un tronc d'arbre» 1 4 
We note from the start that it is not exclusively pa-
pers which Roquentin likes to handle; he also enjoys pick-
ing up chestnuts and old rags, although he maintains that 
it is especially papers which he finds appealing* It is 
not easy to deduce a common categorical denominator for 
the three objects. All three can be found on the ground 
and it is tempting to generalize the orientation of Ro-
quentin' s pastime in Just such a way* But Roquentin does 
not claim to enjoy picking up "things on the ground*" He 
is quite specific in declaring the objects of his fancy as 
ffleg marrons»" "les vieilles loques" and "leg papiers*" 
What is puzzling is that we find no evidence in Roquen-
tin's text of his gathering anything but "les papiers" 
(with the exception of the stone» mentioned earlier and 
which will be examined in a subsequent section of this 
study)* Nonetheless» his mention of chestnuts ("les mar-
rons") is highly suggestive because of its rather obvious 
prefiguring of the episode of the chestnut tree ("le mar-
ronnier")» which plays a crucial role later in the jour-
nal* 1 5 Furthermore» a connection can be drawn between the 
l
* Sartre» La Nausée » p. 22-23. 
1 5
 Roquentin finds many of his papers "dans les jardins" 
and it is in the "Jardin public" that he will later 
have his celebrated encounter with the "racine du mar-
ronnier" (^ Nausée» p. 161 ff* ) * We may infer» then» 
that it is "dans les jardins" (among other places» per-
haps) that Roquentin finds chestnuts, as well as pa-
pers» to pick up* Moreover, in the paragraph describ-
ing his habit, which we have cited above» it is 
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old rags and the pieces of paper* The two objects are 
quite similar in texture and, in fact, can be considered 
two forms of the same material — paper is often made from 
rags» Thus? the fact that Roquentin is fond of picking up 
both old rags and pieces of paper is understandable and, 
if the chestnut tree episode should reveal a related tex-
tu(r)al theme, we shall be able to understand his practice 
of handling chestnuts in a categorically similar manner* 
Quickly abandoning his interest in chestnuts and old 
rags, Roquentin elaborates on his habit of fondling paper* 
He is not a collector* Unlike Robbe-Srillet fs Mathieu — 
another self-absorbed and neurotic loner who picks up and 
saves discarded pieces of string and who, in a way, is 
reminiscent of R o q u e n t i n 1 6 — Sartre's character demon-
strates a mere passing interest in the objects of his ob-
session and does not store them away to be re-examined, 
re-fondled and re-kindled at another time* He is but a 
momentary amateur of discarded scraps* He experiences an 
nuit, 1955)* See also Dennis Porter's "Sartre, Robbe-
Grillet and the Psychotic Hero," in Moft?rp Fiction 
St.ujîi££ 16 (1970): 13-25 for an elaboration of the sim-
ilarities and differences between the two "psychotic" 
personalities* 
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agreeable pleasure in merely grasping the objects and 
closing his hand around them (Il m'est agréable de les 
prendref de fermer ma main sur eux"); to put it different-
ly? we might say that Roquentin likes to have the objects 
"la his hand.» Further, he has the urge to bring the pa-
pers to his mouth and, presumably, to put them jj^ "comme 
font les enfants," but he restrains himself. There is a 
suggestion that Anny, Roquentin 1s ex-lover, is at least 
one of the sources of this restraint, for Roquentin imme-
diately inserts the remark -that Anny used to go into "des 
colères blanches" when he would so much as pick up the 
corner of one of his prize finds. Often he simply holds 
the morsels, feels them (up?i) and looks at them very 
closely. Other times ( and here we note how Roquentin is 
most unlike an obsessive collector), he tears them in or-
rfe
** to hear their "crépitement" or sets them afire, with 
difficulty, if they are very wet. Thus, Roquentin seems 
t o
 enjoy picking up papers for at least four reasons: he 
likes to (1) grasp and caress them, (2) look closely at 
"them, (3)
 p u t them in his mouth (taking Roquentin at his 
wordt this act is but a fantasy which "pour un peu" he 
*ould realize), and (4) destroy then. 
It is clear that Roquentin fs perception of the papers 
'themselves requires some elucidation before we can specu-
late on the origins of his behavior towards these objects, 
careful examination of the language Roquentin employs in 
-li-
ais description of the objects should provide us with some 
interesting and helpful data* Let us begin with an analy-
sis of two words, in particular* which seem somewhat 
striking in their specific contexts: "nerde" and "picri-
que" — the first because of its colloqui al i ty and scato-
logical significance, and the second because of its tech-
nical nature. 
Although Roquentin finds some of the papers "somp-
tueux," he remarks that they are "probablement salis de 
*erde." Whether they are, in fact, soiled with shit is 
difficult to determine, for the papers which Roquentin 
Picks up are often quite muddy. We know this because of 
t h e
 final clause of his description of the papers, in 
*hich he states: "puis j'essuie mes paumes rémoises de 
£°-UÊ. a un mur ou à un tronc d'arbre" (emphasis added)* 
Bu
"t regardless of the factual condition of the papers, Ro-
quentin at least thinks it probable that they have been 
shat on* Thus, we are supplied with a métonymie associa-
t l O R
 °n the part of the writer: mud > shit* 
Another association of Roquentin*s, although not 
nearly as evident as that of "nerde" and "boue," yields 
U r t h e r
 information* as we have already noted, it is the 
P a p e r s w
**ich are "somptueux" that are also "probablement 
s al " 
is de naerde." "Somptueux" is an adjective which is of-
en applied to food — "un repas somptueux," for example 
and this qualifier is quite appropriate for Roquentin 1s 
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pieces of paper, for he has already otentioned his urges to 
bring these objects to his mouth* In general* however? 
"somptueux" denotes something "qui a nécessité ie granffeg 
riéoepsesT qui est d'une beauté coûteuse « d'un luxe brl^-
JLâ&±" ( Le. Petit Robertt emphasis added)* Thus
 T its quali-
fication of an object as "bon à manger" is secondary to 
the principal use of the adjective "somptueux," referring 
"to an object which is both valuable and shiny. Like gold? 
Perhaps* Freud points out that the connection between 
gold and feces and, more generally* between money (i.e., 
the ver*y denotation of value) and feces is not unusual* 1 7 
The origin of this unlikely symbolic relation is found in 
what Freud believes to be the infant's attitude towards 
its own stool: 
They [the contents of the bowels] are treated as 
part of the infant's own body and represent his 
first 'gift': by producing them he can express 
his active compliance with his environment and, 
by witholding them, his disobedience. 1 6 
Thus, both oral and anal imagery are condensed in the no-
tion of sumptuousness. 
In conclusion, we note further that the adjective 
somptueux" is ultimately rooted in the Latin verb sumereT 
«eanin^ (in French) "prendre" or "employer" ( Lg. Petit Rofc-
1 ?
 e 
6 e e
 ©specially Freud's "Character and anal Erotism," in 
2^12. Ê ia jxdax l E d i t i o n o f t h e £gmplete . P s y c h o l o g i c ^ ] . 
^°-£&Ê o £ S i g n i n g Freud* V o l . IX, t r a n s . James S t r a c h e y 
(London: H o g a r t h , 1 9 5 9 ) . 
l g m u n d
 F r e u d , Three E s s a y s o_a HhS. Th?PrY Oi Sexuaj.} tY_T 
*
n
 I h £ SiâJia^rji E d i t i o n oj£ th& Complete P s v c h o t 9 g } f f t l 
£°-£ks_, V o l . VII ( L o n d o n : H o g a r t h , 1 9 5 3 ) , p . 1 8 6 . 
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ert )• Thus» in a rather extensive associative network of 
eating and excreting» excreting and eating» and valuation 
of that which has been discarded» "tout cela est bon à 
prençtre « " as Roquentin himself insists* 
The writer then poes on to describe a certain disco-
loring of the papers that he picks up during the sunnier 
and early fall. Here he particularizes and identifies the 
objects as "des bouts de journaux" — "remnants of • • • 
newspapers»" as Alexander puts it» 1 9 but which could also 
be rendered as "scraps of journals" (we shall need to turn 
our attention to this detail later — see below» p. 237» 
note #301). The papers have been baked by the sun ("le 
soleil [les] a cuits") and we note here another occurrence 
of the alimentary imagery» which began with Roquentin 1s 
mention of the urge to put the papers into his mouth and 
continued with his use of the word "somptueux." These 
scraps are "secs et cassants" ( u d r y and apt to break") and 
"si jaunes qu (on peut les croire passes à l'acide picri-
que." 
"L'acide picrique»" the Littre tells us» is a "mati-
e
**e tinctoriale d'un jaune d'or éclatant et que Lyon em-
ploie présentement d'une manière presque exclusive pour 
ses soieries." In addition to its use as a dye» picric 
a cid» a "bitter toxic . . . yellow crystalline strong 
acid" (Webster's Third flew Tptprpational) is utilized in 
See Lloyd Alexander's translation of the novel» Nausea 
(New York: New Directions» 1964)» p. 10. 
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the manufacture of high explosives and as an antiseptic. 
What is important about Roquentin's use of the term, for 
our present context, has to do with: (1) its color, and 
(2) its taste ("picrique," from the Greek pikros, meaning 
"bitter" ). 
The yellow tint of the papers is attributable both to 
a fading which comes with age and to the work of sunlight, 
which serves to hasten this process of aging* The connec-
tion appears quite clear, for Roquentin's remark about the 
cooking of the papers by the sun and his notation of their 
strong yellow color occur as segments of the same sen-
tence. These two elements are spanned by his mention of 
the papers1 dryness ("sees") and their resemblance to dead 
leaves ("comme des feuilles mortes") — the first qualifi-
cation referring to the sun's heat and the second to its 
aging effect. But the cause and effect relationship here 
nay not be so clear cut. Roquentin has already noted that 
there are papers which are "probablement salis de merde." 
How so? The possibility that these discarded scraps are 
soiled with human excrement seems unlikely, for the public 
streets and parks that Roquentin haunts are hardly appro-
priate places to find used "papiers hygiéniques." We can 
°nly presume that, if the papers are indeed "salis de 
*erde," the shit in question must come from dogs. It is 
a
°t only shit that may be found on discarded pieces of pa-
per, however. A dog will also pee on selected landmarks 
are 
:s 
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in the process of following another dog's scent trail, or 
Perhaps while marking out his own. In other words, if Ro-
quentin finds it probable that these pieces of paper are 
dirty with shit, then it is also probable that they 
dirty with urine, as well. Picric acid, known for iti 
staining capacities and bitter taste, then bears a dis-
tinct similarity to urine, and Roquentin's relating, 
through analogy, of the yellow of the papers to the yellow 
of the compound suggests another scatological network of 
associations. 
anny's "colères," then, are not surprising. Her ap-
parent disgust at Roquentin's little habit recalls the an-
gry reaction of a mother who scolds her child for picking 
up pieces of dirty trash with the usual admonition: 
Don't touch that! You don't know where it's beenl" It 
is understood that "where it's been" may be at the end of 
yellow stream of dog urine, if the piece of trash does 
not already betray some kind of excremental history. An 
even greater anger, admixed with horror, will result if 
the child makes any kind of gesture to bring the object to 
1 S ttou
*h* as children are prone to do ( "comme font les 
enfants"). 
With the advent of winter comes a corresponding 
ange in the state of Roquentin's dirty scraps. The ex-
crenaental imagery of the description gives way to a lan-
guage that betrays a symbolic undercurrent which is quite 
-16-
violent in nature. Gone are the sun-baked yellow pages of 
summer and early autumn. In their place are the quickly-
decomposing leaves of winter: "D'autres feuillets, l'hiv-
e r? sont pilonnés, broyés, maculés, ils retournent à la 
terre.» This description of rot and decay, however, is 
immediately superseded t>y the somewhat unexpected image of 
a
 ^
uiveritig, icy swan, desperately trying to escape the 
clutches of the muddy earth: "D'autres tout neufs et même 
glaces, tout blancs, tout palpitants, sont posés comme des 
cygnes, mais déjà la terre les englue par en dessous. Ils 
Be tordent, ils s'arrachent à la boue, mais c'est pour 
aller s'aplatir un peu plus loin, définitivement." 
The image of the dying swans is an interesting one. 
*e see first the figure of a poet who, either from age or 
a s a
 result of creative impotence, can no longer graceful-
*-y produce his elegant song, nor set himself aloft on the 
pure white wings of his melodic tune. 2 0 Moreover, the met-
aphor is reinforced by the literality of Roquent in 1s de-
scription, for some of the papers have been written on 
(the page torn from a student's notebook, for example, 
This image of the dying swan, which can no longer 
"prendre l'essor," is reminiscent of Mallarmé 9s çygpg 
in "Le vierge, le vivace, et le bel aujourd'hui...» — 
a figure of the poet who is likewise stuck in the mud: 
Tout son col secouera cette blanche agonie/ 
Par l'espace infligé à l'oiseau qui le nie/ 
Mais non l'horreur du sol ou le plumage est 
pris. 
See Stéphane Mallarmé, f>oés3 es (Paris: Gallimard, 
194F), p. 90. 
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*hich is described in Roquentin's next paragraph). There 
are also the scraps of newspaper, other vehicles for the 
written word. The ink of these texts, as the winter pro-
gresses, will become smudged and faded — the decline and 
subsequent disappearance of the poet 1s written production. 
B U T the appearance of the "cygne" in Roquentin's text 
Points to other associative paths as well (the "cygne" as 
signe")• Bachelard, for example, treats the image of the 
swan in the following manner: 
Le cygne, en littérature, est un ersatz de la 
femme nue. Cfest la nudité permise, c'est la 
blancheur immaculée et cependant ostensible. au 
moins, les cygnes se laissent voir! Oui adore 
^e cygne désire la baigneuse. 2 1 
Thus, the swan image which Roquentin associates with the 
cVt white papers reveals a somewhat unexpected aspect of 
the object's symbolic status. In a way, Roquentin sees 
his papers as nude, innocent women and he enjoys his pas-
iae with a kind of voyeuristic pleasure. Furthermore, we 
see the relation of the swan-as-poet to the swan-as-fcaj^-
S-ÊUSe., for, as Bachelard continues: 
L'image du "cygne" . . . est toujours un dégjr. 
C'est, dès lors, en tant que désir qu'il chante. 
Or, il n'y a qu'un seul désir qui chante en mou-
rant, qui meurt en chantant, c'est le désir sex-
uel. Le chant du cygne, c'est donc le désir 
sexuel à son point culminant. 2 2 
Gaston Bachelard, I » Eau et les rpves (Paris: Librairie 
José Corti, 1942), p. 50. 
Ifelçt. , p# 53. 
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The swan, then, is both the object of sexual desire — the 
re itself » and, thus, a condensa-
tion of two moments into what is necessarily a single 
drive: that is, there can be no desire without an object, 
and the sexual drive — both its component of desire and 
its object — is represented by the "cygne." The poet, 
ceaselessly sinking his melancholic song right up until 
the moment of his death, betrays in his swan song a double 
rocus for his desire as poet/swan, for he desires both the 
"cygne" (as female sexual object, as ftaigneuse) and the 
'signe,** and his wish to communicate the world and his re-
lationship to it through the use of language ( signes ) is 
Proportional to his wish to view a virgin Diana at her 
bath ("U femme nue," "la baigneuse," Le. cygne ). Suggest-
ed in the image of the swan, then, is both the desire to 
write and the desire of sexual possession, as well as the 
figure of the subject himself who seeks these goals. It 
is as if the subject wishes to be that which he desires. 
As we shall see, Roquentin*s selection of the swan meta-
phor to depict some of the papers he craves is indicative 
of the fundamental nature of his ideosyncratic preoccupa-
tion. 
The fate of the quivering paper swans is a cruel one. 
Unable to free -themselves, without great difficulty, from 
the lethal glue cf the muddy winter earth, they twist and 
turn and finally manage to tear themselves (literally) 
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from the clutches of their slimy captor, only to be flat-
tened out "définitivement" a short distance away. Later, 
they will become "pilonnés, broyés, [et] macules" as they 
"retournent à la terre." We note the violent nature of 
the first two participial adjectives: "pilonner — battre 
avec un pilon; fouler une étoffe" ( Lettré) and "broyer — 
réduire par !• écrasement en très menues parcelles" ( LJL±-
ine.). The papers appear to have been crushed by a pestle 
or pounded like a piece of cloth which has been fulled. 
They have, in fact, been "beaten to a pulp" like a book 
that has been "mis au pilon." A continuation of the 
swan-as-poet imagery is evident here, for a book which has 
been sent to the pulp mill has been deemed valueless and 
has thus been taken out of circulation — the words of the 
Poet have fallen on deaf ears and his "signes" decompose 
into valueless (i.e. their exchange value has, for all in-
tents and purposes, dwindled to nothing), inarticulate 
signifiers. The signifiers have become insignificant. 
The fact that the "papiers" / "cygnes" / "signes" are "ma-
cules" reinforces this latter interpretation, for the ink 
on the papers has run and now appears as blotchy stains: a 
text which is, perhaps, illegible and thus incomprehensi-
ble a signifier for which there can be no decipherable 
signified, nor even the possibility of one. The verb "ma-
culer" refers, more precisely, to the blurring of a text 
which results from a bad printing ( "to mackle" ). Accord-
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l n g t o t h e
 Ljttrj: "maculer — barbouiller, en parlant de 
feuilles d'imprimerie et d festampes. On macule un livre 
quand on le bat trop fraîchement imprimé." Once again, 
therefore, we note that Roquentin's choice of words indi-
cates a textual quality of the papers which he likes to 
Pick up. They are not just any papers — crumpled brown 
paper bags, sandwich wrappers, etc. — but papers which 
have been written or printed on. 
But, as Bachelard points out, the swan is also "un 
ersatz de la femme nue." Viewed from this perspective, 
the return to the earth of the quivering, white paper 
swans takes on a tragic connotation. The cold, naked wo-
man struggles in vain to free herself from the grasp of 
the sticky earth, a muddy creature which possesses her 
ï>*r en dessous." The woman twists and turns and momenta-
rily frees herself from the clutches of her assailant, 
only to be crushed, for good, a short distance away. The 
"blancheur immacu^fP" of the fresh and innocent "baig-
neuse" is now replaced by a form which is sullied: "pilon-
née," "broyée" and "maculée." She then "returns to the 
earth," as all corpses do. 
This reading of Roquentin's text, following the path 
of the extended metaphor suggested by Bachelard's swan, as 
naked woman, is reinforced by a description that occurs 
later in Poquentin fs journal. With hi6 existential crisis 
in its full fury, Roquent in finds himself unable to write 
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anything more about the Marquis de Rollebon» the subject 
of the historical text for which he has come to Bouvilie 
to do research* He steps out of his room, battling the 
madness of the ontological quandry in which he is trapped, 
and buys a newspaper ("un journal") in which he reads an 
account of the discovery of the body of a young girl who 
has been raped and strangled* Roquentin holds the paper 
and examines it, in much the same way, perhaps, as he ex-
amines the discarded papers that he likes to pick up from 
the ground: "Je roule le journal en boule mes doigts 
crispés sur le journal." 2 3 As for the victim: "On a re-
trouve son corps, ses doigts crispés dans la boue." 2 4 The 
body of Lucienne (the young girl) was found on the ground, 
in the mud, her fingers clenching the earth. Although in 
this case, it is the victim who is holding the ground, and 
not the other way around, we are reminded of the paper 
swans which "la terre . . . englue par en dessous. Ils se 
tordent, ils s1arrachent à la boue, mais c'est pour aller 
s'aplatir un peu plus loin, définitivement." What's more, 
Roquentin, in his panicked hallucinations, imagines one of 
Lucienne's fingers to be "maculé de boue," 2 5 thus re-uti-
lizing one of the three adjectives he has earlier associ-
ated with the dying paper swans. Finally, we note the 
2 3
 Sartre, Lô. Nausée « p. 130. 
2 5
 Ibid. « p. 130, emphasis added. 
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foilowing passage: 
Je marche entre les maisons, je suis entre les 
Biaisons, tout droit sur le pavé; le pavé sous 
mes pieds existe, les maisons se referment sur 
moi, comme l'eau se referme sur moi sur le papi-
e r eJl montagne oie cygne» je suis. 2 6 
Roquentin feels that the houses are closing in on him — 
l n m u c h
 *he same way as he closes his fingers on the news-
paper ( "gur le journal"), and closes his hand on papers in 
general ("fermer ma main s_ux eux," p. 22) — and he com-
pares this sensation to that produced by water, in the 
shape of a mountainous swan, which engulfs both him and 
the paper he is holding. The real paper, once signified 
y t n e
 metaphorical swan, has been separated from its sig-
nifier. This signifier, which at one time served to de-
pict the paper, disappears, only to return OVBT one hun-
dred pages later to haunt Roquentin, as the image of a 
mountainous and engulfing surge of water, itself a meta-
phor for the houses which threaten to close over him. The 
"cygne" seems to have taken off in flight; the signifying 
component of the "signe" has broken loose from its moor-
ings. 
and "tout cela est bon à prendre," declares Roquentin 
that is, the papers which are "lourds et somptueux," 
those which "le soleil a cuits, secs et cassants" and 
which are "si jaunes qu'on peut les croire passés à 1•ac-
ide picrique," those which are "pilonnés, broyés, ma-
Xfei$l. , emphasis added. 
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out culés," and lastly those "tout neufs . . . glacés, t 
blancs, tout palpitants» and «posés comme des cygnes.» 
"Tout cela est bon à prendre." We have thus far ex-
amined in some detail the nature of the "cela." fcoquentin 
6 e S t h e
 P°-Pers as dirty, decomposing objects. They are 
aiud-stained, but probably stained with shit (and perhaps 
urine), as well. They are discarded, discolored and macu-
e
 texts. They are white, pristine swans, poets and 
works, nude baigneuses on their way to an inglorious 
and perhaps violent death. There is an undercurrent, in 
oquentin's description, of anal and oral imagery, as well 
a sexual status for the papers, a sexuality which mani-
s itself as a voyeurism on the part of Roquent in. 
we must now take a glance at the "bon à prendre." If 
oquentin regards the papers in the manner we have sug-
gested, why does he want to handle them, bring them to his 
*outh and set them afire (if they are wet)? 
** aine beaucoup ramasser les marrons, les vieilles 
oques, surtout les papiers." It is the verb "ramasser" 
at Roquentin first uses to describe his activities with 
he found objects. It is also the verb he uses to denote 
action which he no longer feels free to perform, the 
negative verb which marks the "event" which he has hesi-
tated to mention: "Il
 n»y a pas grand-chose à dire: je 
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n'ai pas pu raaasser le papier, c'est tout." 2 7 
The Llttri provides the follorlng senses for the verb 
ramaaji<>r: 
1. amasser en y mettant soin et peine (seule nuance 
que mette la particule re. entre amasser et ramas-
ser ) 
2. prendre, relever ce qui est à la terre 
3. mettre ensemble ce qui est epars 
4« réduire le volume 
5. (fig.) réunir, rassembler pour quelque effort ou 
action 
^ ^ ^w-hiiitièie siècle 
6. s'est dit au commencement du dix n«* 
^A«*osse une personne que pour faire monter dans son carosse 
l'on rencontre à pied 
. i ***» « trouve dans 1 ' em— 
7. se charger d'une personne qu on a 
barras, dans la misère 
..oi mi* tint" le maltraiter 
8. (lig. et pop.) "ramasser quelqu un, 
de coups et de paroles 
« r*-f the "ramasser" of Ro-
Obviously, the primary sense oi 
^, . i^rr listed secondly in the L±tr 
quentin's text is the meaning lisxeo, 
^ t-^  ~r*ir\±& out that it is 
tX£. Ks Roquentin continues, he points 
r^^ i^i r emphasis added) and, 
Pleasant for him "de les prendre.' < empn 
^ _>« As is the case with 
clearly, the objects are fîfiX tgxrs.. 
«4«.Kt suspect a proliferation 
any signifier, however, we might S U S R 
.. ^ + w~ +^ «uffgest secondary connota-
of signification that tends to sugg**» 
2 7
 Ifeid., p. 22, emphasis added. 
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tions, as well. We recall, for example, that some of the 
papers are "pilonnés" and "broyés." Picking up one of 
these scraps, closing one's hand on it, would result in a 
kind of gathering together of a fragmentary whole. These 
Papers are disintegrating and may already be in pieces, 
out Roquentin's fondling, although it may ultimately con-
tribute to the papers' decay, is a temporary salvaging of 
the papers9 individual unities. Thus, the "ramasser" in 
this particular case suggests the third meaning given in 
t h e
 Littrg: "mettre ensemble ce qui est épars." What's 
more, given the dirty and unhealthy condition of many of 
the scraps and the quasi-tragic tone with which Roquentin 
^elates the fate of the paper swans, the first, the sixth, 
and especially the seventh connotations indicated in the 
kiilni seem to slip into the sense of Roquentin1s "ramas-
ser" as the paragraph develops. Indeed, Roquentin's atti-
tude towards the flotsam and jetsam that he picks up is, 
a t
 least for the greater part of the paragraph, more or 
l ess benevolent. It is apparent that he must handle the 
f u n d e d and crushed swan-like detritus with "soin et 
P e i n e " and that these papers, as dying swans, are certain-
l
^ "dans l'embarras, dans la misère." When we consider 
t h e
 undercurrent of sexual imagery and the fate of the 
nu<te virgin, fallen against the muddy earth, the "misère" 
o f
 the object which is "ramassé" is exacerbated. We might 
e v e n speculate that if Roquentin were a well-to-do member 
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of eighteenth century society, he would want to "ramasser" 
the rotting pieces with a kind of metaphorical carriage 
(indicating the sixth denotation in the Liiîxâ)» much to 
the chagrin of the regal Anny who would display, no doubt, 
des colères blanches" at such patent Samaritanism towards 
such foul and filthy rejects. 
But the latent benevolence of Roquentinfs description 
is not consistent, for it gives way rather abruptly to a 
destructive impulse: "d'autres fois je les déchire pour 
entendre leur long crépitement [the crackling, melancholic 
death rattle of the papers' swan song?], ou bien, s'ils 
sont très humides, j'y mets le feu, ce qui ne va pas sans 
peine." it is clear that Roquent in harbors an ambivalent 
attitude towards these objects. Such ambivalence, how-
ever, is quite consistent with the semantic shadings of 
*hat we have taken as the primary verbal signifier of the 
paragraph, for "ramasser," as the Llttré suggests, is an 
antithetical word. The eighth entry in the resume of 
meanings in the Littrg refers to a popular, figurative use 
o f
 "ramasser": "'ramasser quelqu'un,' le maltraiter de 
coups et de paroles." Thus, if we consider the verb in 
its most semantically pregnant form, we discover that in 
Picking up the broken and the miserable, we do so only to 
b e a t an<* insult them later. In other words, P.oquentin's 
Pleasure in picking up papers from the ground is indica-
tive of a wish to both caress and mistreat the objects. 
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The verbs "prendre" and "fermer" demand some consid-
eration as well, although both these actions are partial-
ly subsumed by the connotations of the initial verb, "ra-
masser*" A.s we have already discovered» the "prendre" in 
the phrase "il m 1est agréable de les prendre" functions 
primarily as a reinforcement of the apparent sense of "ra-
masser": "prendre, relever ce qui est à la terre" (the 
second definition of the Littre), But there is another 
sense of "prendre" that resounds through Roquent in»s whim-
sical arpe to put the papers into his mouth, through the 
qualifier "somptueux," and through the phrase "que le so-
leil a cuits." "On prend un repas," and the papers are 
certainly, at least in part, objects to be eaten. 
as far as the verb "fermer" is concerned ("de fermer 
«a main sur eux"), we note its apparent function of indi-
cating a "closing over," or an "enclosing." The papers 
are thus captured — or protected -- by the action of the 
hand which separates and closes them off from the outside 
world. in other words, this maneuver of grasping some-
thing firmly ("fermement") with the hand and enclosing it 
securely is, like the action of putting something into 
one's mouth, a form of incorporation. On takes 
("ramasse," "prend") something from the world and places 
it somehow within oneself, corporeally. Roquent in picks 
uo the papers which he finds in the world in order to hold 
them in his hand — in hL& world, as it is delimited by 
the body. 
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But Roquentin's pastime is not restricted to merely 
Picking up and closing his hand around the objects* In 
addition, he is sometimes on the verge of putting the pa-
pers into his mouth (or, at least* touching them to his 
lips): "pour un peu je les porterais à ma bouche, comme 
font les enfants." The somewhat disgusting aspect of Ro-
quentin's potential action reinforces the peculiarity of 
his o*f-beat habit. If we are to propose an explanation 
for Roquentin's oral interest in the soiled papers, it 
*ill be necessary to begin with an examination of the act 
itself, as a prototypical mode of behavior, without regard 
to the specificity of the objects that Roquentin desires. 
Then we shall better see what role the papers themselves 
p l a y in the manifestation of Roquentin's oral attitude. 
Oral activity, in general, can be traced back to the 
Prototypical scene in which the infant sucks from its 
bother's breast. This infantile paradigm provides the 
framework on which a great deal of oral behavior will lat-
e r
 be founded. Freud, for instance, describes an early 
example of the wish to "put things in one's mouth" in 
terms of an originary moment at the mother's breast. 2 8 
It is precisely at this moment, moreover, that infan-
tile sexuality (and, thus, sexuality in general) first 
appears. Freud's formulation of this theory on the or-
igin of sexuality is both crucial and controversial and 
*e should not skirt a discussion of its soundness and 
implications. V>e shall postpone, however, any consid-
eration of the pros and cons of Freud's position until 
the following chapter, which will be devoted extensive-
ly to the importance of this moment in Freud's text 
(and in the infant's development) and its ramifications 
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FreucMs example is that of "sensual sucking" f Wonnesaug^n^ 
iterally, "bliss-sucking"], in which the infant sucks on 
t S t h u n i b
'
 itss big toe, or on any other bodily part that 
is within reach: 
Thumb-sucking [gas Ludein opter Lutgçhen 3 appears 
already in early infancy and «ay continue into 
maturity, or even persist all through life. It 
consists in the rhythmic repetition of a sucking 
contact by the mouth (or lips). There is no 
Question of the purpose of this procedure being 
the taking of nourishment 2 Ç 
us, the act of sucking is a repetition of the more pri-
mal gesture of taking nourishment from the breast. This 
r
*-enactment of a moment of biological satisfaction is 
P easurabie and is akin to the pleasure-producing struc-
U P e s o f
 ail future sexual activity. As Freud points out: 
Sensual sucking involves a complete absorption 
of the attention and leads either to sleep or 
even to a motor reaction la the nature g_£ ajj. ox~ 
C&fiffi • • • No one who has seen a baby sinking 
back satisfied from the breast and failing 
asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile 
can escape the reflection that this picture per-
sists a_s_ & prototype g£ the ggpreggjop o^ gegual 
gajLJSfactfpp iû later l|fe. 3 0 
e
 infant normally chooses a part of its own body for the 
urposes of sensual sucking? and not an extraneous body or 
Ject# Not only is it more "convenient" to suck oneself 
n
 such a situation, but the choice of himself as object 
makes the baby "independent of the external world, which 
W l t h
 regard to our analysis of the text of Roquentin. 
^reurf, Three Essavs oji £fce_ Thepr.y 2i Se^ua^j t£,
 p p # 
30 
i£i£*t pp. 180,182 (emphasis added). 
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he is not yet able to control •,l31 as the infant matures, 
it will begin to choose its sexual objects — b o t h oral 
and otherwise — from among those which it finds in the 
external world and, if we may extrapolate from Freud's ob-
servation, these later activities will manifest the sub-
ject" s ability or attempts to control this "external 
world." 
The fundamental oral attitude may continue to mani-
fest itself throughout the subject»s life, although not 
necessarily in the form of the auto-erotic sensual sucking 
that we have Just now discussed. There is, however, an 
apparent aetiological connection between those children 
who are especially prone to sensual sucking and those 
adults who demonstrate what might be called an oral «dis-
position1»: 
It is not every child who sucks in this way. It 
may be assumed that those children do so in whom 
there is a constitutional intensification of the 
erotogenic significance of the labial region. 
If that significance persists, these same chil-
dren when they ^ow up will become epicures in 
kissing, will be inclined to perverse kissing, 
or, if males, will have a powerful motive for 
drinking and smoking. Iff however, repression 
ensues, they will feel disgust at food and will 
produce hysterical vomiting. The repression ex-
tends to the nutritional instinct owing to the 
dual purpose served by the labial zone. 3 2 
31 lkl£., p. 182. 
32
 Ibis*. 
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It is clear that a good deal of Roquent in1s behavior 
reflects certain oral tendencies, as Freud describes then* 
Although he is not a particularly avid drinker, smoker, or 
eater, it must be admitted that he is "inclined to per-
verse kissing," as his urge to bring the papers to his 
mouth indicates* This urge, however, is indeed merely an 
i n clin*t fl.pn« for this oral act is never really carried out 
a fact evidenced by Roquentin9s use of the conditional 
tense ("porterais" )• Roquentin's observation that such 
behavior is usually ascribed to children ("comme font les 
enfants") reinforces rather overtly the structural simi-
larity between his adult inclination and the infantile 
practice of putting objects into the mouth, a habit which 
is an obvious correlative of sensual sucking* Moreover, 
the fact that Roquentin restrains himself from mouthing 
the papers, coupled with his awareness that such behavior 
is infantile, indicates that, although tempted, Roquentin 
does not actually take the dangerous step into regressive 
mania — that is, a neurotic return to a time when in-
stinctual satisfaction was not yet governed by the reality 
principle» His resistance represents a crucial moment of 
conscious self-control that would tend to confirm any as-
sertion that Roquentin, although eccentric, is not crazy» 
fiis fear of disease or fear that his behavior would be so-
cially unacceptable (in Anny's eyes, at least) — both 
manifestations of the "reality principle" — are no doubt 
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responsible for the lack of the "peu" that would inspire 
Roquentin to actually bring the dirty papers to his lips 
and mouth. 
It is important to examiney as well, the reverse face 
of the affective coin which Freud strikes in his summary 
of the oral disposition. "If . . . repression ensues," 
Freud says, the individual "will feel disgust at food and 
*ill produce hysterical vomiting." Now, Roquentin is not 
hysterical and does not relate any instances of vomiting 
during the period in which he is keeping his Journal. He 
rfoes, however, feel nauseated fro» time to time and, al-
though this nausea is not directly related to a disgust at 
~ood, it is important to note that Roquentin1s reaction to 
an unsettling thought, a horrifying revelation, or a vis-
cous object takes the form of a negative oral attitude. 3 3 
The ambivalent tendencies of Roquent infs oral lean-
i n g s c a n
 °e further elucidated, if we take into considera-
tion Bachelard1s examination of such images in general. 
For Bachelard, the paradigmatic representation of an oral 
compulsion is to be found in the Biblical story of Jonah 
in the belly of the whale; any fascination with images of 
*'e should remark that at a later point in the text, to-
wards the end of his meal with the Autodidact, Roquen-
tin becomes nauseated while eating a piece of bread 
*'ith cheese. The origin of the nausea, however, is to 
he found in an amalgam of factors — the atmosphere of 
the restaurant, the words and face of the Autodidact, 
the inanimate objects at the table, the food Roquentin 
is chewing — and can be construed as an affective re-
sponse to the world as it appears from a certain point 
of view. 
O v. • 
swallowing and ingesting through the mouth are, then, con-
stitutive of what Bachelard terms the "Jonah complex": 
f,le complexe de Jonas est un phénomène psychologique de la 
deglutition.» 3 4 It is important to remark that it is only 
those images which represent something (or someone) being 
swallowed whole that Bachelard includes under the rubric 
of the Jonah complex* Chewing plays no part in this par-
ticular archetype: "Sous la forme digestive, l'image de 
Jonas correspond à une avidité d'avaler sans perdre le 
temps qu'il faut pour mâcher* Il semble que le glouton, 
anime par des plaisirs inconscients primitifs, retourne à 
*a période du sucking." 3 5 This distinction between chewing 
and sucking appears in Freud's text, as well, and serves 
to mark the definitive break between the nutritional in-
stinct and the oral sexual drive: "The need for repeating 
the sexual satisfaction . . • becomes detached from the 
need to take nourishment — a separation which becomes in-
evitable when the teeth appear and food is no longer taken 
in only by sucking, but is also chewed up." 3 6 Thus we see 
that Bachelard 1s Jonah complex, which "on pourrait consid-
érer . . . comme un cas particulier de sevrage," 3 7 is 
roughly equivalent to what Freud might term an oral fix-
Gaston Bachelard, Lfi. Terre et \es reveries du. r_ej£Q_s_ 
(Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1948), p. 144. 
3 5
 I&ig.t p. 155. 
F r e u d , Three E s s a y s pji t h e Theory fcl g e j W a l i t g f P* 1 8 2 . 
B a c h e l a r d , La. T e r r e e_£ l e s r é V e r i e s £tu £&&&&, p . 1 4 4 . 
-34-
ation: & disposition which concentrates itself on the 
»outh and lips as an erotogenic zone* 
Now, the wording in Roquentinfs text does not permit 
us to ascertain whether he would kiss, suck, swallow, or 
C h e w t h e
 Papers once he has brought them to his mouth* 
u
*t once again, the suggestive addendum "comme font les 
enfants" seems to label the activity as one which is based 
°n an infantile paradigm* Moreovert Roquentin's Journal 
a s
 a whole seems to confirm the existence of a Jonah com-
plex in the psyche of the writerf for its repeated in-
s ances of nausea (the result of a repression of the oral 
rtrive
» says Freud) serve to advertize the strength of the 
oral fixation, albeit a fixation which is unconscious* 
achelard, in fact, treats La. Nausée as a kind of exempla-
rV case of a proliferation of Jonah-in-the-whale imagery* 
a
^ling particular attention to Roquentinfs nauseous cri-
l s
 in the tramway — a scene in which a car seat takes on 
r & t h e r
 imposing existence in the eyes of Roquentin, who 
8 e e s i t
 as the upturned belly of a dead d o n k e y 3 8 — Bache-
I a r c
* maintains: 
Ce^livre [ L* Nausée ] porte le signe d'une fidél-
ité remarquable aux puissances inconscientest 
•erne lorsqu'il présente son héros Roquentin dans 
^e décousu des impressions conscientes* Ainsi * 
même pour un nauséeuxf pour un être qui ne veut 
*"ien avaler, pour un être qui souffre "d'un 
anti-Jonas,M il y a des ventres partout* 3 9 
38 
Sartre, La. Haj^e., p. 159. 
3 ç 
Bachelard, ta. Terre e_t ^es rêveries £u_ repps., P» 169. 
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Vith Bachelard1s closing words» we are reminded of the 
newspaper scene in which Roquentin reads the account of 
the rape of Lucienne* Houses threaten to close over both 
him and the paper like a mountainous, engulfing swan (see 
above, p* 22)* The paper swan which he used to hold now 
threatens to hold him, to "se referme sur [lui]" in an im-
age which is decidedly Jonah-esque: Roquentin is in danger 
of finding himself in the belly of a swanl Thus, the dia-
lectical movement of the metaphoric swallowing / swal-
lowed, which is indicative of the so-called "Jonah com-
plex," presents itself once again, this time in a latently 
sexual framework, for the swan, as we have pointed out, 
appears in Roquentin 9s discourse in the role of a tragi-
cally sexual figure to be possessed ("incorporated," if 
you will )• 
In summary, then, we might say that Roquentin1s urge 
to bring the papers to his mouth indicates an oral dispo-
sition on his part* This disposition is confirmed by its 
negative opposite: the nausea in which his anxiety is us-
ually couched* Moreover, this disposition is, at least on 
one level, sexual in nature — a point of view that is re-
inforced by the swan imagery which appears a few lines 
later in Roquentin*s description of his habit* Thus, the 
Papers can be seen as sexual objects in an activity which 
mimics the originary sexual act* The papers are sumptuous 
breasts which, "pour un peu," Roquentin would bring to his 
aouth "comme font les enfants*" 
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Before abandoning this discussion of Roquentin's oral-
relationship to the dirty scraps that he gathers, we might 
point out a possible connection between the oral aspect of 
the writer 1s disposition and his interest in "picking up" 
things in the first place* Returning to Freud's text, we 
note the following in regard to sensual sucking: 
A portion of the lip itself, the tongue, or any 
other part of the skin within reach — even the 
big toe — may be taken as the object upon which 
this sucking is carried out. In this connection 
a grasping-instinct fGreiftrlefrl may appear and 
may manifest itself as a simultaneous rhythmic 
tugging at the lobes of the ears or a catching 
hold of some part of another (as a rule the ear) 
for the sane purpose. 4 0 
Thus, although most of the time we grasp things for a par-
ticular purpose — that is, in order to "use" an object in 
the context of a task to be performed, or for some other 
specified end — grasping as a kind of aimless pastime 
*ith no apparent motive or meaning may, in general, be re-
lated to this primal Çrel-ftrieb to which Freud refers. 
After mentioning Anny 1s angry reaction to his filthy 
habit, Roquentin embarks on the season-by-season descrip-
tion of the papers that we have already examined. He then 
returns to his own behavior vis-à-vis the objects: "Quel-
quefois Je les palpe simplement en les regardant de tout 
près • . ." Although we may be tempted to regard the verb 
palpg r as «ore or less a synonym for toucher» it is impor-
tant to bear in mind the precise sense of the word. As 
4 0
 Freud, Three Essays ga the Theory Q£ Seyualitvt P* 180. 
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the Littpf gives it, paloer denotes: "Toucher avec la 
»ain, gtang I » intention de connaître" (emphasis added). 
The verb, therefore, indicates more than a mere touching 
and may be rendered most effectively in English by some-
thing like "to examine with the hands." 4 1 We see, then, 
that both Roquentin's touching and his looking at the ob-
jects signal a tendency to inquire about the nature or 
state of the papers that he holds, for both an examining 
*ith the hands "dans I1intention de connaître" and a close 
looking with the eyes suggest a sensual (i.e., "with the 
senses") investigation of the object in question. 
Freud speaks very little about the psychological 
aspects of touching. There is, of course, his mention of 
the "grasping-instinct" which we have cited above and, at 
an earlier point in the same text, he notes the role that 
touching plays in fore-pleasure: 
A certain amount of touching is indispensable 
(at all events among human beings) before the 
normal sexual aim can be attained. And everyone 
knows what a source of pleasure on the one hand 
and what an influx of fresh excitation on the 
other is afforded by tactile sensations of the 
skin of the sexual object. So that lingering 
over the stage of touching can scarcely be 
counted a perversion, provided that in the long 
run the sexual act is carried further. 4 2 
4 I 
Alexander translates "je les palpe" by "I • • • feel 
them," a rendition which is obviously sorely lacking 
the richness of the French phrase (see Nausea, p. 10). 
Freud, Three Essays oj* the Theory o_t Sexualityt P» 156. 
-38-
The sexual stimulus provided by the tactile sensations is» 
no doubt, ultimately related to the sensual arousal of the 
lips, which was originally triggered by the mother's nip-
ple and the flow of milk into the infant1s mouth» Freud 
does not make this connection clear» however» but rather 
moves on immediately to the question of the visual: "The 
same holds true of seeing — an activity that is ultimate-
ly derived from touching." 4 3 Once again, Freud is not ex-
plicit about the mechanics of this derivation, but a close 
examination of the lines which follow reveals a rather in-
teresting possibility. Freud maintains that it is the 
wish to see that which is concealed of the other1s body 
that prevents human sexual curiosity from becoming dor-
mant: "The progressive concealment of the body which goes 
along with civilization keeps sexual curiosity awake. 
This curiosity seeks to complete the sexual object by re-
vealing its hidden parts." 4 4 Thus, one of the ways in 
which the sexual drive manifests itself is through the de-
sire to have the o b j e c t s body revealed to the eyes of the 
subject who looks» The eyes are an erotogenic zone that 
is stimulated by the visual "touch" of the secret parts of 
the other's body. We might say, consequently, that sexual 
curiosity which takes the form of looking is "toucher avec 
1^£ ££&&, dans lfintention de connaître," a visual count-
4 3
 Xfeid. 
4 4
 1ÏLL&. 
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erpart to the tactile palpep. 
This sense of inquiry which Freud attaches to the ac-
tivity of seeing is elaborated further in the Three £s.-
SAXê» In small children, sexual curiosity appears as the 
desire to see the genitals of another: a driv^ which Freud 
terms "scopophilia" f Schaulust1. Now, although it is un-
derstood that some children will engage in certain I « 11-
show-you-mine-if-you111-show-me-yours games ( serving the 
dual function of providing satisfaction for both the sco-
pophilic and exhibitionistic desires which are common to 
young children), the only outlet for many children's voy-
euristic urges is to be found at toilet time: 
Since opportunities for satisfying curiosity of 
this kind usually occur only in the course of 
satisfying the two kinds of needs for excretion, 
children of this kind turn into voveurs» eager 
spectators of the processes of micturition and 
defaecation. When repression of these inclina-
tions sets in, the desire to see other peopled 
genitals (whether of their own or the opposite 
sex) persists as a tormenting compulsion, which 
in some cases of neurosis later affords the 
strongest motive force for the formation of 
symptoms» 4 5 
The excremental staining of the objects Roquentin 
collects is assumedly not human, but the associative simi-
larities between dog turds and human excrement are appar-
ent enough to provoke a kind of psychological oversight on 
the observer*s part. Now, Roquentin declares that some-
times "je les palpe simplement en les regardant de tout 
près." The Inquiring activity ot touching and looking 
*
S
 Ifcié., p. 192. 
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closely at objects which might be soiled with excrement, 
coupled with the image of the papers as swans and, conse-
quently, their associative status as nude women, suggests 
a metaphorical re-enactment of the childhood scopophilic 
moment as it is presented by Freud» Roquentin looks 
closely at the papers, as if they were nude women in the 
process of satisfying their excremental needs, in an ef-
fort to discover the nature of the female genitals. His 
inquisitive touching of the papers further substantiates 
this contention that Roquentin is mimicking a child doing 
sexual research. Although his pastime can hardly be 
termed a "tormenting compulsion," its possible connection 
with the childhood moment seems nonetheless evident. 
Moreover, Roquentin1s inquisitive activities with the 
papers can be regarded in the light of a notion that is 
even more general than that of the sensual / sexual re-
searches of children. Continuing his discussion of infan-
tile sexuality, Freud introduces the "instinct for knowl-
edge or research" r Wlss- £>££X F g T % a c h e r t r i et> ^ s 
This instinct cannot be counted among the ele-
mentary instinctual components, nor can it be 
classed as exclusively belonging to sexuality. 
Its activity corresponds on the one hand to a 
sublimated manner of obtaining mastery, while on 
the other hand it makes use of the energy of 
scopophilia. 4 6 
*
6
 Xfeld*» P. 194. 
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Thus, although sexual curiosity seems to enjoy a somewhat 
privileged status in Freud 1s thought, it is clear that 
there is also a drive to know and understand the world 
that can manifest itself independently of a sexual con-
text.*7 This drive (the Wisstrieb )« Freud explains as an 
attempt to obtain mastery (of the subject^ own immediate 
environment and condition, we should assume)* 
If we return for a moment to the idea of a grasping-
instinct f Greiftriep ] f we discover still another relation 
between the verbs palper and regarder. This urge to grasp 
things, we recall, may originate during the period of sen-
sual sucking. The infant, in an effort to satisfy what 
has become a sexual desire for its mother's breast, takes 
a portion of its own body to replace the absent object of 
its desire. Freud suggests that "in this connection a 
grasping-instinct may appear11 and that the infant's 
"rhythmic tugging" of its own bodily parts is part of this 
same effort to re-create, with its own body, the pleasure 
which it formerly enjoyed at the breast. Thus, we see 
that both sensual sucking and the grasping-instinct are 
attempts to master a situation* The child wants the sat-
isfaction of nursing, but there is no breast to suck on* 
Rather than remaining unsatisfied, the child tries to in-
This is not to say that the yj^strieb is totally inde-
pendent of Schaulust ( for the former finds its "energy" 
in the latter), but that the drive to know is indica-
tive of other informing factors, as well, and is thus 
not completely subsumed by the notion of scopophilia. 
-42-
vent a scheme, on his own, to obtain what his environment 
seems to be denying him. 
Now, if the grasping-instinct can be construed as a 
manner of obtaining mastery, then a structural relation 
between it and the instinct for knowledge appears: both 
are attempts to master and both are related to the sexual 
-rive. Furthermore, there is a linguistic relation be-
tween the greiftrieb and the Wjggtrieb» as well. The 
first element of Freud 1s neologistic compound noun, ffrei£-
irieb, stems from the verb greifen» meaning "to grasp," 
"to seize," "to take hold of." But in former times, this 
sense of the verb was stretched figuratively to mean "to 
comprehend," "to understand." This now archaic meaning of 
greifep is preserved in modern German in the word fregrejf-
SJkf a non-separable prefix verb in which echoes of the 
grasping, gripping grelfen can be heard. 4 8 Moreover, we 
note the slang term Greifer (detective, sleuth), which in-
dicates one who grasps in the sense of solving an investi-
gative puzzle through penetrating acumen and clever under-
standing. Thus, we see that a yjgstrieb is also a 
t fl^)greiftrjj^H and that the notion of seizing something 
*ith the hand provides a figurative base for the more ab-
*
8
 A similar relation exists between the terms fftssep and 
erfasgep- i n fact, the verb fassen itself can still 
mean both "to take hold of" and "to understand." The 
French verbs prendre and comprendre• and the double 
sense of the English "to grasp" suggest that this rela-
tion between physical grasping and intellectual grasp-
ing may be a more or less universal notion. 
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stract notion of seizing something with the mind. 
Roquentin seems to be running a gamut of vernal modes 
with regard to his activities with the papers, and these 
modes are apparently all related to the more primal act of 
taking the breast (if we take Freud's point of view to be 
correct)• Roquentin suppresses his urge to put the papers 
into his mouth (which would be a clear re-enactment of the 
breast-feeding moment) f but does pick them up in the first 
place (the s**asping-inst i net? )• Sometimes he examines 
them with his hands and eyes with the intention of discov-
ering something about their nature, an activity which may 
b e
 considered both as an off-shoot of sensual sucking (an 
attempt to master) and as a manifestation of the instinct 
*or knowledge (a relative of the grasping-instinct). Up 
until this point, then, Roquentin's activity is, at least 
on one level, a multi-faceted endeavor to master a situ-
ation in which something is lacking: the milk from his 
•other's breast. 
As an addendum to these findings, we might note two 
other points of interest. First of ail, there is the 
etymology of the verb paloer. As we have already re-
marked, this verb denotes more than a mere touching; rath-
e r? it conveys the sense of an inquiring tâtonnement with 
the hands. Its root is in the Latin verï> oaioare. meaning 
to stroke or touch gently" and, in the figurative sense, 
"to coax, flatter or wheedle" f Cassell's New Latin Djç-
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tionarv*- It is clear that the modern French verb has 
^^eredi somewhat in meaning from its Latinate ancestor* No 
longer does the word carry its connotation of coaxing and 
flatteringt nor has it remained immune from semantic de-
velopment of its own. The inquisitive aspect of the 
French palper was not present in the Latin verbf and the 
familiar uetloer de I * argent ( "to finger money" ) is cer-
tainly a modern innovation. 4 9 What is interesting, how-
ever, is the relation between the verbs pamper and fiajjii-
l£Xf with regard to their Latin origins. The Latin 
p a l pit^r?T the root of the French palpiter» was used both 
in the expected sense of "to move quickly, to tremble, to 
throb," but also as a frequentative of paloare (gftggell!g 
&ÊE Latin Dictionary). Thus, at their origin, the two 
French verbs can convey similar notions. 
"Quelquefois," as Roquentin maintains, "je les 
palpe," and some of these papers, as we recall, are "tout 
Palpitants" and "posés comme des cygnes." The palpitating 
Papers want to touch too, and we reminded of Roquentin1s 
later remark that the "objets, cela ne devrait pas 
*
9
 This second meaning, by the way, points to another 
sense of Roquentin's occasional handling of the papers 
*ith his hands. The objects, which are "probablement 
salis de merde," take on a certain value for him due to 
his unusual interest in them, and this sense of value, 
coupled with Freud's contention that excrement and mon-
ey are related, suggests that Roquentin "palpe les pa-
piers" like he would "palpe de lfargent" (he fingers 
the papers like he would finger money). 
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toucfrer-"50 Part of Roquent in1 s dilemma, it seems, both 
with regard to his inability to pick up a certain piece of 
paper and with regard to his uneasy state in general, has 
to do with the peculiar way in which objects seem to want 
to touch back. The papers-as-swans, "tout palpitants," 
threaten to "palper Roquentin (simplement I ) , " and later, 
after reading afeout the rape of Lucienne, Roquentin be-
comes terrifyingly aware of the metaphorical power of the 
swan, which threatens to engulf the "anti-Jonas," as he 
earlier woald have "pour un peu" put the paper swans into 
his mouth» 
Finally, there are Bachelard1s remarks on "la curios-
ité agressive" to consider. Aggressive curiosity is the 
term which Bachelard uses to define "la volonté de regartt-
e
** à !• intérieur des choses." 5 1 This visual curiosity cor-
responds, on the sexual level, to scopophilia and, on the 
intellectual level, to Freud fs wjggtrieb. According to 
Bachelard, the wish to see the inside of things "rend la 
v u e
 perçuntîT la vue pénétrante» Elle fait de la vision 
une violence. Elle décèle la faille, la fente, la fêlure 
Par laquelle on peut violer l£ yecret des choses ca-
chées. "52
 T h e 8 e x u a i innuendo that underscores Bachelard1s 
descriptive language is unmistakable, if not downright ex-
Sartre, l& tfaysçe, p. 23. 
5 1
 Bachelard, Le, Terre et les rgveries Sliè repogt P* 7. 
5 2
 LkJLsi», PP. 7-8. 
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P icit. "La curiosité agressive" is posited as a kind of 
visual rape, a looking which uncovers a fault, a slit, a 
crack through which the hidden secret of things can be vi-
ated. And Bachelard, like Freud, presents a paradigmat-
°
 i n f a
« t i l e scene to illustrate his proposition: "Et 
v
°ila l a curiosité de l»enfant qui détruit son Jouet pour 
a U e r V o l r
 ce qu'il y a dedans." 5 3 
Consequently, we see that Roquentin's scrutiny of the 
pers, at close range, may not be as innocuous as it ap-
pears at first glance. The violent fate of the papers-as-
n s , as we maintained earlier, can be regarded as a pre-
curing of the later scene of the newspaper description 
Lucienne's rape and of Roquentin's subsequent halluci-
n a t i o n s
 (see above, pp. 21-22). Roquentin's visual exami-
nation of the already "raped" papers — his "curiosité 
agressive" — not only adds to the violent aspect of the 
scription, but also places Roquentin in the position of 
nterested witness to a rape, a heartless voveur whose 
averse pleasure creates a complicity between himself and 
rapist. if
 w e return once again to the scene of the 
newspaper description, we note that Poquentin seems to be 
^e 11 
aware of a personal complicity in the rape of Lucien-
n e
'
 a
^though there is nothing in the journal as a whole 
which would confirm that he had anything to do with the 
*-êâi crime. Roquentin's position with regard to the vio-
ifeii. ,
 p# 8. 
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lated Lucienne is that of an onlooker: he reads the 
account of the crime on a piece of paper. Moreover, when 
the dying paper swan of the earlier scene takes its re-
venge as the mountainous, watery swan of the later scene 
("l'eau se referme sur moi . • • en montagne de cygne»), 
Roquentin finds himself identifying with the victim of the 
rape, as well as with the rapist — a dual role which is 
strikingly presented in the lines: «Je fuis, l'ignoble In-
dividu a pris la fuite, son corps violé. Elle a senti 
cette autre chair qui se glissait dans la sienne. Je 
• • . voilà que je . . . Violée." 5 4 
As for Bachelard's scenario of the child who breaks 
his toy in order to find out what's inside, we need only 
continue our examination of Roquentin's various activities 
with his scavenged papers in order to discover similar be-
havior on his part. "Quelquefois je les palpe simplement 
en les regardant de tout près," is followed immediately by 
"d'autres fois Je les déchire pour entendre leur long 
crépitement, ou bien, s'ils sont très humides, j'y mets le 
* j-.«. H Sometimes Roquentin is feu, ce qui ne va pas sans peine." w » e " 
_ ^ . 1 -„,* t.rtile examination of 
not content with a mere visual and tacxiut! 
the papers. He destroys them either by tearing them or by 
setting fire to them. Now, it is certainly not clear 
whether Roquentin breaks his "toys" in an effort to in-
quire into their inner nature, or whether he harbors other 
5 4 S a r t r e . hSL Nausée y p» 130» 
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«otives for his rather peculiar behavior. However, given 
Bachelard»s remarks on "la curiosité agressive» and his 
example of the destructive child, and given the juxtaposi-
tion in Roquentin's text of the two inquiring activities 
(the palper and the regarder) with the two destructive 
ones (the déchirer and the mettre Is. ££U ), it is certainly 
Possible that Roquentin's destruction of the papers con-
stitutes a somewhat bizarre manifestation of an aggressive 
SUL&sîxieJa. 
According to Roquentin, it is in order to hear their 
"long crépitement» that he tears the papers. This enig-
matic wish to hear the papers crackle seems, at first 
»n , i-i~ However» the auricu-
«Tlance, a bit difficult to explain. However, 
lar satisfaction that Roquentin derives from tearing the 
Papers does seem to fit, in some manner, into at least two 
associative chains of signification, *hich we are able to 
explicate. 
First of all, we note that the primary sense of the 
verb d l c ^ e x , as it is used by Roquentin, corresponds to 
the most common sense of the word as it is given in the 
Litlrl: "Mettre en pièces sans se servir d'un instrument 
tranchant.» There are two other meanings of dlcJOCfer., 
K^~, . J +. A l i aiv contaminâting the ap-
however. that may be surreptitiously cunt» 
, . ~+ WP note that the verb Parent sense of Roquentin»s act. we nox« 
can also be used in the sense of «déchirer quelqu'un à 
belles dents,- — that is, "en médire outrageusement" 
-4b-
wttrg.)» This verbally abrasive tearing recalls the fig-
r a t i v e
 splinter meaning of the verb ramasser that intro-
U C e s t h e
 Paragraph: " « ramasser quelqu'uûf1 le maltraiter 
e C o u p s e t
 <*e parolep" (emphasis added). As we pointed 
°
U t e a r l i e r
 (see above, p. 26), the antithetical sense of 
CfrMftgPfit announces the ambivalent nature of Roquentin's 
subsequent treatment of the papers, and the déchirer which 
appears in the latter part of the paragraph echoes this 
semantic prefiguring rather closely, at least on the level 
^he secondary figurative meanings of the two verbs 
ch slip into the paragraph's apparent context» And, 
w
 at»© more, this figurative echoing is precisely one of a 
leaning which functions on an audible level, for to mis-
r e a t
 someone with words and to slander < ^ d i r e ) someone 
are both attacks which can only work if they are tiejtCit 
°
r
* at least, understood — both rendered by entendu >-
U s
, we note a possible source for Roquentin's desire 
tQ Jentendre leur long crépitement," a "crépitement" 
which results from his tearing them ("son déchirement"). 
Secondly, it is important to take into consideration 
ttother sense of déchirer : "Causer une vive douleur phy-
ique" ( Littr£ *- Now, although such a meaning generally 
manifests itself on the figurative level (in an expression 
S U c h a s MÇa me déchire le coeur"), the jittré lists the 
sage "déchirer une blessure, la rouvrir, la rendre plus 
grande" —
 a n apparent conflation of the primary and fig-
-50-
urative meanings of the word* Recalling Bachelard's re-
marks concerning the violence of vision, an aggressive cu-
riosity which "décèle la faille, la fente, la fêlure par 
laquelle on peut violer le secret des choses cachées," 
and, furthermore, recalling the entire allegorical frame-
work which seems to underlie the paragraph — that is, the 
Papers as sexual objects which are violently assaulted — 
we discover that Roquentin's tearing of the papers func-
tions as another mode of symbolic rape. The tfeçhjreaeot 
that Roquentin performs can be construed as a tearing of 
the hymen of a virginal victim, the rape of a swan (as 
nude, innocent woman), an act which, of course, causes a 
"vive douleur physique." Furthermore, this sexual &£.-
chirgmQp-f i S f i n a s e n S € f the re-opening of a wound, for 
the already present slit of the vagina is pulled open and 
blood from the ruptured hymen flows from the "wound."55 In 
this case, the rupture is performed "sans se servir d•un 
instrument tranchant," for the real rape with a "trench-
ant" penis has been replaced by a symbolic rape in which 
Roquentin merely tears the papers with his hands. 
5
 This notion of the vagina as wound is suggested by 
Freud when he speaks of an attitude resulting from the 
castration complex — a theory according to which the 
female genitals are regarded as a "mutilated organ." 
See Sigmund Freud, "On the Sexual Theories of Chil-
dren," in liu» Standard Edition, Vol. IX (London: Ho-
garth, 1959), p. 217. 
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Às far as the "long crépitement" is concerned, once 
again, we can only understand it in the very general sense 
of the sound that is emitted by the object being torn. If 
we refer, however, to the later scene of Roquentin's reac-
tion to the newspaper description of the rape of Lucienne, 
we discover that such a general consideration of the 
"crépitement, " as something audible, contains so tue exeget-
ical validity. Roquentin tears the papers "pour entendre 
leur long crépitement." Later, when Roquentin»s identifi-
cation with the rapist gives way to a dual identification 
with both the rapist and his victiai, we find the follow-
ing: "Un doux désir sanglant de viol me prend par derri-
ère, tout doux, derrière les oreilles» les oreilles filent 
derrière moi." 5 6 It is as if Roquentin tlfefiXS. the desire to 
rape somewhere behind him, like an echo of the "crépite-
ment" which sounded the moment of his "rape" of the pa-
pers. But it is also as if Roquentin is fteing naj^eji, from 
behind, &£ the ears that race behind him. For Roquentin, 
the paper-tearer, the ears become an erotogenic zone. 
Later, it is the ears which punish him in his hallucinato-
ry reversal of the rape situation. 
But we have been overlooking the specific sense of 
the term crépitement. and a glance at the Li*tre reveals 
something that is a bit peculiar. The entry for crépite-
BlÊUi reads: "Action de crépiter, de produire une crépita-
Sartre, La. Nausée» p. 130. 
-52-
tion." Cross-referencing, we see that crépitpr denotes: 
"Faire un bruit comme de pétillement," the verb having its 
origin in the Latin crepi tare . a frequentative of creparg 
meaning "to creaky rattle, rustle, crack" ( CasselUa New 
k&tJLû Dictionary ). So far not so good — we have discov-
ered little more than a general crackling. But creoite-
DHÊal is actually a bit more specific, for a crepitation is 
* "bruit réitéré d'une flamme qui pétille, ou de certains 
sels projetés sur le feu" ( ^ ittré)• Thus, it seems that 
the paradigmatic sense of the noun çrfPfttement refers to 
the sound produced by a crackling flame» The crépitement 
of the papers being torn, therefore, resembles that of the 
papers being burned and, in fact, seems to announce this 
forthcoming activity. What's more, if Roquentin tears the 
papers "pour entendre leur long crépitement," perhaps it 
is because of the auditory similarity between the results 
of the two means of destruction — the tearing and the 
burning. Perhaps the tearing is a mere kindling of the 
more explosive situation which results when he lights the 
Papers: a sort of fiery foreplay. 
and what about Roquentin1s use of fire? Isnft it odd 
that the only papers he sets on fire are precisely those 
*hich are water-soaked ("très humides")? It is hardly 
surprising that such an endeavor "ne va pas sans peine." 
*hy does he engage in such a difficult enterprise which 
consists in both drying up and then destroying a damp, 
discarded object? 
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The idea of fighting water with fire rings false* It 
is a reversal of the commonly accepted (and scientifically 
logical) practice of fighting fire with water, a technique 
whose inversion leaves us with an apparently absurd propo-
sition. But we must not hasten to write off Roqruentin's 
eccentric habit as patently absurd* Its absurdity may 
only be manifest, for, as Freud points out, such reversals 
and shifting of terms are hardly foreign to dreams and to 
those psychological activities which akin to the dream 
mode (i.e., fantasies, obsessions, and the l i k e ) . 5 7 Nor 
a r e
 "they foreign to myths, and here it may be good to cite 
* mythic precedent for Roquentin's case. 
The myth is that of Heracles and the Lernaean hydra. 
The latter was a monstrous creature — a kind of water-
dragon — with several heads, one of which was said to be 
immortal. Heracles fought the hydra with his sword, cut-
ting off its heads one by one, but was unable to overcome 
the creature, since the hydra simply regenerated each of 
its severed heads. It was only by getting iixfc to the 
head that was believed to be immortal that Heracles suc-
ceeded in vanquishing his threatening adversary. Thus, 
the creature of water is subdued by fire. Freud cites 
this myth in conjunction with another Greek tale: the 
legend of Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods in or-
5 7
 0 
See, for example, the section devoted to absurd dreams 
in Freud's Interpretation of preams (New York: Avon, 
196S),
 p p # 461-481. 
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àer to brins it down to earth for the benefit of man» 
There is more than a thematic relation between the two 
myths, forf as Freud notesf it was Heracles who rescued 
Prometheus from his punishment of being chained to a 
boulder while a vulture constantly pecked away at his liv-
er* 
The Prometheus legend and the myth of the Lernaean 
hydra are discussed in one of Freud1s later essays, "The 
acquisition and Control of Fire.1' Freud maintains that 
Min order to gain control over fire» men had to renounce 
the homosexually-tinged desire to put it out with a stream 
of urine."58 Whether this presupposition is valid or not 
Is subject to debate. Nonetheless, the ensuing analysis 
of the Prometheus myth provides some interesting and, per-
haos, important considerations with regard to the interac-
tion of fire and water and their symbolic relation to 
aspects of human sexuality. At the risk of entering into 
a
 lengthy digression, it may be worth our while to examine 
"the fundamental elements of Freud1 s analysis of the two 
myths, for the bizarre nature of £oquentinfs pyromaniacal 
interest in water-soaked papers will require a somewhat 
extended and carefully considered exegesis» 
Sigmund Freud, "The Acquisition and Control of Fire," 
in The Standard Edition» Vol. XXIII (London: Hogarth, 
1964), p. 187. 
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Freud's hypothesis concerning man's overcoming the 
desire to urinate on flames can be confirmed, says Freud, 
through an interpretation of the Prometheus legend* In 
the myth, there are three elements in particular which 
draw Freud's attention: "the manner in which Prometheus 
transported the fire, the character of his act (an out-
rage, a theft, a defrauding of the gods) and the meaning 
of his punishment." 5 9 It seems unusual, first of all, that 
Prometheus transports the pilfered flames in a hollow 
stick. The "fennel-stalk" is an obvious paradigmatic rep-
resentation of the hero's own penis, in which one would 
expect to find urine — a means of quenching fire. But 
Freud points out that if "we remember the procedure of re-
versal, of turning into the opposite, of inverting rela-
tionships, which is so common in dreams and which so often 
conceals their meaning from us," then such a contradiction 
is quite understandable. 6 0 Secondly, it is important to 
note that through this theft, Prometheus steals something 
from the gods and this defrauding, in analytical terms, 
can be seen as a crime against the instincts: "the id 
• • • is the god who is defrauded when the quenching of 
fire is renounced." 6 1 Thirdly, Freud remarks that the na-
ture of Prometheus1 punishment betrays another inversion, 
5 ç
 Xfcip:*
 f P. 188. 
6 1
 lh±d., p. 189. 
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or reversal. The liver was, in ancient times, regarded as 
the corporeal source of passion and desire. What better 
punishment, then, for a perpetrator of a crime of passion 
than to have his Liver consumed relentlessly by a hungry 
pecker?i Of course, according to Freud, Prometheus1 crime 
consists in precisely the opposite — his is a crime of 
renunciation of an instinct. Why, then, the reversal? 
Well, if, through all its distortions, it [the 
Prometheus legend] barely allows us to get a 
glimpse of the fact that the acquisition of con-
trol over fire presupposes an instinctual renun-
ciation, at least it makes no secret of the re-
sentment which the culture-hero could not fail 
to arouse in men driven by their instincts. And 
this is in accordance with what we know and ex-
pect. We know that a demand for a renunciation 
of instinct, and the enforcement of that demand, 
call out hostility and aggressiveness, which is 
only transformed into a sense of guilt in a lat-
er phase of psychical development. 6 2 
Freud goes on to observe that the heat generated by a 
fire recalls the sensation one feels when in a state of 
sexual excitation; moreover, the shape and movement of the 
flames suggests "a phallus in activity." Freud concludes: 
One of the presuppositions on which we based our 
account of the myth of the acquisition of fire 
was, indeed, that to primal man the attempt to 
quench fire with his own water had the meaning 
of a pleasurable struggle with another phal-
lus. 6 3 
Thus, the instinct which is renounced in man's acquisition 
and control of fire is a homosexual one* 
6 2
 UkLé*f PP* 189-190. 
6 3
 UllsL* t P- 190. 
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It is important to note the slippery nature of 
Freud's argument* for» in fact, his conclusion is the re-
sult of what may be sleight-of-hand. although Freud 1s hy-
pothesis is not inconceivable and may indeed be valid* our 
attention is drawn to the second element of the Prometheus 
myth. Freud maintains that the "god who is defrauded when 
the quenching of fire is renounced" is instinctual life 
itself: the id. forking» however, in this symbolic realm 
of interpretation, we cannot help but notice the omission 
of a quite common analogy — that of god as father. Using 
Freud's own terminology, we miçht agree that if primitive 
man did indeed have to overcome an instinctual urge to ur-
inate on flames in order to control fire, then to him "the 
attempt to quench fire with his own water had the meaning 
of a . . . struggle with another phallus." This struggle 
way not necessarily have been "pleasurable," however, as 
Freud maintains, even though it was instinctually motivat-
ed. Couldn't we also theorize that for Prometheus, the 
appropriation of the flames of the gods for his own use 
and for the benefit of his fellow men, and the subsequent 
concealment of those flames in his own phallus, represent 
a power struggle between father and son for certain "wa-
tering" rights? 
*ith the introduction of the tale of the hydra into 
h i s text, and with a concluding comment about the rela-
tionship between the urinary and sexual functions of the 
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penis» Freud 1s analysis points the way to an elaboration 
of this alternative reading: of the Prometheus myth which 
we are suggesting. This reading runs roughly as follows. 
What Prometheus stole from the gods was fire — an arche-
typal representation of the phallus* This fire he stored 
in a hollow stick — his own penis* Prometheus was pun-
ished for his transgression against the gods (and against 
Zeus» in particular — the giver of the law» the Father) 
bjr having his liver» the Seat of Passions» eaten away by a 
bird of prey* Nonetheless» Prometheus had managed to 
bring fire down to earth and it could then be utilized by 
mortals for their own benefit» in spite of the gods* Now 
in possession of stolen property, man must be on the alert 
for subsequent threats to his phallic fire» in the form of 
a kind of symbolic castration by the original owner of the 
pilfered flames* 
It is at this point that the myth of the Lernaean hy-
dra comes into play» a myth that» according to Freud» 
"seems to correspond to a reaction of a later epoch of 
civilization [i.e., post-Promethean] to the events of the 
acquisition of power over fire." 6 4 The hydra» having 
"countless flickering serpent1 s heads»ff displays an over-
whelming» phallic status* At the same time» being a crea-
ture of the water» the monster is a castrating figure» for 
it has the power to extinguish fire (the phallus)* In a 
6 4
 Xfeié.t p. 192. 
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wayT then? we may regard the presence of the hydra as the 
revenge of the gods, who threaten to douse the very fire 
which has been stolen from them* The threat is overcome, 
however, and the monster is subdued through an inversion 
of the normal extinguishing capacity of water over fire: 
Heracles wields his phallic fire, more powerful than the 
sword, and eliminates his watery threat. In the style of 
Bachelard, we shall term such manifestations of the over-
coming of water by fire the hvdra complex» 
Finally, we note that "Heracles was also the deliver-
er of Prometheus and slew the bird which devoured his 
[Prometheus 1] liver." 6 5 Thus, Prometheus is freed from the 
duty of expiating his crime through the strength of Hera-
cles and of those others who now have the power of fire 
under control. It is evidently this pardoning of Prome-
theus which constitutes the fundamental "reaction of a 
later epoch of civilization to the events of the acquisi-
tion of power over fire," the result of a growing "sense 
of guilt" (as Freud puts it) on the part of man, the 
myth-maker, for his earlier punishment of Prometheus. 
Now, although Freud posits a homosexual instinct as 
that which is renounced in man's acquisition of fire, an-
other instinctual renunciation seems more likely. For if 
the theft of fire by Prometheus can be connected with the 
overcoming of the desire to put out the fire with a stream 
6 5
 Ibiot. 
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of urine» and if this mortal crime against Zeus is 
regarded as a crime of passion, then mustn't the instinct 
in question ultimately be sexual and the crime in question 
ultimately be one that is forbidden by the father? 
\s Freud points out in Totem aji<i faboo • the scenario 
which depicts both a crime against the father and the re-
nunciation of an instinct is that of the primal horde* at 
a certain mythical point in the history of man» a group of 
brothers rises up and murders the father who» until then, 
had exercised exclusive property rights over all the women 
in the clan. But the crime having been perpetrated, the 
brothers must renounce the satisfaction of their sexual 
urges, which they are now free to pursue. This restric-
tion of their instinctual freedom is a result of a certain 
identification which they have come to have with the mur-
dered father. Because of this identification, the broth-
ers: (1) feel guilty about their crime and have qualms 
about possessing their booty, and (2) realize that they 
cannot aJJ, take the place of the father and must therefore 
devise and observe a system of restrictions for their sex-
ual urges. 6 6 
How is it , then, that man's acquisition and control 
of fire recalls the behavior of the primal horde? Return-
ing to Freud's essay on Prometheus, urine, and fire, we 
note the following observation in the article's concluding 
6 6
 Sigmund Freud, Totem Qjxd JafrPP* in IHS. Stftftctarrf Bgl-
liûût Vol. XIII (London: Hogarth, 1958), PP- 141 ff. 
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paragraph: 
The sexual organ of the male has two functions 
• • • It serves for the evacuation of the blad-
der , and it carries out the act of love which 
sets the cravings of the genital libido at rest* 
The child still believes that he can unite the 
two functions* According to a theory of his» 
babies are made t>y the man urinating into the 
woman's body* 6 7 
The structural similarity between urination and ejacula-
tion? reinforced by the unconscious impetus provided by a 
childhood intuition? indicates that the instinct which is 
renounced in the acquisition of fire is not a "homosexual-
ly-tinged desire to put it out with a stream of urine," 
but the symbolic equivalent of the desire to urinate: the 
desire to ejaculate* Man steals the phallus from the gods 
— from the Father — and must subsequently renounce the 
spoils of his crime by allowing his own fire to burn with-
out being quenched* Man acquires control of fire because 
fill his desire to murder the Father and the resulting feel-
ings of guilt which are bound up with this wish. 
Before returning to Roquentin's text, it may be pro-
pitious to turn our attention for a moment to Bachelard1s 
remarks on the Prometheus myth, a point of view which both 
reinforces and extends our own reading of the tale* 
Bachelard finds it difficult to believe that man 
"discovered" fire through a proto-scientific process by 
which the primitive inventor reasoned that, if two sticks 
or flints were rubbed together for an adequate period of 
6 7
 Freud, "The Acquisition and Control of Fire," p. 182. 
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time, a spark would be produced* Nor does Bachelard think 
it likely that man would have attempted to harness the vi-
olent blazes of "natural" fire (e.g., the fire produced by 
a tree which has been struck by lightning, or the spectac-
ular flames of an erupting volcano) in an effort to pre-
serve this phenomenon for his own use» In the face of 
these natural manifestations of the element of fire, it is 
more likely that primitive man fled in terror. No, ac-
cording to Bachelard, the "two stick theory" of man 1s ac-
quisition of fire is the more promising, but not, however, 
for the scientific reasons which have often been postulat-
ed. In the words of Bachelard: "il faut reconnaître que 
le frottement est une expérience fortement sexualisee." 6 8 
Thus, the scenario of the primitive man / genius, in the 
throes of a utilitarian compulsion to improve the lot of 
mankind, sitting in a field and patiently rubbing one 
stick against the other in the far-fetched hope that he 
mi<çht be able to light a spark and consequently acquire 
the means to produce, by and for himself, a fire in front 
of which to warm himself and his family» over which to 
cook food and dry his clothes, and to put to who knows 
vhat other marvelous uses . . • this scenario of a poor, 
but industrious neanderthal who was no doubt ridiculed by 
his fellow clansmen and scorned by the clanswomen (except 
*or the one patient and compassionate cavelady who stood 
6 8
 Gaston Bachelard, La. p- r rhf»™lvse gUi £ Ê U (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1938), p. 53. 
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by him and loved him in spite of his apparent insanity) 
must give way to the less ennobling scene of a primitive 
man sliding one stick up and down in the groove of an-
other» lost in the bliss of a sexual reverie, and playing 
out the mechanics of his fantasy by reproducing the frofr-
£ agg ot one body against the other» generating an arousing 
heat through a friction reminiscent of that produced dur-
ing intercourse and, finally, creating a fire-producing 
spark at the climactic conclusion of the frictional fore-
play. Man's acquisition of fire, then, is the result of a 
simple toy and the childish game of reproducing metaphori-
cally that which is lacking to him at the time. The prac-
tice is essentially onanistic, although evidently an ex-
tension of previous sexual experiences with others. 
Bachelard concludes: "Prométhée est un amant vigoureux 
plutôt qu fun philosophe intelligent et la vengeance d&s 
dieux est une vengeance de jaloux." 6 9 
On closer examination of his text, however, we dis-
cover that Bachelard has altered somewhat his position on 
the status of Prometheus* It is, in fact, in his initial 
chapter that Bachelard posits the notion of f,le complexe 
cte Promêthée." It is not uncommon for a child to encoun-
ter a rather strong prohibition against playing with 
matches and with fire in general: "Le feu est donc init-
ialement lfobjet d'une jnt?rtf* Ç t i o n générale d'où cette 
6 9
 IkU., p. 54. 
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conclusion: l'interdiction sociale est notre première 
connaissance générale sur le feu. Ce qu'on connait cl • a-
bord du feu c'est qu'on ne doit pas le toucher." 7 0 The pa-
rental admonition, "Don't touch that firel" then provides 
a kind of archetypal structure for the more general "Don't 
touch that!" In fact, as the child gets older, a trans-
gression of any social taboo is likely to meet with the 
threat of a short- or long-range punishment by fire (and 
brimstone): "Don't touch (do) that4 You'll be burned (in 
hell)!" 
Bachelard continues: 
Dès lors, puisque les inhibitions sont de prime 
abord des interdictions sociales, le problème de 
la connaissance personnelle du feu est le prob-
lème de la désobéissance aptrojte. L'enfant veut 
faire comme son père, loin de son père, et e 
même qu'un petit Proroéthée, il dérobe des allu-
mettes. Il court alors dans les champs et, au 
eux d'un ravin, aidé de ses compagnons, il 
nde le foyer de l'école buissonniere-
cr 
fonde le foyer 
This strategy of a "clever disobedience" of the father's 
law in an effort to achieve a personal knowledge of that 
which the father forbids, this desire to "faire comme son 
pére," is what Bachelard terms the Erfrtnethettg ç^aelÊ*. 
U m o s t immediately, however, Bachelard warns his reader 
not to jump too quickly to a sexual reading of his scenar 
io: "Il ne faut d'ailleurs pas se hater de confondre ce 
complexe de Prométhée et le complexe d'Oedipe de la psy-
7 0
 Ifrjd., p. 28. 
7 1
 l&ld.» P- 29. 
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chanalyse classique." 7 2 Bachelard assures the reader that 
he will undertake an examination of the sexuality of fire 
in a later chapter (the one, apparently» in which he dis-
cusses nan's acquisition of fire), but he is* at this 
point, careful to maintain that the Prometheus legend is 
fundamentally a myth of man's "volonté d'intellectualité": 
Nous proposons donc de ranger sous le nom de 
complexe de Prométhée toutes les tendances qui 
nous poussent à savoir autant que nos^peres, 
plus que nos pères, autant que nos maitres, plus 
que nos maîtres • . . Si l•intellectualité pure 
est exceptionnelle, elle n'en est pas moins très 
caractéristique d'une évolution spécifiquement 
humaine* Le complexe de Prométhée est le com-
plexe d'Oedipe de la vie intellectuale.73 
Thus, Bachelard leaves unexposed the sexual undertones of 
his scenario of the "little Prometheus," in which the 
child steals what his father has forbidden him to touch, 
takes it to the hollow of a valley and, presumably, plays 
with it ("aidé de ses compagnons"), while he plays hooky 
from his formal education in order to establish a private 
school "in the bushes" where he pursues another kind of 
knowledge — that of fire . . • «^d of sexuality 
Bachelard's conflation of the sexual drive and the 
"volonté d'intellectualité" (the gjsptrjeb) under the ru-
bric of the "complexe de Prométhée" is not surprising. As 
we discovered earlier, there seems to be a clear relation-
ship between sexual curiosity on the part of the child, 
7 2
 Ifrid., pp. 29-30, 
7 3
 X k i ^ t PP. 30-31. 
-66-
the grasping-instinct, and intellectual curiosity. The 
common denominator of these three modes of inquiry (exami-
nation through the eyes, examination with the hands, and 
examination by the mind) is their shared context of being 
attempts at mastery of a situation. Furthermore, we note 
that Bachelard 1s second Promethean scenario — the one de-
picting primitive man playing with a pair of sticks — 
also suggests a desire to master a situation. The caveman 
wishes to reproduce a sexual experience g|ftftpnoric&Hy» 
because (we might presume) the conditions of repeating 
literally the sexual experience are lacking to him at the 
time. Thus, he invents a kind of sexual novelty item with 
which he can pacify himself: an adult toy. The fire he 
produces is an analagon of the fire in his loins. The 
flame, for him, signifies sexual desire. It is a phallus. 
"S'ils sont très humides, J'y «ets le feu, ce qui ne 
va pas sans peine.» Ending our circuitous digression, we 
return to Roquentin's text with a re-stocked arsenal of 
analytic material. Those papers that will not emit a 
"long crépitement" when torn — that is, those which are 
"très humides" — are set afire by Roquentin, "ce qui ne 
va pas sans peine." Roquentin struggles to light the sog-
gy scraps that do not tear properly (in an auditory 
sense). We are reminded of Heracles' struggle with the 
Lernaean hydra, in which the cutting power of the sword 
had to be replaced with the burning power of a flame be-
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fore the watery creature could be subdued» Roquentin1s 
"hydra complex" indicates an aggressive emancipation of 
his Promethean urges from the threat of a fizzling* watery 
dousing (we recall that it was Heracles who freed Prome-
theus from his punishment )• But what threat do these wet 
papers pose for Rogaentin, the Promethean? 
What Roquentin does, essentially» is play with fire. 
His attitude towards the papers and his activities with 
them serve no utilitarian ends. Like Bachelard1s primi-
tive man with the two sticks, Roquentin is re-enacting a 
sexual situation through the metaphorical medium of the 
flaming matches. Such an interpretation, moreover, is 
consistent with our reading of the sexual undertones that 
pervade the rest of Roquentin 1s description of his activi-
ties with the papers. As we have discovered, the papers 
as quivering, icy swans are the objects of Roquentinfs 
oral desires, palping, scopophilic scrutiny and subsequent 
metaphorical rape. Now Roquentin is sparking a hot flame 
with which to heat and eventually violate the structural 
sanctity of the wet papers. Furthermore, we detect traces 
of Bachelard's "petit Prométhée" in Roquentin's pyromania. 
"Comme font les enfants," Roquentin likes to pick up 
dirty, discarded objects which, with a little encourage-
ment, he would bring to his mouth. This behavior, as we 
remarked earlier (see above, p. 15), is in violation of 
the parental warning: "Don't touch / play with thatl You 
-6 8-
don't know where it's beeni" Bachelard suggests that the 
child's curiosity about fire provides the basis for future 
curiosity which will also meet with a threatening prohib-
ition: "Don't touch / play with thatl You'll be burnedl" 
Thus, Roquent in is re-enacting the childhood scenario of 
the little Prometheus who steals fire from the father in 
order to examine and question its nature, and subsequently 
play with it, "aidé de ses compagnons." In spite of the 
parental prohibitions concerning dirty scraps of paper and 
matches (and one 1s own sexual organ), Roquentin will han-
dle these objects nonetheless, for his paper-picking habit 
is a manifestation of both a general curiosity and a sex-
ual curiosity, as well. "Le complexe de Prométhee est le 
complexe d'Oedipe de la vie intellectuale," as Bachelard 
maintains. 
But Roquentin's transgression of the prohibition con-
cerning the touching of dirty things and his playing with 
matches — the violation of another childhood taboo are 
not isolated incidents. They are interrelated, because 
Roquentin sets fire to the thing which is forbidden (if it 
is wet). They are, in fact, interrelated in a structural-
iy similar manner to the way in which the Prometheus myth 
and the story of the hydra are related. We recall that 
the myth of the Lernaean hydra is a tale in which the 
emancipating hero, Heracles, combats and subdues the crea-
ture which embodies the gods' retaliation for the crime of 
-69-
Prometheus. And what might this retaliation be, in gener-
al, for the subject who manifests a Prometheus complex, 
who touches that thing which is forbidden him, who steals 
the phallus from the father? 
Castration, of course* As Freud points out, male 
children are often threatened with this horrifying punish-
ment i-f they do not renounce the urge to touch and play 
with their penises, their "fire," as it were — their 
phallus: 
The effect of this "threat of castration1 is 
proportionate to the value set upon that organ 
and is quite extraordinarily d^ep and persis-
tent. Legends and myths testify to the upheaval 
in the child 1s emotional life and to the horror 
which is linked to the castration complex a 
complex which is subsequently remembered by con-
sciousness with corresponding reluctance. 
For this reason, the male child will often refuse to admit 
the total absence of a penis in the female genitalia, 
maintaining that the little girl does have a penis, but 
that it is "still quite small." 7 5 But regardless of this 
comforting theory, the sight of the female genitals and 
their conspicuously absent penis still constitutes a ter-
rifying reminder that what the little boy has to play with 
can be taken away if he is not good. 7 6 
7
* Freud, "On the Sexual Theories of Children," p. 217. 
7 5
 LhisL* f P* 216. 
7 6
 Freud d e a l s e x t e n s i v e l y w i t h c a s t r a t i o n i n two c a s e 
h i s t o r i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r . See t h e " A n a l y s i s o f a Pho-
b i a i n a F i v e - y e a r - O l d B o y , " i n Ifcfc gtançtarg EtfitiSLEt 
V o l . X ( L o n d o n : H o g a r t h , 1 9 5 3 ) , PP* 3 - 1 4 9 , a s w e l l a s 
"From t h e H i s t o r y o f an I n f a n t i l e N e u r o s i s , " i n Xfce. 
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But what is there specifically in the image of the 
hydra which suggests that the threat in question is that 
of castration? On a simple level, we might propose that 
the hydra, being a creature of the water, menaces the 
wielder of fire with its extinguishing power. If we throw 
water onto a flame, the flame disappears; metaphorically 
speaking, if we throw water onto the flame as phallus, the 
phallus disappears. Such an analysis, however, although 
it explains the nature of the threat, does not explain how 
it is that a watery threat can be overcome by fire. How 
is it that water is "doused" by Heracles1 fire? 
At this point, it will be helpful to recall another 
study of Freud's — that concerning the Medusa's head — 
in an effort to neutralize the paralyzing effects of the 
apparent absurdity of the hydra complex. In this short 
essay, Freud remarks, first of all, that the head of the 
Medusa has been separated from its t>ody and that there is 
an obvious structural similarity between decapitation and 
castration. 7 7 Thus, the sight of the Medusa's head recalls 
the female genitals and their apparently missing penis; 
consequently, the Medusa's head is horrifying because its 
B e r e
 Physical appearance reminds the onlooker of the 
threat of castration. The meaning of the Medusa's head is 
Stantfartf Edition. Vol. XVII (London: Hogarth, 1955), 
PV>* 3-124. 
7 7
 Sigmund Freud, "Medusa's Head," in Xh£- StftntfftTrf ££1" 
Ï-Umf Vol. XVIII (London: Hogarth, 1955), PV 273-274, 
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complicated, however, by the hair» which is usually 
represented in the form of snakes* If we take the head to 
be a figuration of the female genitals, then the Medusa's 
hair will be regarded as pubic and surrounding the area 
which is marked by the absent penis. But the snakes lead 
Freud to an interpretation that denotes both presence and 
absence in the vaginal symbol: 
It is a remarkable fact that, however frighten-
ing they [the snakes] may be in themselves, they 
nevertheless serve actually as a mitigation of 
the horror, for they replace the penis, the ab-
sence of which is the cause of the horror. This 
is a confirmation of the technical rule accord-
ing to which a multiplication of penis symbols 
signifies castration. 7 8 
Furthermore, what is to be feared, literally, in regard to 
the Medusa's head is its capacity to turn whoever looks 
upon it to stone. Once a^ain, Freud notes the reassuring 
Phallic imagery of the myth, for "becoming stiff means an 
erection.» 7 9 The myth, then, is a tale in which a subject 
is threatened with castration at the sight of the female 
genitalia. The threat is countered, however, when the 
subject "stands up" to the threat through a proliferation 
of phalluses, as well as through his own stiffening. 
There is a strong resemblance between the head of the 
Medusa and the Lernaean hydra. The Medusa's decapitated 
state and its hairy appearance suggest the female geni-
tals; the hydra's watery environment and consequent threat 
7 8
 ikii-t P* 273. 
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to the phallus as fire make this monster a creature of the 
vasçina. The Medusa's hair» as snakes, mitigates the ter-
ror of the observer by displaying itself as so many penis-
es at what is precisely the locus of the phallic absence; 
the hydra's "countless, flickering serpent's heads" serve 
the same function* In turning to stone, the observer 
stands up to the Medusa; in wielding fire — another phal-
lic image — Heracles overcomes the threat of the hydra. 
Roquentin's hydra complex is, thus, a means of reas-
surance against the threat of castration. The papers bear 
little resemblance to a hydra, nor do they appear at all 
like a Medusa, but they are wet, they probably emit a 
musty odor because of their indefinite period of soggy de-
cay against the earth and, what's more, they represent wo-
men whose genitalia are exposed (i#e., the papers as 
swans / as b a i g n e W f f h In other words, the wet scraps 
constitute a vaginal image, rather than a phallic one. 
Unlike the hydra and the Medusa, however, there seems to 
be no detectable multiplication of phallic images associ-
ated with the papers, which would serve to create an af-
fective ambivalence with regard to the object and, thus, 
neutralize its threat. Roquentin's only defense seems to 
be the flame with which he lights the objects of his sca-
venging urges. 
We might add one last observation concerning this 
menace of castration, which the papers seem to pose. Ear-
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lier we concluded that Roquentin1s close visual examina-
tion of the scraps recalls the prototypical childhood sco-
pophilic moment: the youngister sneaking a peak at a member 
of the opposite sex who is urinating or defecating (see 
aboveY pp. 39—40). The papers1 occasional status as swans 
/ nude women, in addition to the probability that some of 
the papers are soiled with piss or shitf suggested such a 
hypothesis. Now, if in fact Foquentin's interested scru-
tiny of these objects recreates this instance of scopophi-
lia, then it is likely that a fear of castration will 
arise as well, for if Roquentin is mimicking this form of 
childhood sexual inquiry, then what he must discover first 
and foremost about the nude woman • s body is the absence of 
a penis. He strikes the match in self-defense. 
••Puis j'essuie mes paumes remplies de boue a un mur 
où à un tronc d'arbre." There is nothing unusual about 
Roqueotin's final act. After handling the dirty scraps 
that are the objects of his eccentric pastime, Roquentin 
wipes off his hands before turning his attention back to 
more mundane activities. As we remarked earlier (see 
above, footnote 15, pp. 8-9), the fact that he sometimes 
chooses "un tronc d'arbre" against which to wipe his palms 
provides the paragraph with a certain spiral structure, 
because, we recall, it is with chestnuts ("les marrons") 
that Roquentin commences his description, only to abandon 
these objects almost immediately in his text. The tree 
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that appears at the end of the paragraph, then, could very 
well be a chestnut tree, if we assume that Poquentin 
stalks chestnuts in the same area where he picks up pa-
pers* 8 0 
The meaning of the wiping, itself, seems rather 
straight-forward, although there is at least one flicker-
ing connotation which shadows the verb's primary sense, 
given the specific context of "j'essuie mes paumes." The 
Littré furnishes us with the following entries for e_s_aiiy.-
ex: 
1. oter l'eau, l'humidité, etc. en frottant 
2. sécher, en parlant de l'action du soleil, du vent 
3. oter une tache, un enduit 
4. subir, supporter, souffrir 
Roquentin's palms are "remplies de boue" and it is osten-
sibly for this reason that he is wiping them: a conflation 
of the first and third meanings in the LittC&« But 
act of cleaning one's hands is reminiscent of Pilate's 
washing of the hands — a scene so mythically important 
that its sense survives even today in both the French and 
English expressions: "se laver les mains de quelque 
8 0 The "mur," as well, seems to have some s i « ° ^ c " ^ ; 
but its interest lies outside the frame of •»'£•••»* 
considerations. We might remark in passing, however, 
that a wall — like the chestnut tree in Là tL&ttS&e. 
is destined to play a primary role in the ^ * e r a r ^ 
world of the novelist, Sartre, as both the title of a 
short story and the name of the collection of tales in 
Y+ A «= against these objects 
which the story appears. It is aïttiI ...... rfi^ tv 
that Sartre's heroes will attempt to clean "their dirty 
hands" ("leurs mains sales") of existential guilt. 
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chose," "to wash one's hands of something»" Roquentin re-
moves his spots of mud, the marks of sin on his hands, 
for, if our understanding of his pastime is at all cor-
rect, he cannot help but experience some feeling of guilt 
with regard to his handling of the papers. As we have 
seen, Roquentin 1s description of his habit functions as a 
metaphoric prefiguring of the scene in which he reads the 
journalistic account of the rape of little Lucienne, a mo-
ment at which he is seemingly punished by the same swan he 
used to covet as a discarded scrap. Furthermore, Roquen-
tin is re-enacting a childhood transgression of a parental 
prohibition, a breaking of the Father's law, and a corre-
sponding sense of guilt must manifest itself. Thus, the 
fourth definition of essuyer — "subir, supporter, souf-
frir" — echoes through Roquentin1s text, but in an up-
ended form. Roquentin suffers a guilt which sullies his 
being in much the same way that the mud dirties his hands. 
In cleaning his hands ("en s'essuyant les mains"), he at-
tempts to unburden himself of the guilt which he suffers 
("la culpabilité qu'il essuie")t but, as the series of 
meanings of the verb suggests, the cleaning and the suf-
fering may not be completely separable and we wonder 
whether Roquentin's contrition may not resurface elsewhere 
in his journal. As we shall see, it does. 
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We have now completed the first stage of our examina-
tion of Roquentin«s eccentric behavior with dirty scraps 
of paper* This seemingly marginal moment in Roquentin's 
two hundred pages of journal writing is quite rich in ana-
lytical material and provides a productive clue to the 
puzzle which is the writer's psycho-ontological dilemma. 
We have undertaken a kind of "psychanalyse des choses," 
drawing more or less on Freudian theory to expose what may 
be the psychological undercurrents of Roquent in1s actions. 
The papers are marked with mud, shit, and perhaps urine. 
They suggest both poetry and rape, and they are, for Ro-
quentin, toys to be played with. "Comme font les en-
fants," Roquentin is trying to master a world of situ-
ations which are somehow just out of reach of his grasp, 
his understanding. Picking up the papers, he can hold the 
world in his hands, feel it out, gaze at it, and even de-
stroy it. But the dirty papers are, of course, nothing 
more than a childish substitute for that which is only too 
real and which is lacking. It is * game of to-have and 
to-have-not that Roquentin is playing» 
In order to classify the role which the paper game 
Plays in Roquentin's personality as a whole and in his 
struggle with a real, contingent world over which he is 
losing control, we shall need to take a glance at the phe-
nomenological facet of "existential psychoanalysis" and 
its relation to the Freudian point of view which has, so 
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far, been so enlightening* An intermingling of the two 
theoretical stances — Freud's and Sartre's — will pro-
vide us with a kind of psychoanalytic ontology with which 
to re-examine Roquentin's unusual practice of handling 
discarded papers, as well as the second moment of his de-
scription: his inability to pick up a particular scrap of 
paper — a fragment of a written text, a weather-beaten 
pa?e which re-announces the theme of the swan / poet and 
the fate of the writer. We turn now to the problem of be-
ing and desire* 
Chapter II 
TO KAVE AND TO BE 
Although Roquentin 1s scavenging does not result in 
the actual collection and storage of the detritus he 
gleans from 3ouviile*s streets and parks, the diarist's 
peculiar penchant for dirty paper can be regarded nonethe-
less as a kind of appropriation, or at least an attempt at 
one. The scraps are thus, in a sense, the objects of Ro-
quentin's desire, objects to be possessed. The ramifica-
tions, as well as the very validity of this hypothesis, 
are not readily apparent. It is clear that, in closing 
his hand over the object, Roquentin is mimicking a corpo-
real appropriation of the thing he is holding — that is, 
although he is not actually incorporating the object, he 
is at least making a gesture along those lines hy taking 
the object in££ the hollow of his hand. Swallowing the 
object, an act he might perform with a little encourage-
ment, would be a more effective and true means for Roquen-
tin to appropriate the papers. It is not at all clear, 
however, how Roquentin1 s mere handling of the objects, his 
gazing at them, and, finally, his destroying them can be 
construed as acts of attempted appropriation, or more spe-
cifically, as gestures that mimic corporeal appropriation. 
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Moreover, the general sense of the notion of appropriation 
the taking or using of an object as one's own — does 
not seem to apply in this casef except in a rather margi-
nal way. Although it is true that Roquentin ••uses" the 
objects, his attitude towards them is hardly one that a 
propriétaire takes towards his property» As we have al-
ready pointed out, Roquentin is not a collector. What, 
then, is this idea of appropriation to which we are refer-
ring? 
Sartre himself furnishes us with a wealth of thought 
with regard to the notion of appropriation. His position 
is fundamentally phenornenologi cal and ontological and not 
at all psychoanalytical, although, as we hope to demon-
strate, the latter point of view tends to substantiate and 
extend Sartre's ontological conclusions. Conversely, we 
shall try to show that Sartre's speculations tend to pro-
vide a further groundwork of data for the theoretical con-
siderations of Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis. 
We shall not attempt any kind of long and careful ex-
egesis of Sartre's presentation and discussion of the no-
tion of Being and its relation to Nothingness, which pre-
cedes his examination of appropriation and its role in 
ontologically-^rounded desire. Such endeavors have al-
ready been undertaken in works devoted exclusively to Sar-
tre's principal philosophical text itself, and these sec-
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ondary works should be consulted for further elucidation 
of the rather lengthy and complex considerations put forth 
in L1 Etre £t le. néant. 8 1 Our own resume of the lengthy 
propaedeutic that comprises the greater part of LlEiELÊ. e_i 
Le néant, and which culminates in a discussion of the on-
cological gesture of appropriation, would necessarily be 
sketchy and insufficient. We shall thus limit our scope 
to the key conclusive moments in Sartre1s work which are 
most useful for the present study. 
As we maintained in the preceding pages, Roquentinfs 
relation to his papers can be understood in the sense of 
four modes of activity: touchingt seeing! eating and de-
stroying. Furthermore, these four categories can be sub-
sumed under the rubric of playing and, as we shall demon-
strate in the following pages, under the more general 
rubric of appropriation. Let us begin with a considera-
tion of the act of touching. 
"Les caresses," Sartre maintains, "sont appropriation 
<*u corps d« Autrui. " 82 The caress, a sensual touch, appro-
priates the body of the Other. Although the objects that 
Roquent in fondles are not "Others" efeT ft&t given that they 
***e inanimate and have no consciousness, they do seem at 
81 S e e , f o r e x a m p l e : J o s e p h C a t a l a n © , L ggWBWlTftTy fii 
4^ûr£&uJL S a r t r e ' s "ge jL M fi^£ Eftthl nffness" ( New York. 
Harper and Row, 1 9 7 4 ) and W i l f r i d Desan , I i l£ T r a g i c LL' 
GJLU ( C a m b r i d g e : Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 4 ) , b o t h 
o f w h i c h p r o v i d e s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d and i n t e l l i g e n t r e a d -
i n g s o f S a r t r e ' s main a r g u m e n t s . 
8 ? 
Sartre, L fEtre et le néantt P* 459. 
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least to perform a symbolic role for him as swans, poets? 
nude woien. We shall thus begin with an examination of 
the concept of the caress, and then demonstrate its possi-
ble extension from the flesh of p-jrhers t o t n e surface of 
non-conscious things: a connection which Sartre does not 
make directly, but one that is certainly implied and ren-
dered possible when we take into consideration some of his 
general observations regarding appropriât!ve strategies* 
How and in what sense is the caress an appropriation 
of the Other's body? First, it is important to keep in 
mind that "les caresses" do not constitute a "simple con-
tact" with the Other's body. They are purposeful acts 
with a certain end in mind: "C'est que la caresse n'est 
pas simple effleurement: elle est fflgpnn?ment< E n c a r e s ~ 
sant autrui, Je fais naître sa chair par ma caresse, sous 
mes doigts. La caresse est l'ensemble des cérémonies qui 
incarnant Autrui.» 8 3 Thus, the caress as fftÇpnneBeQ* is a 
kind of crafting, a shaping, an act which is creative and 
akin to the making of a work of art. The finished product 
in this case is the flesh aii£ flesh of the Other, for in 
response to the objection that the Other's body is already 
incarnated ("in the flesh"), without the intercession of 
the lover's caress, Sartre points out that this assertion 
is not exactly true: 
3
 ifeie* 
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La chair d'autrui n'existait pas explicitement 
pour moi, puisque je saisissais le corps et» Au-
trui en situation; elle n'existait pas non plus 
pour lui puisqu'il la transcendait vers ses pos-
sibilités et vers l'objet. La caresse fait naî-
tre Autrui comme chair pour moi et pour lui-
même* 8*
 w 
That is, for myself as well as for the Other, as c_o_u-
ap^Wneaafifit the flesh as in-itself of the Other is not 
revealed as such except through the caress, because prior 
to the caress the Other, as he/she appears in situation 
that is, as an object that is relevant to my projects, 
that plays an active role in the drama which is my con-
scious life), is revealed as being-for-itself, the being 
of consciousnesses Sartre continues: 
• • • la c a i s s e révèle la chair en déshabil-
lant le corps de son action, en le scindant des 
possibilités qui l'entourent: elle est faite 
pour découvrir sous l'acte la trame d'inertie — 
c'est-à-dire le pur "étre-là" — qui le sou-
tient. 86 
Thus, the caress is an attempt to realize the Other as 
pure, untranscended being: an attempt to grasp the Other 
*s being-in-itself through an "ensemble des ceremonies qui 
incarnent Autrui." The subject-who-caresses plays the 
r o l e of a n
 Anti-Pygmal ion who shapes and fashions an Oth-
e r f w n o i s
 already conscious, in an effort to create a 
84
 laie. 
To be precise, it is not only by means of a caress that 
the body, as flesh (as the facticity of consciousness), 
is revealed to the for-itself. Pain, for instance, re-
sults in a similar revelation. 
Sartre, k'Etçe. ej£ le néant, p. 459. 
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statuesque being that will be no more than a mere fleshy 
object» 
But for what reason does this anti-Pygmalion desire 
to strip the Other of his freedom through the creativet 
incarnating gesture of the caress? We should note that 
the tactile caress is a "façonnement" that is undertaken 
through the contact of the subject's flesh with that of 
the Other: 
Ainsi la revelation de la chair d'autrui se fait 
par ma propre chair; dans le désir et dans^la 
caresse qui l'exprimet je m1incarne pour réalis-
er l'incarnation ct'autrui; et la caresse en £e_a.-
U s a n t lf incarnation de l'Autre me découvre ma 
propre incarnation; c'est-à-dire que je me fais 
chair pour entraîner l'Autre à réaliser BOUX Êtti 
et^oour moi sa propre chair et mes caresses font 
naître pour moi ma chair en tant qu'elle est, 
pour autrui» chair le tP-lsant afrîtrt- £ 1^ 
szhSLlr..87 
In other words, the desire to caress the Other the de-
sire for the Other as it expressed through the caress 
is a wish for the incarnation of the Other iû flrrf?r tuô^ 
the subject realize his own incarnation. Possession, 
then, in the sexual sense, must be seen as a "double in-
carnation réciproque," and this double reduction of both 
Self and Other to mere corporeal materiality is the aim of 
a desire which would reify consciousness itself: "Ainsi, 
dans le désir, il y a tentative d'incarnation de la con-
science. "86
 T h e anti-Pygmalion wants to sculpt a woman 
8 7
 Ibid. , p. 460. 
86
 l&±â. 
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into an inert, fleshy statue in an effort to freely reduce 
his own being to an effigy stripped, of freedom» 
Desire, then, at least as it is manifested through 
the caress, is a wish to appropriate the Other's body in 
order that this appropriation reveal to the subject his 
own body as flesh* Furthermore, this revelation of one's 
own body as flesh, says Sartre, reflects an attempt to in-
carnate, to reify consciousness itself — both one's own 
and that of the Other. 
Touching, of course, is not the only means by which 
one can caress the Other. Sartre also speaks about a car-
ess with the eyes and, in fact, seems to posit both touch-
ing and sight as privileged modes with regard to the vari-
ous empirical tendencies which manifest desire. We note 
the following comparison between grasping with the hand 
and caressing with the eyes: 
• • • en prenant et en c_axÊ£S£Oi ** a a i n d e ] \ ~ 
Autre, Je découvre, sous la orgh?ng i o& ^ u e ceXX* 
main est d'abord, une étendue de chair et d fos 
qui peut être prise; et, pareillement mon regard 
caresse lorsqu'il découvre, sous ce bondissement 
que sont d'abord les Jambes de la danseuse, l 
étendue lunaire des cuisses. Ainsi la caresse 
n'est aucunement distincte du désir: caresser 
a 8 9 
des yeux ou désirer ne loot qu un. 
When the subject perceives the flesh of the dancer's 
thigh, the Other, who until this point has appeared as be-
ing-in-situation (viz., as beine a dancer), now appears as 
body through a visual revelation of her flesh ailfc flesh. 
8 9
 XbJjî-» P. 459. 
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She is at this moment, for the perceiving subject, no 
longer a person dancing} but flesh to be caressed. The 
subject becomes aware of his own body as flesh, and the 
troubled state which accompanies this awareness — which, 
in fact, i£ this awareness — is described by Sartre as an 
"empâtement de la conscience, ,,9° a kind of pasty con-
sciousness which is indicative of the fluid freedom of the 
for-itself, now oozing through the thick facticity of the 
body, which consciousness has to exist. 9 1 The in-itself 
invades the for-itself* How such an ontological condition 
is to be construed as desire is a question we shall deal 
with later in this section» 
Of course, Roquentin is in fact fondling and ogling 
disçaro;e,d paper and not the flesh of an other. In stand-
ing by our earlier analysis of his interest in the scraps, 
we can submit that the papers rTPrgP c n t t h e * l e s h o f a n 
other, but this assertion is admittedly a bit shaky when 
we try to relate the handling of paper to the caressing of 
a human body (the game of pretend to the real activity). 
There is something in common, however, between Roquentin's 
urge to touch inanimate objects and the desire which mani-
fests itself in the caress of the Other. Both acts can be 
9 0
 Ib|tf., p. 460. 
9 1
 Sartre uses the verb exister transitively to indicate 
the manner in which consciousness encounters its xac-
ticity — that is, the body. Consciousness, as gtre r 
pour-soi» finds its free and limitless capacity to 
transcend phenomena hampered by the solid, patpabte 
en-soi to which it finds itself «attached. 
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understood as attempts to possess, and both the papers and 
the Other are then seen as objects-to-be—possessed. This 
structural connection between the two acts is further elu-
cidated, if we recall that through the caress the subject 
tries to incarnate the Other, to strip the Other of his/ 
her possibilities by neutralizing the transcendant force 
of the O t h e r s consciousness y by reducing its freedom in 
situationt and thereby causing the Other to appear as mere 
flesh, being-in-itself. Furthermore, this act is carried 
out in an effort to realize one's own Self as en-goj 
through the cutaneous mediation of the Other. The inani-
mate object, on the other handy is already in-itself and 
it is not necessary for the subject to try to undermine 
any transcendance on the part of the object in order for 
that object to be revealed as being-in-itself beneath the 
subject's touch. The inanimate object can be possessed as 
is, without the ontological conflict between two con-
sciousnesses that invariably grounds the aim of the car-
ess. Thus y we can conclude that the subject strives to-
wards the same goal — an appropriation of the object as 
being-in-itself — whether he chooses to caress the body 
of the Other or to handle an inanimate object la tXxs. BAB.-
O^r ojf a. caress (that isf in handling the object for the 
sole purpose of handling it, and not in an effort to tran-
scend the mere being-there [gtre-lÀI of the object towards 
some utilitarian possibility: the grasping of a hammer in 
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order to pound a nail into a wall, for instance, can hard-
ly be construed as a "caress" of the hammer). 9 2 Roquen-
tin's touching of the papers, as well as his looking at 
them, can thus be understood as variants of the caress. 
Before setting aside our discussion of the caress, we 
should note that Sartre himself makes the leap between the 
desire for the Other through possession and the desire to 
possess an inanimate object. This equating of the two 
drives, although not carried out in terms of the caress, 
is at least maintained in terms of appropriation in gener-
al: 
Il se fait à propos de tgtfte, possession la 
synthèse cristallisatrice que Stendhal a < * e c ~ t e 
pour le seul cas de l'amour. Chaque objet pos-
sédé, qui s'enlève sur fond de monde, n a n x f e * * e _ 
le monde tout entier, comme la femme aimee m 
feste le ciel, la plage, la «er qui l e n t o u ^ 
aient lorsqu'elle est apparue. S'appropr 
objet, c'est donc s'approprier le monde symboli 
quement• 9 3 
-, , , + i **> rtfhich confers on the 
Stendhal's notion of frîF + ftl1**atioa ( w n i c n 
+^* lover1 s pre-amorouB 
beloved the power to transform the to y e i 
* .> which the beloved be-
perception of the world into one in whicn 
w ^r+pnded to all objects 
comes its informing center) can be exxen 
* +*<> object's utility. 
9 2
 This distinction on the basis of the J
 e c h o e d i n 
in so far as our projects " • J " ™ ™ ^
 ready-to-hand 
the Heideggerian d i s t i n c t i ° n / ^ ( voxb^n^Êa): the (£Eh,anden) and the present-at-band < ï a i ^ ^
 & g 
former is applied to an object that ^ object that 
equipment ( Z&MS. > » the latter ^ f e r S ^
 i n . i t s e l f ). 
is perceived as merely being " t h* r e
 g e e M a r t i n Heid-
For more on the example of the hamm ,
 r r i e a n d E d -
esger, Being &£& XÀJBS.» trans. John
 l 9 6 2 ) , p. 98. 
ward Robinson (New York: Harper and Kow, 
9 3
 Sartre, L'Etre ej. iê. olilLtt P« 6 8 6 # 
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possessed, announces Sartre. In appropriating an object, 
the subject appropriates the world as it is signified 
(symbolized) by the subject's relation to that object. 
Thus, it remains for us to determine how it is that 
the subject's attempt to realize himself as flesh by means 
of the visual and tactile caress is related to this at-
tempt to "s'approprier le monde symboliquement" of which 
Sartre speaks. It is towards an understanding of this 
latter endeavor that our examination of Roquentin»s behav-
ior now proceeds. 
We have already observed how the predicates "regard-
er" and "palper" are both informed by a certain "drive to 
know." This Wiss- oder Frrgchfrtrieb. according to Freud, 
is powered by "the energy of scopophilia" and is, at the 
same time, a "sublimated manner of obtaining mastery" (see 
above, Ch. I, p. 40). The interest in acquiring sexual 
knowledge, an urge which can be understood as the paradig-
matic case of the more general HgPtrJefrt is mainly mani-
fested in the form sax rTT--"-""»• 0± satisfying sexual cu-
riosity: scopophilia f s ^ n l u s t ) , the wish to &&S. the body 
of an other "in the flesh." Thus, the drive to know is 
intimately related to sight, and sight, in turn, is "an 
activity that is ultimately derived from touching" (see 
above, Ch. I, pp. 40-41). Furthermore, the "drive to 
grasp" (Greiftrieb) — denoting, in the Freudian corpus, 
the infantile urge to grab things (especially parts of the 
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infant*s own body) — reveals both another "manner of ob-
taining mastery, " as well as the semantic shading of the 
drive to grasp / understand / comprehend. Consequently, 
the Grelftr|efr is structurally parallel to the yjggtrjeb 
(see above, Ch. I, pp. 42-43). We concluded, therefore, 
that both "regarder" and "palper" are subsumed by the more 
general verbal category of "connaître," and that this 
knowing itself is an empirical manifestation of the more 
primary desire to obtain mastery over a situation: a 
situation which is always characterized t>y the absence of 
the mother's breast (see above, Ch. If P* 43). In conclu-
sion, then, we can add that the desire to know indicates a 
certain hunger on the part of the subject, and that eat-
ing, like seeing and touching, not only plays a functional 
role in the overall strategy that expresses an attempt at 
mastery, but also occupies a privileged position in this 
plan, for it is the need to take nourishment as a newborn 
infant that is at the origin of the subjects subsequent 
ventures to master a given situation» 
For Sartre, knowing is a form of appropriation. To 
understand such an assertion, it is first of all necessary 
to observe that the rather general predicative mode of 
l&ine (both "to do" and "to make") is always reducible to 
another "catégorie cardinale de la réalité humaine": 
fljroJx.94 As an example of this relation, Sartre remarks 
It should be pointed out that Sartre sees three princi-
pal verbal "categories" as constitutive of human realx-
94 
pal verbal "catego 
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that one might make a cane by cutting a branch from a tree 
and then fashioning it into the proper shape and size* 
But clearlyt I make a cane ("je fais une canne") in order 
to have it ("pour avoir cette canne"): "Le «faire1 se ré-
duit à un moyen d'avoir." 9 5 Such an example illustrates 
how the making or altering of a concrete object can be re-
garded as appropriation» for the creative gesture of "mak-
ine;" the cane consists in rendering the object "appropri-
ate" for a certain usage on my part. 9 6 However, the 
reduction of faire to avoir m*y not always appear possible 
in other cases in which a utilitarian intention is not 
presupposed. This objection can be overruled, though, if 
we consider the following: 
Elle [mon activité] peut sembler gratuite comme 
dans le cas de la recherche scientifique, du 
sport, de la création esthétique. Pourtant, 
dans ces différents cas, le £&±IL& n'est pas non 
plus irréductible. Si je crée un tableau, un 
drame, une mélodie, c'est pour être à l'origine 
d'une existence concrète. Et cette existence ne 
m'intéresse que dans la mesure ou le lien de 
95 
96 
ty: "avoir," "faire," and "être" ( LlEJXÊ fit 1s. Ofeajxt, 
p. 507). 
Sartre, L'Etre et le aient, p. 665. This argument, es-
tablishing the rapport between shaping the worid 
through labor and consciousness' desire to appropriate, 
finds its roots in Hegel's EtLSttomenoVPgy £* HUkif Ch. 
IV. See G.W.F. Hegel, XhS. EkfcPpmenpVogy £* }LiXkf'
 n , 
trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 
especially pp. 238-239. 
It may be wise at this point to note the two fundamen-
tal senses of
 f PP-n»T»i atlon. as they are given xn Rafe-
ilt: "(1) Action d'approprier a un usage, a une desti-
nation, (2) Action de s'approprier une chose, d en 
faire sa propriété." Both variants of the term are ob-
viously present in the example of the cane. 
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creation que j'établis entre elle et moi ne don-
ne sur elle un droit de propriété particulier. 
Il ne s'agit pas seulement que tel tableau, dont 
jfai l'idée, existe; il faut encore qu'elle ex-
iste par moj. 9 7 
Thus, even with regard to such activities as scien-
tific research, sports and art, the goal of the enterprise 
is to make something that will be pine. It is important 
to note that the object in such cases reveals itself to be 
something that "se distingue radicalement de moi-même": 
the bit of discovered data, the goal that is scored as the 
result of the ball being struck by ray foot, the text that 
I write — ail events which are not me. But, at the same 
time, it is my doing ( fai re ) that somehow sustains the ex-
istence of these objects in the sense that they are ay. 
discovery, m^ goal, ©^ thesis. Speaking in terms of the 
work of art specifically, Sartre remarks that it is the 
artist's thought which sustains the work of art, as if a 
mind were perpetually conceiving the work even after the 
Piece's concrete achievement. This is the work's meaning 
<Signification ». Sart re continues: 
Je suis donc avec elle [cette pensée, cette sig-
nification] dans le double rapport de la con-
science qui la conçoit et de la conscience qui 
la rencontre- C'est précisément ce double rap-
port que j'exprime en disant qu'elle est nienne. 
Nous en verrons le sens, lorsque nous aurons 
précisé la signification de la catégorie 
"avoir." Et c'est pour entretenir ce double 
rapport dans la synthèse d'appropriation que je 
crée mon oeuvre. 9 8 
Sartre, L'Etre et le néant» p« 665. 
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It is, then, a synthesis of self and not-self that 
characterizes appropriation in the Sartrean sense: "intim-
ité, translucidité de la pensée," on the one hand, and 
"opacité, indifférence de l1 en-soif" on the o t h e r . " As we 
shall see, this relation holds true for all appropriated 
objects, even if they are ready-made and in no way one's 
"creation." In fact, it is the creation of the rapport 
itself (i.e., the synthesis of self and not-self) that is 
of primary importance. 
It is in this way that knowledge is a form of appro-
priation. If a facet of -the world is revealed to me, it 
is through me that this awareness of the world comes into 
being. In thinking the thought — which is this awareness 
-- I sustain its being by means of my own consciousness; I 
create it, as it were. However, there is a certain ma-
teriality of the thought by which the thought exists inde-
pendently of my being. The thought may be ©JLfiLÊ.» b u t l t i e 
£Lû£ ae. Thus, my knowledge of the world, my awareness of 
the way in which the world reveals itself to me, consti-
tutes a certain appropriation of the world. Clearly, it 
is not the physical world itself that I appropriate, but 
its revelation. Nonetheless, we can see the similarity 
between the appropriation of the cane, that of the work of 
art, and that of knowledge: it is towards a synthesis of 
self and not-self, of consciousness and being-in-itseIf, 
" Ibi* 
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that appropriation aims* 
Furtheraore, the notions of discovery and revelation* 
which are bound up with the urge to know, suggest the par-
amount role of sight in the pursuit of knowledge. This 
conclusion can hardly be disputed, for, in addition to the 
predominantly visual orientation of the terms "discovery" 
and "revelation," we note that one often says "I see" ( j ^ 
YQJs ) to indicate "I understand" (le. comprends ). We have 
already discussed sight in relation to the caress (see 
above, pp. 84-S5), but it is not readily apparent how the 
urge to know is related to the spectator's troubled stare 
at the flesh of the dancer*6 thigh» The two ideas are re-
lated, however, and Sartre does not hesitate to make a 
quick and Incisive leap into the realm of sexuality: "La 
vue est jouissance, voir cfest ^florer» 1' 1 0 0 Thus, in one 
graceful swoop, Sartre establishes a connection between 
the visual caress of the Other's flesh and the viewing of 
any concrete object or abstract concept whatsoever. In 
fact, the apparent recklessness of Sartre's introduction 
of a certain "sexuality" of understanding (especially in 
the light of his polemic against Freud for the latter's 
stance regarding the primacy of sexuality) could provoke a 
well-founded scepticism in the reader, if it were not for 
the canny theoretical flight which follows in Sartre's 
1 0 0
 JLfelot.f p . 6 6 6 . 
-94-
text.*°* 
Sartre continues: 
Si l'on examine les comparaisons ordinairement 
utilisées pour exprimer le rapport du connais-
sant au connu, on voit que beaucoup eî1 entre 
elles se présentent comme un certain y.ip.1 p_&r. là 
vue» L'objet non connu est donné comme imma-
culé, comme vierge, comparable a une blancheur» 
Il n'a pas encore "livré" son secret, l'homme ne 
le lui a pas encore "arrache»" A 0 
The object to-be-seen reveals itself as an immaculate, 
virgin whiteness to-be-violated in order to tear from it 
its secret. We are strikingly reminded of Bachelard's 
"curiosité agressive," a tendency that is illustrated in 
the example of the child who destroys a toy in order to 
see what there is inside (see above, Ch» It PP» 45-46). 
This "curiosité agressive" demonstrates the violence of an 
inquiring vision which "décèle . . . la fêlure par la-
quelle on peut violer je secret des choses cachées." 
Moreover, we are reminded as well of Bachelard's analysis 
of the image of the swan as naked woman, as feaisofeUSÊt as 
"la blancheur immaculée et cependant ostensible . . . les 
cygnes [qui] se laissent ypir" (emphasis a d d e d ) . 1 0 4 This 
1 0 1
 It is important to understand this moment in Sartre s 
text as a sudden and surprising introduction of a 
point of view that would seem to undermine the integ-
rity of Sartre's strong reluctance to accept ^ e i«-
-> , ^  - «uncial factor in human re-portance of sexuality as a crucian xa.<~ +v^*-
* ^ *•*<=+ «neh a moment xnax 
ality. It is on the basis of just sucn 
our reading of Freud against Sartre hinges. 
1 0 2
 Sartre, L'Etre e_£ Ls. n£&at, PP. 666-667. 
l
« Bachelard, L& Terre
 Ê J l u t&T^L&& tftt C M » * . *• 8 ' 
" • Bachelard, L1E&U *i 1 * . fife**. P- 5 0 " t h i S «>""«* 
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connec-tion between the two moments in Bachelard's corpus 
— two moments? which actually occur in two separate vol-
umes of the psychologist's work ~ is dramatically under-
scored by what follows in Sartre's text: 
Toutes les images [celles de l'objet immaculé, 
vierge, blanc, etc.] insistent sur l'ipnorance 
ou est l'objet des recherches et des instruments 
qui le visent: il est inconscient d'etre connu, 
il vaque a ses affaires sans s'apercevoir du re-
gard qui l'épie comme aaS. £&mm& EJàliUi P&FSftQt 
gurpren? & asu fe&la*105 
Thus, scopophilia and the y^atrieb are linked in Sartre, 
as well as in Freud, although we note that in Sartre the 
two are related through a metaphorical structure, which 
the writer uses to clarify his position on the drive to 
know, whereas in Freud the two drives appear at a single 
stroke at the moment of childhood Schaulttgt. Moreover, 
the two urges in Freud are not related in terms of t e 
figurative "comme" (i.e., on the nrtf»PhPr*c level), but 
rather in terms of a symbolic structure in which one drive 
is an elaboration and extension of the other (i.e., on the 
me*pnymj.ç level). 
This choice of metaphor on Sartre's part is not at 
all gratuitous, however, and his use of the image of the 
spied-upon bather to illustrate the a p p r o p r i a t e context 
of knowledge betrays a position which is more in line with 
Freud's thinking than Sartre would perhaps care to admit. 
is quoted above, Ch. If P» *'• 
1 0 5
 Sartre, L'Etre fet ife né&nti P' 6 6 7 , 
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Sartre's use of paradigmatic imagery to elucidate 
psychological facets of what he would call the subject's 
"choice of being" is, in fact, oui te similar to the tech-
nique of Bachelard, a representative of what we might con-
sider a middle ground between Sartrean existentialism and 
Freudian psychoanalysis, since he builds his argument on a 
combination of ontological and libidinal theory. Further-
more, as we have just discovered, our reading of two seem-
ingly unrelated instances in Bachelard's writing is clear-
ly and precisely echoed in the text of Sartre. 
A few lines after his Introduction of the image of 
the baigneuse. Sartre provides us with an even more inter-
esting piece of analysis: 
. . . toute recherche comprend toujours l'idée 
d'une nudité qu'on met à l'air en écartant les 
obstacles qui la couvrent, comme Acteon écarte 
les branches pour mieux voir Diane au bain, 
d'ailleurs la connaissance est une chasse. Ba-
con la nomme chasse de Pan. Le savant est te 
chasseur qui surprend une nudité blanche et qui 
la viole de son regard. Aussi l'ensemble de ces 
images nous révèle-t-il quelque^chose que nous 
nommerons le complexe if* A f t e o n * 
In the style of Bachelard, Sartre terms the ensemble of 
ima Bes that reveal to us the nature of the urge to know 
the "Actaeon complex." 1 0 7 
l 06 ïfr*d. 
l
°? The scene of Actaeon glimpsing the nude Diana at her 
bath is an image which is central in one of Lacan s 
T* T IIT« rhnse freudienne, M Lacan de-
essays as well. In "La Chose xrw ~ w* r**~ 
P i « S Freu* as "u„ , . » » r ^ T . l l ^ X l l l r - Z ' l 
des chiens dès l'abord dépistes et qu , 
relancer à sa poursuite, sans pouvoir r a l e n ^ ^ n * „ 
course où seule sa passion pour la déesse le mené. 
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What is important for us to conclude at this juncture 
is thatf in his discussion of the appropriâtive nature of 
g.pnnaj trg, , Sartre seems to underwrite our own observations 
concerning the symbiotic relationship between such urges 
a® the 0rejtftrirt>» the Wisstrieb» and Sçhattltfgt — tenden-
cies which appear to suggest a strong bond between a drive 
to understand the world and a sexual drive. Moreover» we 
have maintained that these urges see» to constitute an at-
tempt on the part of the subject to master a situation; in 
Sartre 1s terms, the caress, the glance, and the Actaeon 
complex reveal an attempt on the part of the subject to 
"s'approprier le monde symboliquement." 
Furthermore, we have suggested that the situation 
to-be-mastered by both the r^rej-ftrieb and the Wjgstriefr 
may, at its origin, be the absence of the mother's breast. 
Such a conclusion we made on the basis of the role of sen-
sual sucking ( Wonnegaujxen > in the development of the sub-
ject (see above, Ch. I, pp# 41-42). Consequently, eating 
must be considered as somehow at the heart of the afore-
mentioned attempts at mastery — as a kind of informing 
factor. 
These hounds that are off the track are other analysts 
who, despite the single-minded purpose and acumen of 
their master, have strayed from the path to Diana's 
riverside grotto. See Jacques Lacan, "La Chose freu-
dienne," in Ecrits X (Paris: Seuil, 1966), p. 221 
( also p. 248 )• 
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Not surprisingly, thenf Sartre goes on to introduce 
the activity of eating into the web of appropriâtive ten-
dencies he has thus far been weaving* After his postula-
tion of "le complexe rf'Actéon," Sartre continues: 
En prenant d'ailleurs cette idée de chasse pour 
fil conducteur, nous découvrons un autre symbole 
d'appropriation, peut-être plus primitif encore: 
car on chasse pour manger. La curiosité animale 
est toujours sexuelle ou alimentaire» Connai-
tre, c'est manger des yeux» 1 0 8 
The "fil conducteur" that Sartre is following now provides 
a binding axis for another "symbole d'appropriation," 
which "nous découvrons" ( that is, which we "remove the 
cover from" in order to render it vjslbie)• Curiosity — 
the desire to know — is either sexual or alimentary, and 
the inquiring stare with which we discover an object is, 
consequently, either sexually or alimentarily inspired, 
the latter source of the drive being "plus primitif." 
Although he maintains that "la curiosité animale" is 
always either sexual or alimentary, we should remark that 
the "either . . . or" construction, which Sartre utilizes 
to describe the relation between the two qualifiers, could 
easily be replaced by the more precise "both • . • and." 
Sartre points out that the rapport between the known ob-
ject and the knower is similar to that between the work of 
art and its creator. The creator's mind is continually 
creating the work of art, because the art object's meaning 
is forever linked to the creative activity of the artist; 
1 0 8 S a r t r e , L ' E t r e e_t jjg. n é a n t , P* 6 6 7 < 
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at the same time, however, the work of art has an exis-
tence of its own, in-the-world, which is entirely indepen-
dent of the being of the artist. Io this sense, the art-
ist's act is structurally parallel to the caress, through 
which the subject "shapes" the flesh of the other while 
the other nonetheless pursues an existence of his / her 
own in-the-world. Thus is construed the sexuality of the 
creative act and, by extension, the sexuality of knowl-
edge. But, Sartre notes, this relation of knowing subject 
to object known, in terms of the caress, «n'exclut pas son 
inverse": "dans le connaître, la conscience attire a soi 
son objet et se l'incorpore; la connaissance est assimila-
tion."»09 The rapport between the knower and the known is 
therefore one in which the object remains forever outside 
the subject, while, at the same time, the object is assi-
milated, incorporated by the subject, as if actually ea-
ten. This seemingly paradoxical double relation is some-
what elucidated by Sartre in his description of the 
"devouring" of the known object: 
Le connu se transforme en mfii» devient ma P" 8®* 
et par là même accepte de recevoir son existence 
de moi seul. Mais ce mouvement de dissolution 
se fige du fait que le connu demeure a la même 
place, indéfiniment absorbé, mange et indéfini-
ment intact, tout entier digère et cependant 
tout entier dehors, indigeste comme un cail-
lou.no 
1 0 9
 Ibltf. 
1 1 0
 ifeitf. 
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In other words, although it might be said that curiosity-
is a wish to devour, it is a wish to incorporate the ob-
ject in a very specific way: f,un rêve d'assimilation non 
destructrice," as Sartre goes on to call it, a wish both 
to digest and to eat without digesting the desired object* 
This wish, however, can be nothing more than "an 
rêve," as Sartre has already suggested, for the subject 
obviously cannot appropriate an object which is at the 
same time to-be-digested and not-to-be-digested: 
Le malheur est que — comme le notait Hegel — 
le désir détruit son objet» (En ce sens, <*i~^ 
sait-il, le désir est désir de «anger.) En re-
action contre cette nécessité dialectique, le 
Pour-soi rêve d'un objet qui serait entièrement 
assimilé par moi, qui serait &£i.t sans se dis-
soudre en moi, en gardant sa structure d'en-soj, 
car, justement ce que je désiref c'est g&t objet 
et, si je le mange, je ne l,ai plus, je ne ren-
contre plus que m o i » 1 1 1 
This search for an object which can be eaten while at 
the same time remaining intact is termed t>y Sartre "le 
complexe de Jonas." Whether Sartre is actually the origi-
nator of the term is unclear, but his first published use 
of it precedes Bachelard's hy some four years. 1 1 2 The 
identity of the term's originator is of little importance, 
however. What is important is that Sartre and Bachelard 
are once again pursuing similar lines with regard to be-
havior. We should recall that, in Bachelard, "le complexe 
1 1 1
 Xfelot., p. 668. 
1 1 2
 L'Etre ejt le néant was first published in 1944, L& 
Terre e_t les reveries otu, gepog in 1948. 
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de Jonas11 refers to the urge to swallow an object whole, 
without chewing» Furthermore, Bachelard considers the Jo-
nah complex "comme un cas particulier de sevrage" in which 
the infant's eating strategy changes from sucking to chew-
ing, a moment at which Freud signals the inevitability of 
the detachment of the sexual drive from the nutritional 
instinct (see above, Ch. I, p# 33)• 
The fact that Sartre goes on to say that "cette 
synthèse impossible de 1•assimilation et de l'intégrité 
conservée de l'assimilé se rejoint, dans ses racines les 
plus profondes, avec les tendances fondamentales de la 
sexualité," 1^ is, then, not surprising. Although Sartre 
never mentions the role of the breast in the development 
of infantile sexuality, the connection can nonetheless be 
read between the lines of his text when he relates eating 
and the Jonah complex to sexuality and the Actaeon complex 
through the mediating term of appropriation» Having sug-
gested the similarity between scientific research and the 
lover's caress, Sartre concludes his examination of the 
verb "to know" with the following summary, which, in the 
interest of clarity, we shall quote in full: 
On voit les courants sexuels et alimentaires qui 
se fondent et s'interpénétrent, pour constituer 
le complexe cf'Actéon et le complexe de Jonas, on 
voit les racines digestives et sensuelles qui se 
réunissent pour donner naissance au désir de ^ 
connaître. La connaissance est à la fois Pene-
tration et caresse de surface^ digestion et con-
templation à distance d'un objet indéformable, 
1 1 3
 Sartre, L'Etre e_l 1 Ê nâ&ait P* 6 6 8 # 
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production d'une pensée par création continuée 
et constatation de la totale indépendance objec-
tive de cette pensée* L'objet connut c'est aa_ 
pensée comme chose» Et c'est précisément ce que 
je desire profondément lorsque je me mets en 
quête: saisir ma pensée comme chose et la chose 
comme pensée* Le rapport syncretique qui fond 
ensemble des tendances si diverses ne saurait 
être qu'un rapport rffftpprffPrifttiont „ C , e sî p o u ^ " 
quoi le désir de connaître est, si désintéressé 
qu'il puisse paraître, un r&pport d'appropria-
tion. Le connaître est une des formes que peut 
prendre lf avoir» x l 4 
The désir dte_ connaître is informed by both sexual and ali-
mentary drives and is the desire to possess an object in 
the "double rapport" of mine / but not-roe» It is the de-
sire to appropriate one's thought as a thing» 
Thus, we see that Roquentin's gathering of the dis-
carded papers, his temptation to put them in his mouth, 
the fact that he feels them inquiringly ("il les aaJLGte." ) 
and likes to look closely at them can all be subsumed un-
der the more general verbal category of "to have," in 
terms of a certain understanding of "appropriation" (or 
appropriation of understanding). In so far as his pastime 
is inquisitive, we might conclude that what Roquentin de-
sires is a certain reification of thought. Regarding the 
sexual undertones of his acts that we proposed in the pre-
ceding section of this study, we might conclude that what 
Roquentin desires is a revelation of his Self as flesh, a 
reification of consciousness itself. And finally, as far 
as the urge to put the trash into his mouth is concerned, 
1 1 4
 X&1£.t pp. 668-669. 
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Roquertin has a notion to undertake a strategy of 
appropriation that is "peut—être plus primitif encore" — 
to actually make the papers a part of himself. The common 
denominator that is derived from these three points of 
view, the avoir, is still, however, a slightly mysterious 
term. Why should one desire a reified thought, a reified 
consciousness, a food which refuses to be digested? What 
is? it in the nature of this desire and its objects, this 
desire which is inseparable from its objects, that allows 
it to appear in the first placed We must now examine 
these questions before concluding our analysis of Roquen-
tin's symptomatic gestures, attempts at appropriation 
which point to an even more fundamental phenomenological 
dilemma. For this reason, we shall defer our examination 
of Roquentin 1s destruction of the objects, behavior which 
can be more easily elucidated following the next step in 
our theoretical inquiry. 
We have shown, through a paraphrase of Sartre's work, 
now faire can ultimately be reduced to avoir. It is now 
necessary to understand how avoir must, in the end, be un-
derstood as a manifestation of gtre» 
In any psychoanalytic study there is a need to invoke 
Freud, either directly or indirectly, and we shall contin-
ue to do so in spite of Sartre's ardent protest against 
the legitimacy of some of Freud's most crucial postula-
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tions* In fact» there are only two main points of conten-
tion (albeit important ones) between Sartre's position and 
that of Freud: the notion of the unconscious and the li-
bido theory. We shall not attempt a complete resolution 
of these fundamental differences between the two systems 
of thought, for even allowing for terminological disagree-
ment and a possible misunderstanding on Sartre 1s partt it 
remains evident that we must deal with two radically dis-
tinct points of view. 
Regarding our presentation and elaboration of Freud's 
position, we shall draw to some extent on the interpreta-
tions of Jacques Lacan and Jean Laplanche, the primary 
spokesmen of the so-called "French Freudian" school* This 
strategy, although somewhat indirect, should yield clearer 
and more extensive results, for, especially in terms of 
the aims and origins of desire, Freud's French interpret-
ers have clarified some of the ambiguity in the transla-
tions of Freud's work, as well as extended his arguments 
in a systematic and perspicacious manner, without having 
lost sight of the all-important role of language in the 
psychoanalytic method and the need to read Freud a. la. le_£-
It is in the strange, arabesque jargon of the dream 
~ a series of images and connections which are ornate in 
detail and mysterious in content — that the most profound 
insights of the Freudian discovery find their fertile 
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source* For the dream is a symptom and its language that 
of the unconscious, and it is through a translation or de-
ciphering of the dream's rebus-like structure — a kind of 
language of pictograms — that the analyst unlocks (or 
leads the patient to unlock) the truth of the dreamer's 
subjectivity. Moreover, it is not only in the dreams*s 
pictorial dialect that the patient's unconscious reveals 
itself* The patient's discourse as a whole — his memo-
ries, his relation to the analyst, his descriptions of 
what he had or did not have for dinner — provides the ma-
terial through which the unconscious allows access to the 
perspicacious reader / analyst* Thus, what is most funda-
mental in Freud's contribution to the art of psychoanaly-
sis is the notion of the unconscious, a structure which 
manifests itself thrptfgh language* 
This emphasis on the language and speech of the 
"talking cure" is what Freud 1s French interpreters (espe-
cially Lacan) have so well preserved of the Freudian meth-
od. And this reiterating of the importance of language as 
the crucial material of the Freudian technique is much in 
keeping with what Sartre only sketchily outlines in his 
plan for the development of a "psychanalyse existent-
ielle": "Il ne convient pas seulement, en effet, de dres-
ser la liste des conduites, des tendances et des inclina-
tions, il faut encore les ^ t l ? f f r e r * c'est-à-dire il faut 
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savoir les interroger»nil5 xhat is, the goal of the analy-
sis that Sartre is proposing is The breaking of a code, 
the solving of the cipher which is the patient's behavior, 
through the technique of asking the proper questions and 
(we must imagine) receiving informative responses. Thus, 
this enterprise of déchiffrage* like the paradigmatic ana-
lytic situation in Freud, is one that necessarily plays 
itself out on the plane of language* in the exchange of 
signs between analyst and analysand. What's more* this 
constantly signifying va-et-vient of both speaker and lis-
tener in a theatre of discourse is a notion that is funda-
mental to the for-itself's relations with others, as Sar-
tre understands them. In fact* it is constitutive of 
them. Speaking about being-for-others (Ifgtre-ppmr-ftu-
trui)* that aspect of the for-itself that presupposes the 
existence of the Other as another free upsurge of being in 
the world (i.e., another consciousness)• Sartre maintains: 
Le langage n'est pas un phénomène surajoute a 
l'être-pour-autrui: il est originellement l 1-
étre-pour-autrui, c'est-à-dire le fait qu'une 
subjectivité s'éprouve comme objet pour l'autre. 
Dans un univers de purs objets, le langage ne 
saurait en aucun cas être "inventé'1, puisqu'il 
suppose originellement un rapport à un autre su-
jet; et dans l'intersubjectivité des pour-au-
trui, il n'est pas nécessaire de l'inventer, car 
il est déjà donné dans la reconnaissance de l'-
autre. Du seul fait que, quoi que je fasse, mes 
actes librement conçus et exécutés, mes pro-jets 
...,..' _ _  ^  _r^ «~~«<= un QÉ»nfi crui m' — 
vers mes possibilités on t dehors un sens qui m' 
échappe et que j'éprouve, je gujg langage 116 
1 1 5
 TfrjçU, p. 656. 
1 1 6
 Ifeiat. i P* 440. 
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Language is not a trait of our being-for-others, it i_s_ oar 
being-for-others, and insofar as we recognize that we are 
in a world where there are other consciousnesses , we are 
the language that we speak* In other wordst Language is 
the manifest content of our latent being-for-others in 
much the same way as the discourse of the dream, in 
Freud's work, is the manifest content of our latent uncon-
scious structures. For both Freud and Sartre, then, we 
are what we say* 
Consequently, if Sartre is intent on developing a 
psychoanalysis which would be ontologically grounded (as 
he suggests from time to time), then the crucial impor-
tance of language must be stressed, for the "material" of 
one's being-for-others i_s_ language, and it is the nature 
of this being that must be questioned* 
But before turning our gaze to the problematic of de-
sire, we should consider at some length the principal the-
oretical distinctions between the systems of Freud and 
Sartre, in order to ascertain our terminological bearings 
before attempting to map one text on to the other* 
La psychanalyse empirique part . . * du postulat 
de l'existence d'un psychisme inconscient qui se 
dérobe par principe à l'intuition du sujet. La 
psychanalyse existentielle rejette le postulat 
de l'inconscient: le fait psychique est, pour 
elle, coextensif à la conscience. 1 1 
1 1 7
 LhLsL* f P* 658. 
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With clear and unambivalent terseness? Sartre categorical-
ly dismisses the concept of an unconscious» which he 
ascribes to the school of "empirical psychoanalysis" 
(i.e., that of Freud)• But we must be careful here not to 
misunderstand Sartre 1s use of the term conscience» antic-
ipating the probable objection to the casually dropped 
bombshell he has just detonated before us, Sartre contin-
ues: "Mais si le projet fondamental est pleinement vécu 
par le sujet et, comme tel, totalement conscient, cela ne 
signifie nullement qu'il doive être du même coup çopny par 
lui, tout au contraire.» 1 1 8 The distinction, in Sartre's 
text, between consciousness and knowledge is a crucial 
one* Put in another way, this distinction can be con-
strued as the separating out of two "kinds" of conscious-
ness» There is what Sartre terms a "thetic" aspect of 
consciousness (l^ conscience +hgtloue)« which is a deriva-
tion of Husserl's phenomenological maxim: "Consciousness 
is consciousness o£ something." Thetic consciousness 
(also known as "reflective" consciousness, 1& conscience 
r ê f l é c M e ï refers to that process of cognition by which we 
are aware of an object for consciousness. Through the 
thetic property of consciousness we possess knowledge ( la. 
c o n n a l M a p ç p ^ whether it be construed as perception, mem-
ory, reason or otherwise. When the known object of con-
sciousness is oneself, we have what Sartre terms "posi-
1 1 8
 Ibid 
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tional self-consciousness11 (La. conscience posi tjonne[ le j£e_ 
soi ) « in which the self is posited as a mere object-in-
the-world for a transcending consciousness• l l 9 It is at 
this Juncture that Sartre parts company with Husserl, for 
he points out that it is not at all necessary to posit 
oneself as an object in order to be conscious (of) one-
self* 1 2 0 There is also the "non-thetic" aspect of con-
sciousness to be considered. L& ? o n g Ç i e n c e non-thétigilfe 
(also known as Munreflective consciousness," "non-posi-
tional consciousness," and the "pre-reflective cogito") 
reveals no knowledge per se of the Self, but only "an im-
plicit consciousness of being conscious of an object." 1 2 1 
1 1 9
 This "positing" of an object by consciousness is what 
gives rise to the term "p^*+f onnelle » " ft u s a « e t h a t 
refers more to the revelation of the object than to 
any situation in space of consciousness» 
1 2 0 Sartre brackets the preposition in the phrase c_o_a-
ZSLLSLHSLZ (£&) fefii, when he is speaking of non-thetic 
self-consciousness, in order to indicate that the Self 
is not really an object for consciousness at that mo-
ment • We might also mention that Sartre's case 
against Husserl is presented mainly in the text L& 
Transcendant jfe l'Ego, in which he contends that the 
Ego, rather than being a transcendent conscious entity 
(as Husserl claims), is actually tranpçençted fev. con-
sciousness and is the self which is posited as an ob-
ject for thetic consciousness: "• • • l'Ego n'est ni 
formellement ni matériellement &3JL& * a conscience: il 
est dehors, dans 1st °ûnde c'est un être du monde, com-
me l'Ego d'autrui" — Jean-Paul Sartre, Lô. TrftQgÇep-
dance jte l'Ego (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. 
Vrin, 1966), p. 13. In other words, the Ego is what 
the subject thinks himself to be, a construct of thet-
ic consciousness. 
1 2 1
 We are borrowing this definition from Hazel Barnes-
terminological key which appears at the end of her 
translation of L'Etre Ê ! L E ttâftat, fieiûfi &OSL EûiJiiag-
ness (New York: Quokka, 1956), P» 801. 
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Thus, if I am at this moment thinking about what I'd like 
to have for supper, I am both positionally conscious of my 
anticipated meal and non-positionally conscious of my con-
sciousness: "toute conscience positionnelle d'objet est en 
A. 
même temps conscience non-positionnelle dfelle-même."*22 
It is important to note, then, that these are not exactly 
two "kinds" of consciousness, as we first suggested, but 
more precisely two facets of the same transcendence which 
manifest themselves at a single stroke. 
Thus, "l«interprétât ion psychanalytique ne lui [au 
sujet] fait pas prendre conscience de ce qu'il est: elle 
lui en fait prenrfrp connaissance.tfl 2 3 Sartre does not deny 
that there are two levels of a sort which make up the 
Psyche of a subject and that one of these levels is well 
camouflaged and resistant to the subject's capacity for 
awareness. But, he points out: "nous n'établissons pas 
entre les deux plans considérés la différence de l'incons-
cient et du conscient, mais celle qui sépare la conscience 
irréfléchie et fondamentale de la conscience réfléchie qui 
en est tributaire." 1 2 4 Sartre replaces the concept of the 
unconscious with the pre-refleetive cogito and repression 
by what he calls "bad faith" (la. matfVftiSfe ZQ±) — put sim-
ply* "a lie to oneself within the unity of a single con-
1 2 2 S a r t r e , ^ « fit re e_£ le . nAant , p . 1S« 
1 2 3
 XÉLU. , p . 6 6 2 . 
1 2 4
 lhlsi.f P . 5 5 2 . 
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sciousnessj" 1 2 5 a denial by reflective consciousness of 
what is grasped pre-reflectivelyt but of which the subject 
has no knowledge* 
But if it is important for us to precisely understand 
Sartre's use of the term "consciousness" ( L& Conscience ) y 
it is equally important for us not to misconstrue the 
Freudian concept of "the unconscious" ( &&& ffnfeewUSgtg )• 
Both Freud and Sartre share "the position that to require 
that whatever goes on i n the mind must also be fcnown, to 
consciousness fauch dem p«iiBstBeia hekannt wertfep, aii£££j 
is -to make an untenable claim." 1 2 6 Ift however, something 
is not "known to consciousness," is it necessarily uncon-
scious? Freud would undoubtedly answer in the affirma-
tive, but this response requires some qualification. 
Freud understands the psychic apparatus as made up of 
three "systems," which he terms consciousness ( doa &£-
wusstseip). the unconscious ( &&E. EobfeEUSalfe>» *«<* t h e P r e~ 
conscious (ittts Vorbewusate). 1 2 7 Roughly speaking, con-
sciousness is that system which includes all that is 
kaawn.. The other two systems contain psychic elements 
which are not known, and these elements can be considered 
unconscious. The unconscious &£ S, gygtgB however, com-
1 2 5
 Barnes, fieJLûfi &ûd N f ^ M " " n e s e « p* 8 0 ° * 
1 2 6
 Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," in Xh& Standard Edi-
tion ai th& complete ppychPloric*l a^rfcfe» vol. xiv 
(London: Hogarth, 1953), P- 167, emphasis added. 
1 2 7
 Freud's original German will be included from time tc 
time in the following pages for the sake of precision. 
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prises that which is not only unknown to consciousness, 
but which also can not be known to consciousness. We can 
easily see the ambiguity that arises with regard to the 
term "unconscious." If used in a descriptive sense, the 
word refers to something that is not, at least tor the mo-
ment, available to consciousness (it may or may not be ca-
pable of becoming conscious)* On the other hand» if "un-
conscious" is used in the systeaatic sense, it refers to 
something that is permanently barred from consciousness 
and must remain unconscious (in the descriptive sense). 
In an effort to eliminate this ambiguity, at least in his 
writing, Freud proposes the use of the abbreviations Cs 
(fiw) for consciousness, Des ( BfeE> * o r t h e unconscious, and 
Pes ( Vbw) for the preconscious when speaking in the sys-
tematic sense. 1 2 8 
Thus it is that we must be quite careful to read some 
of Freud*s apparently clear and basic statements with an 
eye towards their immediate, as well as their more margi-
nal contexts. The metapsychological paper on the uncon-
scious, for example, which we have just cited, begins with 
an introduction to both the notion of the unconscious and 
that of repression. Freud states: 
1 2 8
 Freud, "The Unconscious," PP- 172-173. It should be 
pointed out that "preconscious" cannot be used in the 
descriptive sense, and thus is terminologically un-
ambiguous, since that which comprises the system Pes 
is, by definition, unconscious (in the descriptive 
sense). 
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Everything that is repressed must remain 
unconscious; but let us state at the very outset 
that the repressed does not cover everything 
that is unconscious* The unconscious has the 
wider compass: the repressed is a part of the 
unconscious f das Verdrangte j.st ein Tell des Un.-
bewusstep].129 
We must be alert to two considerations: first of all, that 
Freud may be speaking of the unconscious in either the de-
scriptive sense or the systematic sense (a distinction 
that is not elaborated until a few pages later in the es-
say) and, second, that such concepts as "the repressed" 
< tffts Verdrangte) may undergo significant qualification as 
the essay proceeds* 
Ts it true that "everything that is repressed must 
remain unconscious," and, if so, how are we to understand 
this statement? Does Freud simply mean that whatever is 
repressed must remain unconscious only so long as it re-
pressed? Or can he mean that whatever is repressed is 
permanently closed out from consciousness, banished to the 
unconscious — that is, to the system Ucs, which Freud 
will presently introduce into the essay? Or is the ambi-
guity of the term "unconscious" at play here; in other 
words, does he mean both? 
Further along in the essay we find the following pas-
sage in which Freud is pointing out the difficulties of 
bringing to light those thoughts of which the patient is 
unconscious: 
1 2 9
 liLié.t P. 166. 
-114-
Actually there is no lifting of the repression 
r Auf hebung der Verdranpunfz 1 until the conscious 
idea f die bewusste Vorstellung It* 3 0 after the 
resistances have been overcome, has entered into 
connection with the unconscious memory—trace• 
It is only through the making conscious C das j*e_-
wusstmanftep ] of the latter itself that success 
is achieved. 1 3 1 
Kere we note a strong indication that the work of the cen-
sorship is not permanent* Although stubborn, the repres-
sion can be ••lifted» f aufgphoben ) through the mutual ef-
forts of both the analyst and the analysand, and the 
unconscious memory-tracef through a union with the con-
scious idea, can find its way to consciousness. Repres-
sion, it seems, is not permanent» 
But what of the system Ucs, the eternal graveyard of 
that which has been exiled from conscious life? Is Freud 
suggesting in the passage quoted above that the analyst 
possesses the magical key by which all the captives of the 
system Ucs can in the end be freed from behind the bars of 
the rigorous censorship? Hardly, for this would lead the 
development of his theory into an irresolvable contra-
diction. 
It is in the notion of the "making conscious" of the 
unconscious memory-trace that the dilemma is resolved. 
First of all, let us remark that the "thought" — con-
scious or unconscious — considered in its most general 
1 3 0
 That is, the idea which has been suggested by the ana-
lyst regarding what is being repressed by the patient 
" an idea of which the patient is thus unconscious. 
1 3 1
 Freud, "The Unconscious," op. 175-176. 
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sense (as a dynamic force of some kind in the psychic 
mechanism ), can take on many forms* Among these forms are 
ideas, emotions, feelings and instinctual impulses. Freud 
maintains that there are both conscious and unconscious 
ideas ( Vor^tellungen *- He does not, however, understand 
such phenomena as instinctual impulses (Tri ebreming^p )
 a s 
having this same bi-systematic character: 
I am • • • of the opinion that the antithesis of 
conscious and unconscious is not applicable to 
instincts rhat auf den Jrieb fc£ia& AnwgPtfttng]* 
An instinct can never become an object of con-
sciousness — only the idea [d^e Vorstellung1 
that represents the instinct can* Even in the 
unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be 
represented otherwise than by an idea. If the 
instinct did not attach itself to an idea or 
manifest itself as an affective state, we would 
know nothing about i t . 1 3 2 
Thus, there are certain elements that are destined to re-
main unconscious, elements from which the repression can-
not be lifted. In a way, however, even instincts (Irjebe.) 
can somehow find their way into consciousness, but only as 
something else. The text of the system Ucs must first be 
"translated" into the language of the systems Cs or Pes 
before its existence can be named: 
How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the un-
conscious? It is of course only as something 
conscious that we know it, after it has under-
gone transformation or translation [ PlflgetZVlOg 
Oder UbereetZttPr 1 into something conscious. 1 3 3 
1 3 2
 IhLû.f P. 177. 
1 3 3
 Xfeid., p. 166. 
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It may be well to say a few words about the mechanism 
of repression before moving on to other considerations» 
First of allf it is important to note that, according to 
Freud, there are twp censorships. There is, of course, 
the barrier between the systems Ucs and Pes through which 
only derivatives of the repressed material can p a s s . 1 3 4 
But there is also a second censorship which is situated at 
the dynamic boundary between the systems Pes and Cs. Un-
like the primary censor, which closes off the Ucs, this 
second censor can be overcome: 
In psycho-analytic treatment the existence of 
the second censorship, located between the sys-
tems Pes and Cs, is proved beyond question» We 
require the patient to form numerous derivatives 
of the Ucs, we make him pledge himself to over-
come the objections of the censorship to these 
preconscious formations becoming conscious, and 
by overthrowing thiff censorship f qturch djle fig.-
gjggttng dieser Zensur 1* we open up the way to 
abrogating the repression [frahnen uns • • • den 
£^£ £U£ A u f h e h ^ g der YgH*** w n g u n g^ accomplished 
by "the earlier o n e . 1 3 5 
The repressive mechanism that controls the border between 
the Pes and the Cs systems can be defeated without any 
transformation or translation of the psychic material in-
volved. The overcoming of this censor is termed by Freud 
"ALE Besieging dieger Zensur«" indicating a defeat, a con-
quest, a surmounting of the barrier. On the other hand, 
1 3 4
 To be more precise, we might say "around which" or 
"over which," instead of "through which," when refer-
ring to the crossing of the wall of repression: 
Freud1 s terms, as we have just notedf are "U©-setz:ung" 
and "Ubejv-setzung. " 
1 3 5
 Freud, "The Unconscious," pp. 193-194. 
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when speaking of the primary censorship! Freud utilises 
the term "Auf hebuncr.M Now, although Strachey renders this 
overcoming as an "abrogation,,f something is most certainly 
lost in the translation. Freud's use of the term AiiltlÊ-
bung* like Hegel fs, presents some difficulties for the 
translator, since the word suggests both a preserving, as 
well as a doing away with. In addition, the literal sense 
of Aufhebunft is a lifting (up), a raising. Thus, we can 
see that the censor which bars the way to the Des is not 
really "abrogated," since it is at the same time pre-
served. This dialectical movement with regard to the eva-
sion of the primary censorship is in line with what we 
have argued above. Certain unconscious material ( such as 
instinctual impulses) must be repressed; in this sense, 
the censorship is preserved. But these impulses can be, 
and are, represented by ideas ( ïar^teiLiàagÊa) t which are 
capable of becoming conscious; in this sense is the way 
opened for the "abrogation" of the primary censorship. 
We see, then, that there are some cardinal conceptual 
differences between the theoretical models of the psychic 
apparatus that are presented by Freud and Sartre. What 
Freud explains by means of the descriptive and systematic 
unconscious, Sartre seems to relegate more or less to the 
Pre-reflexive cogito — a consciousness» However, if in-
stead of dividing the mind into a conscious and an uncon-
scious, or thetic and non-thetic consciousness, we simply 
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regard the universe of mental processes as awareness or 
non-awareness, we discover that — point of view and ter-
minological worrying aside — there is a shared ground be-
tween Freud and Sartre. The subject is aware of many 
things about himself and the world. There are other 
things, however, of which he is unaware, but which are 
somehow represented and at work in his mind and must be 
considered part of his mental life. In many cases, the 
repression can be overcome (fresiegt); the subject confess-
es to himself the lie which has constituted his bad faith. 
But what about the censor that stands guard at the gates 
of the system Ucs? This repression can be "abrogated" 
( aufgehofrepi through a translation of the language of the 
Ocs, but it cannot be unconditionally vanquished. Is 
there an instance of bad faith in Sartre1s model of the 
psyche which cannot be overcome, except through a kind of 
translation — an originary bad faith that forever pre-
vents the thinking subject from becoming whole to himself? 
For the moment, we shall suspend judgment on this 
proposition and postpone further discussion of an "origi-
nary" bad faith until we have begun our examination of the 
second major point at which Sartre•s psychoanalytic theory 
diverges from Freud 1s. 
This second point of contention concerns the libido 
theory — more specifically, the libido itself. Put quite 
simply: "Libido is a term used in the theory of instincts 
-119-
for describing the dynamic manifestation of sexuality." 1 3 6 
Now, in his "theory of instincts," Freud differentiates 
between the "libidinal, sexual or life instincts" and the 
so-called "death instincts." The latter are: 
those which follow the aim of leading the living 
creature to death and therefore deserve to be 
called the «death instincts' : these would be di-
rected outwards as the result of tHe combination 
of numbers of unicellular elementary organisms, 
and would manifest themselves as destructive or 
aggress j^  ye impulses. 1 3 7 
Elsewhere Freud describes such a tendency as "an urge in-
herent in organic life to restore an earlier state of 
things." 1 3 8 The former set of instincts, which Freud 
places under the rubric of pros* have as their aim "to 
form living substance into ever greater unities, so that 
life may be prolonged and brought to higher develop-
ment. " 1 3 « These instincts are thus sexual in nature and 
have as their ultimate purpose the proliferation of the 
species: reproduction. Freud concludes that life "would 
consist in the manifestation of the conflict or interac-
tion between the two classes of instincts." 1 4 0 Thus, human 
reality can hardly be reduced to one grandiose libidinal 
1 3 6
 Sigmund Freud, "The Libido Theory," in XhZ Stftftrtfrfcg 
Edition,. Vol. XVIII (London: Hogarth, 1955), p. 255. 
1 3 7
 Ibis*., p. 258. 
1 3 8
 Siçmund Freud, Bevond the ELÊASLUHÊ. Principle, trans. 
James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 30. 
1 3 9
 Freud, "The Libido Theory," P» 258. 
1 4 0
 !£!£•» p. 259. 
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manifestation, as Sartre seems to understand Freud1s 
position. Leaving this rather glaring oversight aside, 
however, at least for the time being, let us note that 
Sartre's case against the notion of the libido consists 
mainly in his supposition that sexuality is not a funda-
mental structure of human reality» 
If Sartre does not see sexuality as fundamental, how 
does he understand it? At first glance, we might conclude 
that (in spite of himself, perhaps) Sartre does place sex-
uality in a prominent role in his phenomenological de-
scription of the subject's relation to others» We note, 
for example, his claim that "l'attitude sexuelle était un 
comportement primitif envers Autrui," 1 4 1 and further, "le 
Pour-soi est sexuel dans son surgissement même en face d1 -
Autrui et que, par lui, la sexualité vient au monde." 1* 2 
If the for-itself is sexual in its very upsurge in the 
face of the Other, then it can hardly be denied that sex-
uality is a primary relation of the for-itself to others. 
But the rather self-evident correlate of this hypothesis 
— that there can be no sexuality without the appearance 
of the Other — is one that Sartre does not want over-
looked: 
Que ce comportement [primitif envers Autrui] en-
veloppe nécessairement en lui la contingence 
originelle de i•Stre-pour-autrui et celle de no-
tre facticité propret cela va sans dire. Mais 
1 4 1
 Sartre, L'Etre et le. sxksulf P* 4 7 7 , 
1 4 2
 Ifcitf. 
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qu'il soit soumis dès l'origine à une constitu-
tion physiologique et empirique, c'est ce que 
nous ne saurions admettre. Des qu'il "y aM le 
corps et qu'il "y a" l'Autre, nous réagissons 
par le désir* par l'Amour et par les attitudes 
dérivées que nous avons mentionnées» 1 4 3 
In other words» the subject is not born with a sexual 
"constitution" (not to be confused with a s_££ — i.e., 
male or female), but develops such attitudes upon encoun-
tering the Other. Consequently, sexuality is not primary, 
since it is a drive which characterizes the subject's re-
lation towards others and not towards the world. As Stern 
puts it: "He [Sartre] . . . designates it [sexuality] as a 
fundamental structure,' but only of our being-for-others 
and not of our being-in-the-world, which is our very exis-
tence."1 •• Thus, sexuality functions as the "skeleton" of 
all relations between the for-itself and the Other: 
Et cela non pas à cause de l'existence d'une 
certaine "libido" qui se glisserait partout, 
mais simplement parce que les attitudes que nous 
avons décrites sont les projets fondamentaux par 
quoi le Pour-soi réalise son être-pour-autrui et 
tente de transcender cette situation de fait. 1 4 5 
But if sexuality is not the fundamental structure in 
Sartre's understanding of human reality, then what is? 
T h e
 nature of this structure has already been hinted at in 
the preceding pages, but there are several instances where 
Sartre is quite succinct about what is primarily at stake 
**
3
 Itoltf. 
A l f r e d S t e r n , S a r t r e : His PH l o s o o h y ançf S x i g t e n t E f t l 
gsvchQftnalvsJc? (New York: D e l a c o r t e , 1 9 6 7 ) , p . 1 5 8 . 
S a r t r e , L ' E t r e ejt le. QSJklktf PP* 4 7 7 - 4 7 8 . 
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for trhe Pour-sol : "Nous avons vu que la realité humaine, 
bien avant de pouvoir être décrite conme lîfritfp ou volonté 
de puissance, 1 4 6 est cho:(.x <t' être» soit directement, soit 
par appropriation du monde." 1 4 7 We might note, in passing, 
that Sartre goes on to describe the orientation of exis-
tential psychoanalysis — a psychoanalysis of things and 
the matter of which they are made — as an attempt to un-
derstand: 
la façon dont chaque chose est le symbole o_bj££.-
ti;f de l'être et du rapport de la réalité hu-
maine à cet être* Nous ne nions pas qu'il 
faille découvrir, par après, tout un symbolisme 
sexuel dans la nature, mais c'est une couche 
secondaire et réductible qui suppose d'abord une 
psychanalyse des structures présexuelles. 1 4 8 
Now, if we recall Sartre's discussion of the role of lan-
guage with regard to the subject's being-for-others and, 
in particular, the fact that "le langage • • • £&£ origi-
nellement l'être-pour-autrui" (see above, p» 106 )t and if 
we recall as well his later contention that "le Pour-soi 
est sexuel dans son surgissement même en face d1 autrui" 
(see above, p. 120), then it becomes difficult to under-
stand how things, as objective fivjafefiLfe of being, can be 
seen in a non-sexual light. It seems that either this 
particular process of symbolization must be construed as 
1 4 6
 "Volonté de puissance" or "will to power": a concept 
which Sartre ascribes to Adler, but which is found 
earlier in Nietzsche, as well» 
1 4 7
 Sartre, L'Etre et L& ÛfiAOlt P* 6 9 3 • 
1 4 8
 Xfeié.t pp. 693-694. 
-123-
somehow pre-linguistic» or else one must presuppose that 
an intuitive interpretation of the meaning of objects can 
somehow take place before the encounter with the Other and 
(once again) the inception of language. Sartre seems to 
be implying a very delicate paradox. Although he suggests 
that a network of sexual symbolism will invariably accom-
pany the analysis of things and their relation to the sub-
ject's choice of being» he must strain nonetheless to 
privilege an order» other than the sexual» in the realm of 
psychoanalysis — the "talking cure." 
The danger of this paradox is neutralized somewhat 
when we consider what Sartre means by a choice of being 
( JLê. choix &i_£tx&) under which such secondary concepts as 
the libido and the will to power are subsumed. The fol-
lowing passage is worthy of consideration: 
Le projet originel qui s'exprime dans chacune de 
nos tendances empiriquement observables est donc 
le projet d'etre où si l'on préfère» chaque ten-
dance empirique est avec le projet originel d'-
être dans un rapport d'expression et d'assou-
vissement symbolique» comme les tendances 
conscientes» chez Freud» par rapport aux com-
plexes et à la libido originelle* Ce n'est 
point d'ailleurs que le désir di9 être soit &L&T 
*>Pr<* pour se faire exprimer gnstfi-t? par les de-
sirs £ posteriorf: mais il n'est rien en dehors 
de l'expression symbolique qu'il trouve dans les 
désirs concrets* Il n'y a pas d'abord &Q, désir 
d'être» puis mille sentiments particuliers» mais 
le désir d'être n'existe et ne se manifeste que 
dans et par la jalousie» l'avarice» l'amour de 
lfart, la lâcheté» le courage, les mille expres-
sions contingentes et empiriques qui font que la 
réalité humaine ne nous apparaît jamais que man-
ifestée par an tel homme* par une personne sin-
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gulière. 1 4 9 
It is clear that Sartre does not intend the "desjr ft'etre" 
to come bgforg (in a strictly temporal sense) the sexual, 
or any other drive# Thus, his references to pre-sexuai 
structures can only be construed as an attempt to privi-
lege ontological over sexual considerations and has little 
to do with the subject's early infantile history. Put an-
other wayf we might state that Sartre sees the desire to 
be as a primary drive, which is at the heart of all other 
drives, and which shows itself only in the guise of libi-
dinal urges, the will to power, or any other fundamental 
attitude that characterizes human reality* 
We must now ask the question: how is it that the on-
tological choice can provide a dynamic force? In other 
words y what is it about the nature of human reality, human 
•being," that can constitute a drive to become what one is 
(at first glance, a very passive and static project)? 
A brief sketch of Sartre's ontological universe is in 
order. The principal focus of Sartre's text is, of 
course, the distinction between being-in-itself ( fitrg~enr. 
esiL) and being-for-itself ( gtre-oour-soi ). At the risk of 
being somewhat reductive (especially with regard to the 
latter concept), we must nonetheless establish a working 
distinction between these two ontological modes. The in-
itseif is the being of the phenomenon* the full being of 
1 4 9
 LklsL't p. 652. 
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the world, brute existence. The only thing that can be 
really said about bein^-in-itself is that it simply Lfi. 
The for-itself, on the other hand, is the being of con-
sciousness. This mode of being is actually grounded in 
nothingness. It is a nothingness through which being-in-
itself i s "nihilated" ( nk&Ll± > and, thus, i£ ûûlt in a 
strict sense. As Hazel Barnes puts it: 
Being-for-itself (etre-pour-soi). The nihila-
tion of Being-in-itself; consciousness conceived 
as a lack of Being, a desire for Being, a rela-
tion to Being. By bringing Nothingness into the 
world the For-itself can stand out from Being 
and judge other beings by knowing what it is 
not. Each For-itself is the nihilation of a 
particular Being. 1 5 0 
The notion of the for-itself is, then, somewhat com-
plicated, since one must deal with an entity which is pre-
cisely a jaçfc of being, an empty entity which nonetheless 
manifests itself as human reality. The role of nothing-
ness in the relation of the thinking subject to the world 
is expressed by Sartre in the chapter entitled "Les Struc-
tures Immédiates du Pour-soi. M He states: 
La realité humaine, par quoi le manque apparaît 
dans le monde, doit être elle-même un manque. 
Car le manque ne peut venir de l'être que par le 
manque, l'en-soi ne peut être occasion de manque 
a l'en-soi. En d'autres termes, pour que l'être 
soit manquant ou manqué, il faut qu'un être se 
fasse son propre manque; seul un être qui manque 
peut dépasser l'être vers le manqué. 1 5 1 
From Hazel Barnes' terminological key in gejpfi aji£ 
N o t hlngf?^gf i p. 800. 
5 1
 Sartre, L'Etre ejt JLfe uifiLOi, p. 130. 
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This surpassing (^passement) of the plenitude of being-
in-itself by the for-itself constitutes the upsurge of de-
sire as a dynamic tendency in human reality. What's more, 
it is to the appearance of desire in the world that Sartre 
appeals for a confirmation of his claim that consciousness 
is a lack, a hole in being: "Que la réalité humaine soit 
manque, l'existence du désir comme fait humain suffirait a 
le prouver.»*52
 T h u S f Sartre succeeds in pointing to the 
nothinnness that grounds human reality by calling into ev-
idence the dynamic force ( le. disjx> which results from its 
non—being* 
Furthermore, human reality is seen as a continuous 
.. ~-*«m« "Le Pour-soi choisit 
sequence of choices — as freedom. u* 
, . ._ J.' ~**. -f » i ± ou* un avec le parce qu'il est manque, la liberté ne faix qu 
manque, elle est le mode d'être concret du manque d'-
e t r e . « l " The for-itself strives relentlessly to complete 
itself, to achieve the plenitude of being of the in-it-
self, to be what it is while serving as its own grounding: 
* ~~ +fi«» for-itself cannot 
an obviously impossible goal since xne 
~ H m p . Thus» the for-it-
be in-itself and free at the same time. 
~<*A +n choose its being» 
self cannot escape -this endless need to cnoo 
^ ~* ~nrt the result of this 
from which it is forever separated, ana 
never attain means 
necessity to pursue something it c a n 
+« ifq world in a fantasmatic 
that the for-itself constructs its wor 
152
 Ibid. 
1 5 3
 Tfritf»t P» 652. 
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manner: the objects that it chooses only function in an 
unsubstantial and illusory way as unsatisfying substitutes 
for what it really wants. Like the greyhound chasing the 
mechanical rabbit, the for-itself is forever in pursuit of 
an object which it wishes to incorporate and, moreover, 
there is no hope of its ever devouring the real object, a 
real rabbit. The for-itself, consciousness, freedom and 
human reality are all separate terms used to describe the 
same (non-)entity: that being which wants to be in-itself, 
but must necessarily be for-itself. 
Thus, the origin of desire presents itself as ontolo-
gical: the for-itself wants to fre. Desire is then mani-
fested through choice. The choice of an object, which is 
always, at its origin, the elusive in-itself, constitutes 
a fundamental mode of being-for-itself: doing. But since 
choice is always choice oj£ g^ethlng. the object of the 
choice is never separated from the process itself, but 
forms an integral part of i t . Since the original project 
of the for-itself as lack is to be what it is (that is, to 
be something which is not nothingness), it can be seen 
that the for-itself is always choosing to fill its own 
lack, to achieve a plenitude like that of the in-itself. 
The for-itself wants ;to have itself and, since it is it-
self lack, it must choose itself from what is always out-
side it* in other words, since the for-itself is a lack 
o f
 beinp, it cannot possess a being hy possessing itself. 
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Hr must look for being elsewhere. Thus, it is only by ap-
propriating a being which is outside itself and claiming 
this being as its own that the for-itself can choose it-
self. 
There is a complicated connection, therefore» between 
being (etfe ). doing ( faire) and having ( ayoj.r ). The for-
itself wants to be in-itself (gtre ) and must therefore 
choose itself through the mediation of an object in the 
world (faire ) so that it can have itself (&voJx>-- "Ainsi 
la réalité humaine est désir d' etre-en-sol," 1 5 4 "tout ce 
qui est mien . . . m'apprend à moi-même mon choixf c'est-
à-dire mon être,»* 5* and Mla situation [i.e., fout? situ-
ation] est aie-one. . • . parce qu'elle est l'image de mon 
libre choix de moi-même et tout ce qu'elle me présente est 
mien en ce que cela me représente et me symbolise." Do-
ing and having are bound up in the same drive, which is 
grounded on the desire to be. 
"Grounded on the desire to be": the originary desire 
and its manifestation in human reality are part of the 
same system. "Le projet originel d'un pour-soi a£ ftfcUl 
£iSÊ£ 2 U Ê goj* être."is? but since the for-itself is itself 
lack and can only choose itself outside itself, the being 
*
5
* Xfcié*t p. 653. 
1 5 5
 Xfeié.f p. 541. 
1 5 6
 Ibid*, P- 639. 
1 5 7
 Ihlsi., P- 651. 
-129-
which it chooses is never the being of its original aim* 
Although the object of the for-itself's choice is alvays 
somehow determined by the aim of the original project, 
this object of the manifest drive is always fantasmatic: 
it is a representation, a surrogate for the real object 
(the for-itself-in-itself ), a metaphor for that which is 
permanently foreclosed to the for-itself# For example, in 
his discussion of love and Jealousy in Proust, Sartre 
maintains: 
[Ces émotions] ne sauraient se réduire au strict 
désir de posséder une femme, mais • • • visent a 
s'emparer £ travers la femme du monde tout enti-
er • • • [L'amour] apparaît • . • comme un rap-
port fondamental du pour-soi au monde et a soi-
même (ipséité) à travers telle femme 
particulière; le femme ne r e p r e g e n * e [emphasis 
added] qu'un corps conducteur qui est place dans 
le circuit. 1 5 8 
Thus, the object in love is a representation of the ulti-
mate object in the for-itself's fundamental project: the 
desire to be* 
Sartre's ontological examination of desire yields, 
then, as he points out, a structure that is roughly paral-
lel to that generated by Freud's psychological analysis. 
*n a passage quoted earlier (see above, p. 123), the phi-
losopher's comparison of Freudian thought to his own can 
b e
 seen as follows: 
f i s t ) * I n F r e a c* ) 
EMPIRICAL ? ORIGINAL PROJECT :: MANIFEST : COMPLEXES/ 
TENDENCY OF BEING »**VE ORIGINAL LIBIDO 
1 5 8
 Xfeia!., p. 649. 
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Moreover, according to Sartre» "le désir d'être [le projet 
originel d'être] • • • n'est rien en dehors de l'expres-
sion symbolique qu'il trouve dans les désirs concrets."159 
Since the desire to be is grounded in nothingness and can-
not be apprehended except through its manifestation in a 
symbolic sense, it must be latent, giving the impetus to a 
conscious tendency while at the same time being re-pre-
sented, netaphorized into something which it is not. The 
fundamental project can thus be understood as a kind of 
originary bad faith, for the subject must, of necessity, 
always be denied a direct knowledge of his desire to be — 
a desire which can only be apprehended in a symbolized, 
representational and translated mode.160 
Thus, although Sartre does not use the word, it is 
not impossible to apply the term "latent" at this point in 
his argumemt, whether one admits of an unconscious, in the 
systematic sense, or not. It is also clear that the com-
plexes and original libido are latent, according to the 
Freudian system. Sartre's equation, then, seems to bal-
1 5 9
 ifeiSÎ. » P. 652. 
1 6 0
 It might be helpful to note at this point that the 
various terms which Sartre uses to describe the role 
of the object in the empirical tendency — representa-
tion, symbol, metaphor, etc. — should all be under-
stood as a kind of translation from an inconceivable, 
unattainable mode (the for-itself-ln-itself) to one 
that is both conceivable and attainable. Thus^ the 
represented, symbolized, metaphorized object o. the 
for-itselfs original project can only he manifested 
through a kind of "surrogate" object which stands in 
the place of the inaccessible object. 
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ance except for one more consideration: the desire to be 
is originary for Sartre; is the libido originary for 
Freud? Sexuality is an empirical tendency» a metaphor» as 
far as Sartre is concerned; what is the status of sexuali-
ty in Freud's system? 
The Three Essays oja the Theory fii Sexuality contain 
what is probably the principal elaboration of Freud's 
study of drives. Rather than examine this text directly» 
it may be well to draw on Jean Laplanche's commentary on 
drives in Freud» for in Laplanche's text» YÀJ& fet »°rt && 
psvchapalYfrgT the subtle differences between the instinct 
( Instinkt) and the drive (IrJLÊfe) are examined with a ter-
minological rigor that even Freud himself» as a result of 
years of revising, had difficulty maintaining* 
Both mechanisms» the instinct and the drive, can be 
dismantled into four roughly separate units: the impetus 
<1& apjiÊfiee.), the aim (le feul ) » the object dlofrjet)» and 
the source < 1& fiojjxc^). The impetus is the essence of the 
mechanism» the force which is the instinct / drive itself; 
the aim is the act towards which the mechanism is driven» 
and the thing by means of which the aim of the instinct / 
drive can be accomplished is the object in the mechanistic 
system; the source of the mechanism's driving force de-
pends on the nature of the particular mechanism. The 
source of the Instinct is "that somatic process in an or-
gan or part of the body from which there results a stimu-
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lus represented in mental life by a drive." 1 6 1 The source 
of the drive is the instinct itself. 
In short * there is only one instinct — that of 
self-preservation. The example, par excellence selected 
by Freud to illustrate the instinct at work is that of the 
hungry infant. The mechanistic source of the self-preser-
vative process is, in this case, somatic. The various 
parts of the baby»s body tell the infant that it is hun-
gry. Hunger is the impetus for the motor response which 
will be, of course, eating. The aim of the instinct is 
self-preservation, but more particularly, the baby wants 
to eliminate the physical tension which has arisen as a 
result of its lack of nourishment. The nourishment it-
self, then — the milk — since it is the thing through 
which the instinct's aim can be achieved, is the object of 
the instinct. Consequently, when given the breast, the 
baby sucks on it, and the action of the infant at its 
mother's breast is the manifestation of the instinct. Al-
ready, as we shall see, the baby has entered (willy-nilly) 
into the symbolic plane of consciousness through the em-
pirical tendency to suck, which must be regarded as a aaa-
Ltegta^Xgn of the instinct. 
1 6 1
 Sigmunct Freud, «Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, • in 
Xhe Standard Edition Vol. XIV (Londonï Hogarth, 1953), 
P. 123. This description is cited by Laplanche in his 
ïiÊ £t aoxi en ppychftnMYg* <P«- A s : Flammarion, 197Û), 
p. 25. 
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Although the two mechanisms9 instinct and drive, 
function in a similar fashion* it must be noted that there 
is an important difference between the two: the instinct 
is somatic, the drive is psychical» The drive is "prop-
ped11 on the instinct. In addition to the satisfaction of 
its hunger that the baby achieves through the ingestion of 
the milk, the child is also experiencing a pleasurable 
stimulation of the lips and mouth through the action of 
sucking at the nipple and the movement of warm milk into 
the body. This stimulation provides the infant with a 
sensual pleasure that will henceforth be associated with 
the satisfaction of the instinct, and later, as the child 
discovers more erotogenic zones, will be desired in itself 
as sexuality. Sexual pleasure is thus grounded on in-
stinctual satisfaction, and this secondary pleasure, which 
constitutes the aim of the drive, can be seen as an off-
shoot of the instinct. This is, in essence, Laplanche's 
notion of propping ( k±*X&MS.f AuIfi-tUUlO* >• Although the in-
stinct is primary and does not constitute, in itself, a 
Psychological structure, it does not « i s t "tf'ftfrord Pour 
se faire exprimer ensuite par les désirs & PPPtgriQri" < t o 
borrow some words of Sartre»s). The instinct is bound up 
with its manifestation as drive and can even be regarded 
a s the source ot the drive: 
Quelle est finalement la source de la pulsion? 
Dans cette perspective, on peut dire que c est 
l'instinct tout entier. L'instinct tout entier 
avec lui-aiême sa "source," sa "poussée,* son ^ 
"but" et son "objet" tels que nous les avons de-
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finis, l'instinct, armes et bagages avec ses 
quatre facteurs, est à son tour source du pro-
cessus qui le mime, le déplace et le dénature: 
la pulsion. i 6 2 
Thus, the drive is a mimetic process: a re-presentation of 
the instinctual mechanism. 1 6 3 
162 
163 
Lapianche, yjj* £-£ a°x l EH pgyghftttftVyggt P» 41. 
At this point, we should reconsider Freud's statement 
with regard to the systematic unconscious and Triebe* 
On page 115, we cited the following: 
I am • . . of the opinion that the antithe-
sis of conscious and unconscious is not ap-
plicable to instincts [ jiat auf tfen Tr*gfr 
feeing Anwenflung 1" An instinct can never be-
come an object of consciousness — only the 
idea f die Vorstellung 1 that represents the 
instinct can. Even in the unconscious, 
moreover, an instinct cannot be represented 
otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct 
did not attach itself to an idea or manifest 
itself as an affective state, we could know 
nothing about it ("The Unconscious,,f p. 
177). 
Is Freud talking about pulsion or inP*inÇt here? La-
planche1 s suggestion that the drive f pulsion. XrJ_e_fe ) 
As a derivative, a representation of the instinct ( ia-
gtinct, Inst}ffifr*i seems to be muddled by the passage 
we have just cited, in which the drive seems to be 
primary and mimed t>y a representation ( YprgteHttng >• 
Either the use of the term Tr*eb in this case is a 
divergence from terminological rigor on Freud's part 
or Lapianche*s analysis is somewhat less than conclu-
sive. 
A third possible interpretation presents itself, 
however. Continuing our reading of the passage, we 
note the following (both the English and German ver-
sions are given for the sake of precision): 
When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious 
instinctual impulse or of a repressed in-
stinctual impulse, the looseness of phra-
seology is a harmless one. we can only mean 
an instinctual impulse the ideational repre-
sentative of which is unconscious, for noth-
ing else comes into consideration ("The Un-
conscious," p. 177). 
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Sexuallty, "qui représente le modèle de toute pulsion 
et probablement la seule pulsion au sens propre du 
terme,«**• and its power source, the reservoir of libido, 
is aoj. originary desire. At this point it must be main-
tained that the instinct of self-preservation is at least 
•ore primary than the sexual drive. Sartre's equation be-
comes unbalanced, and the comparison should be rewritten: 
«enn wir aber doch von ^ n e r . . u n b e ¥ r U " H b r e -
Triebregung oder einer verdrangten Trieore 
gun* reden, so ist dies eine harmlose Nach-
lassigkeit des Ausdrucks. Wir konnen nichts 
anderes meinen als eine Triebregung, *•*•» 
VoretellungsreprSsentanz unbewusst ist, denn 
etwas anderes kommt nicht in Betracht (Das 
Unbewusste," in the flrfftWW»**» *&£*&> V o i* X 
[London: Imago, 1946], P» 276). 
««ihlo confusion on the part Freud seems to sense a possible c o n i u ° ^0_n<4__ o f 
^ —m» +*% hie ••tooseness ox 
of the reader, for he refers to his ^
 h. w e v e r, w c 
phraseology." In clarifying his point, h o w ^ e r » W«_ 
note that he shifts from ^ to X ^ ^ f c t n l : i n -
scribe the repressed that can only ~ ^ J
 b o t h f anct 
ness through a representation. ino.ee 
Freud's discarding of one term for «"»>*her ^ £ _ * * 
fort to "tighten" his V*™Be°X°**'*lZ
 Trieb and Xn-
Planche-s effort to ^ ^ " ^ V
 TZ ^ ^ M ^ -
«Haiti» help us to understand why. X lJl_
 clnt>e 
the stirring, moving *«"£•• °* **. Laplanche points 
understood as the Inft*iliKt. * ° r ; i n c t t n a t p r o p s the 
out, it is the force of the ^ ^ f Quelle] of the libi-
drive (that is, it is the sour [ % g f l M l t .- t h e 
do). Since this is the case, ?h* conscious, ex-
T r ^ b in its entirety — cannot be
 ( _ ^ } a n d ob_ 
cept through its manifestation M " *££«,..
 Con-
ject (QiuieJtl). The impetus ( £tftOft » * L ^ ,
 D U t the 
scious as an affective state < *ltgKtrilfftMtf ^ ^ 
source (the Txi£bxfe£lWS> »s * U C ? '
 erf f r o B conscious in its entirety, is forever banished ir 
l i l e #
 ....tion of the instinct 
Thus, the lxiej> is a ~ ^ ° d * f c a n o niy become con-
<lû£iinjt±)t and the Irisfe. i^eii
 appearance as an 
scious through its manifestation, its 
empirical tendency» 
»•• Laplanche, 3LU *1 mfiXl ÊU attfiO.oai»*» *« l 8' 
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(In Sartre) < I n Freud/Laplanche) 
EMPIRICAL:ORIGINAL PROJECT : : MANIFEST:INSTINCT J* 
TENDENCY OF BEING DRIVE SELF-PRESERVATION 
Sexuality drops out of the equation as merely another link 
in the symbolic chain» an "empirical tendency.» 
Of course, it may be misleading to declare that sex-
uality is «merely" another link; it is more precisely the 
first link, the link which Joins the symbolic with the 
real. It is the "model of every drive," as Laplanche 
points out, and no one can deny that Eros plays a predomi-
nant role in Freud-s thought. This proliferation of dis-
course on sexuality is, without a doubt, the source of 
Sartre's misunderstanding of desire in Freud. Leaving 
«,*» nnte some remarkable 
this discrepancy aside, however, we nox« 
^ *wA«» In the example of 
support of one argument by the other. 
• K « + nraiity is the atti-
the baby nursing, it can be seen that orai 
^ i n t of articulation 
tude ear. excellence which marks the poinx 
between the instinct and the drive: 
sxonnel, implique a la fois U B
 r_ 
relation, disons: l« incorporation, ^ " ^ ^ 
tain type d'objet, l'objet qui est precis 
susceptible d'etre avale, incorpore. 
, *i„« of orality can apply 
It is evident that this description 
*u rft-ive. In fact, it applies 
to either the instinct or the drive. 
to both in a rather complex fashion: 
Le 
f 
a 
.
 rf(.nB u n e position tout a 
,e feut. sexuel . . . est dans un v ^
 f o n c t i o n 
ait spéciale par rapport au ^
 d iffér-
limentaire; il est a la fols te • 
ent. Le but de l'alimentation était 
1 6 5 ?bio%t *>• 22< 
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l»ingestion; or, en psychanalyse nous parlons de 
l'incorporation. Les termes peuvent paraître 
bien proches, et pourtant ils sont décales l un 
par rapport à l'autre. Avec l'incorporation, le 
but est devenu scénario d'un fantasme. 
The primary manifestation of originary desire — eating, 
swallowing, incorporation — finds support in Sartre's 
text. Since the fundamental project of being-for-itself 
is the desire to be in-itself while remaining for-itself, 
the aim of this project is a kind of self-possession: the 
-^  ,4._.w _— an impossible for-itself wants to \ nfffT"orftte itself »« »» 
task. Taking another look at an important passage cited, 
in part, earlier in this study (see above, P- 100), we 
read: 
Le malheur est que — comme le notait Hegel --
le désir détruit son objet. (En ce sens, di 
sait-il, le. d^sir ÊÊi dlsjx iS. « f ^ J ? ^ 8 
added]. ) En réaction contre cette n c * e s V ^ 
dialectique, le Pour-soi rSve d'un objet qui 
serait entièrement assimilé par moi, q u i ^ ^ 
Bai, sans se dissoudre en moi, en gar an 
structure d'ÊB^fiûi, car, justement ce que je a 
sire, c'est çej: objet et, si Je le mange, 
l'ai plus, je ne rencontre plus que moi. Cette 
synthèse impossible de l • assimilai** et se 
intégrité conservée de l'assi«ile se ^ J ^ 
dans ses racines les plus profondes, a v e ^ 
tendances fondamentales de la sexua 
j.é.<,oi-f dreams is, then, by This object of which the for-itself dream 
M
 + hic dialectical process of 
necessity, fantasmatic, and this " " 
.,„„, with the fundamental 
desire has "deep-rooted connections 
r* *he sexual drive]." In 
tendencies of sexuality [i.e.t *«« s e* 
* •«« the original fantasmatic 
fact, as Laplanche demonstrates, tne 
1 6 6
 I b i d . , p . 3 7 . 
1 6 7
 S a r t r e , r ' F . t r e ejt Ls. ufeftUit P* 6 6 8 * 
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object is the breast or, more specifically, the nipple -
an object which is symbolically connected by contiguity 
with the real object of instinctual life, milk: 
Comprenons bien que l'objet réel, le lait, était 
l'objet de la fonction [i.e., the biologica}. 
instinctual function], celle-ci étant comme 
pre-ordonnée au monde de la satisfaction» C'est 
cet objet réel qui a été perdu, mais l'objet qui 
est lie au rebroussement auto-érotique, le sein 
devenu sein fantasmatique — est, lui, l'ob-
jet de la pulsion sexuelle. Ainsi l'objet sex-
uel n'est pas identique à l'objet de la fonc-
tion, il est déplacé par rapport à lui, il est 
dans un rapport de contiguïté tout à fait essen-
tiel qui nous fait glisser insensiblement de 
l un a l'autre, du lait au sein comme son sym-
bole* 168 
Although the preceding discussion demonstrates that 
sexuality, being a drive rather than an instinct, is not 
the originary source of desire, but rather a symbolic man-
ifestation of a more primary mechanism of desire, the in-
stinct of self-p r e Servation, it is clear that Freud's sys-
tem is still not in accord with Sartrean logic. The 
°**igin of desire for Sartre, as we remarked earlier, is 
ontological. it is the rift between being-for-itseif and 
eing-in-itself which precipitates the fundamental state 
°* dissatisfaction in the subject. The biological nature 
o f t n e
 origin of desire, as it is construed by Lapianche, 
*ust somehow give way to a phenomenological argument which 
focuses on that same moment of consciousness — that of 
the point of articulation between the instinct and the 
drive — i-f
 a n ontological resolution is to be formulated 
1 6 8 
L a p i a n c h e , V ie e t mort en ppvcfranalvset P» 3 7 . 
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which is appropriate to human reality. The origin of de-
sire must be discovered in the upsurge of consciousness --
that is, in the upsurge of the for-itself, the appearance 
of nothingness and the opening of the ontological rift. 
Psychoanalytically speaking, this moment is marked by 
the phallus — that signifier which serves to originarily 
designate, as a primary link in a signifying chain, the 
effect of the nothingness that is signified. In an effort 
to clarify some of the obscurity surrounding the role of 
^ « «1 «nee at Jacques Lacan 1s the phallus, we shall now take a glance 
* M T « Signification du phal-
essay regarding this concept, "La t>ign" 
*^_ ~i «• n-f articulation be-lus," in which he examines the point of arxx 
^ * -« fhe origin of desire» tween the instinct and the drive as the o n * 
Speaking of the rift fro. which desire emerges, Lacan 
draws on a passage fro» Freud • s *££**& *** E l ^ u x * ^ ^ ' 
ciple. Freud maintains: 
No substitutive or reaction f ^ ^ T / p e r s î s t -
fice to remove the repressed instincT f 
ine tension; and it is the diff«~ e n C« *J ^ * 
amount between the pleasure of s a t i " 
which is d ^ m ^ e d and that £ * c h i- acta» ^ 
W h f T » t f that P ~ ^ d J - * h # a f I I ' position at-
will permit of no halting at any P°
 g ^ p 
tained, but, in the poet's woras, K , 
forward unsubdued" [ Mephistopheles in Goethe 
Faust, Part I ] . 1 6 9 
+ «„=, for at least two rea-
This moment in Freud is interesting for 
.
 +__ the quirk in Stra-
sons. First of all, it demonstrates the q 
chey's translating project that Laplanc 
* the rigorous attention he pays 
straighten out by means of tne " » 
6 9
 Freud, Bevond itofe ElffrfW» Erinr4pVfe» »• 36« 
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to the German text. «The repressed instinct" is actually 
M
*he repressed d r j ^ " ( de^ yergrgnrte
 TVl*p) in the origin 
nal text and this correction should be kept in mind in the 
Present context, in which Laplanche's argument plays a 
Principal role. Secondly, this sentence in Freud is the 
asis for the following paraphrase in Lacan's text: 
le désir n'est ni l'appétit de la satisfaction, 
ni la demande d'amour, mais la différence qui 
resuite de la soustraction du premier à la sec-
onde, le phénomène même de leur refente ( Snal-
*can, like Freud, describes the advent of desire in pseu-
do-arithmetical terms. Desire is initiated through the 
subtraction of the appetite for satisfaction ( l'appétjt ^ 
^* gatlgfftctipn.) f r o m the demand for love ( 1& demande d' a-
a^Uii:)- Clearly, the first term refers to the instinctual 
nctionf hunger, and the second term carries an erotic 
connotation and thus points to the sexual drive. It is 
«portant to note that desire is neither one nor the oth-
er, but rather the relationship between the two terms. 
over, this remainder can actually be seen as an abso-
U t e V f t l u e
» tor it makes little difference whether one re-
gards the first term or the second as the minuend or the 
ubtrahend. A positive difference ( "le phénomène même de 
leur refente" ) is derived no matter which direction the 
Process takes. I n the appetite for satisfaction, there is 
° conscious choice; the infant is merely hungry and as 
170
 T 
Jacques Lacan, "La Signification du phallus," in Ec-
rits It (Paris: Editions de Seuil, i971 ), p. 110. 
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l Û n g
 ^
 t h e
 » W * l tension is relieved, the organism 
W U l n 0 t
 ^ ^
 I n t h e
 « « « * *<>r love, on the other hand, 
*• the term implies, the infant must a ^ for satisfaction. 
" is evident that this second notion implies the con-
sciousnes,
 o f a n e e r f # T h i 6 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
ishment, but
 w l t h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ( ^  ^ ^ 
to the demand, at least as far as the infant is con-
erned), the aim is metaphorized as sexuality emerges (see 
the discussion above of Laplanche's argument). Seen from 
another perc?rk*>0 + 1 ~ 
*- -H«cxive, once consciousness of the need 
arises, the object of the instinct is re-presented in a 
^antasmatic sr**»»-*.» i 
scenario and becomes a weak substitute for the 
desired object «-* ^i -, 
J e c t o t
 biological satisfaction* What the in-
really wants, then, is biological satisfaction with 
strings attached. It wants to be able to demand and 
V e t h G r e a l
 object which consciousness has somehow 
royed ( Phenomenologically speaking, this object has 
nxhilated [ néantj gf ]l- Thus, the fantasmatic object 
&°P*ething t& fee. desired for the infant, and the 
erence between the appetite for satisfaction as mi-
nuend and +Vxe* ** 
i n e
 demand for love as subtrahend is obviously 
Positive: 
I* REAL OBJECT > FANTASMATIC OBJECT, 
n
 ^ P E T I T E FOP SATISFACTION - DEMAND FOR LOVE > 0. 
tion of the terms can be reversed, however, for 
nfant wants to be able to ask for and receive botft 
fantasmatic and the real object. In other words, the 
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baby wants to have both the object of consciousness and 
the object which consciousness prevents him from ever re-
ally having* Thus, the object of the aim of the drive is 
doubled, and consequently: 
FANTASiCATIC OBJECT > REAL OBJECT, 
then DEMAKD FOR LOVE - APPETITE FOR SATISFACTION > 0. 
The combining of these two points of view yields: 
(APPETITE FOR SATISFACTION - DEMAND FOR LOVEJ > 0. 
"It seems, then, that an instinct [ein Trieb» a 
drive] is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an 
earlier state of things." 1 7 1 Freud's assertion can be in-
terpreted in two ways* First, as Freud seems to intend, 
the human organism still wants to behave as if it were a 
non-conscious, one-celled organism* Secondly, the human 
organisa simply wants to return to a pre-conscious (i.e., 
Br£or Î-SL consciousness) sirate in which it does not have to 
"think, for consciousness transforms real into fantasmatic, 
a n d
 fantasy is never as satisfying as the real thing* 
Thus, obtaining the object of a drive is like purchasing a 
hotel on Park Place in a game of Monopoly: the player is 
temporarily satisfied with his long-dreamed-of financial 
success, but the revenues from the symbolic, plastic 
structure will never enable him to pay the gas bill for 
h i
» real apartment. 
I 7 1 F r e u d , B e v o n d ;tfce p l e a s u r e E n i n g i p l e . P* 3 0 . 
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re-The "earlier state of things» can, of course, be 
stored and, in all cases, eventually L& restored. As 
Freud so succinctly remarks: "The ai* of all life is 
death.«W2
 T h e death drive exists in conjunction with Eros 
and both these impetuses are metaphors for the same o r d i -
nary impulse. Human reality strives constantly to close 
the opening between its own phenomenological nothingness 
j , i....*!!- universe. Desire (consciousness) and the non-fantasmatic unive 
is desire for this closure and the goal of the drive can 
be achieved temporarily through sexual objects or perma-
^ .é-^i «w -the permanent clo— 
nently through death. Unfortunately, the
 P 
+ ~ A«ilv a solution to the sure provided by death is not reatty 
* .4.4* «é-t«o -termination of problem of dissatisfaction, for with the termin 
life, human reality becomes a meaningless term. 
rf».An«trates quite clear-Sartre's ontolo«ical schema demonstrax 
«»«.! object and suggests, 
ly the inadequacy of death as a real, onj 
J« •.wen into consideration, 
if the preceding discussion is tasen 
«„i v be the desire for a 
that the desire for death can only be 
^~„+h as conceived by con-
fantasmatic object — that is, death as c 
^ ,.min.tlon of tension which would sciousness: a permanent elimination 
i =« of consciousness. 1 7 3 The 
not, however, result in a loss of cons 
1 7 2
 XfelSÎ.f P. 36. 
ccount of old Feather— 
1 7 3
 Neil Hertz points out that ™ J * p d e a t h i n Eliot's 
stone's fantasy of 8 " r y J ^ s t r a t i o Q of this dilemma. 
Mlfldlemarch is an apt ilLustr
 w r i t t e n a detailed 
Before his death, the miser n
 d e g t l n e d t o annoy those 
plan for his funeral — a p i " 
in attendance. In Chapter 34, we re 
. , t i v e in some form or We are all of us imaginative 
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desire for death cannot, then, be an instinct; it can onl 
be a drive. Once a 3ain, speaking of the original project 
of the for-itself, Sartre explains: 
Le pour-soi surgit comme néantisation de I • en-
soi et cette néantisation se définit comme pro-
jet vers l«en-soi: entre l•en-soi neanti et l -
en-soi projeté, le pour-soi est néant. Ainsi le 
but et la fin de la néantisation que je suis, 
c'est l'en-spl. Ainsi U realite fc^*^*/*^. 
désir d'Stre-en-soi . • • L'Etre oui fait 1 ob 
jet du désir du pour-soi est donc un en-soi qui 
serait à lui-même son propre fondement . . . La 
valeur fondamentale, qui preside a ce J ^ ^ * * * 
justement 1•en-soi-pour-soi, c•eS!*~ft~ f® 
déal d'une conscience qui serait f o n d e m e " * n ^ 
son propre étre-eo-soi par la pure c o n 8 C ; e " * | , 
. -.-. ^—« n'est cet ideal 
qu'elle prendrait d'elle-même. C esx 
qu'on peut nommer Dieu. Ainsi pcut-on dire que 
ce qui rend le^mieux concevable le pro Je fonda 
mental de la réalite humaine, c est que 
est l'être qui projette d'etre Dieu. 
r* ^ r4 u r a n l S t o b e C O B i e i 01 
The subject, in wanting to become God, 
* «-f self-possession of 
mortal, for what he seeks is a sort of setT P 
«Ta. mort nous rejoint a 
which he can remain conscious. L.& mo» 
~ +w» brood of desire; 
other, for images are the o
 tf B U C n 
and poor old Feathers o -
 t ^ . w ^ f did 
at the way others cajoled «
 I n 
not escape the fellowship of ill»-* ^ ^ 
writing the programme for h * B
 t h a t 
tainly did not make clear to h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
his pleasure in t h * J ; ^ e d t o anticipation, 
formed a part was « ^
 B | h e c o t t I d in-
In chuckling °™* **l™l
 Qt h i s dead hand, 
fLict by the ^ gict clutch
 u e n e B S w i t h 
he inevitably mingled his co 
he was preoccupied witn
 x c o f f i n 
was one of grati ficat ion * » - J £ * o r k : N o r . 
(George Eliot, JLLiidlejaaxSLu I N e w *° 
ton, 1977], P. 222). 
l
» Sartre, L'Etre ejt le. niant, PP- 652-653. 
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nous-même,Mi7s
 b u t d e a t h is precisely the death of con-
sciousness* 
Thus, in huiian reality the aim of being is to have 
itself: «'Le projet originel rff un pour-soi as. peut viser 
Siàe. &£UDL gtpe. " In fact, being and having are virtually 
inseparable as modes of consciousness: 
D n
^
d e s i r n e
 P e u* être, en son fond, que désir 
^'êtrg ou désir d« avoir» I 7 6 
Le^desir d' avoir est au fond réductible au désir 
d fetre par rapport à un certain objet dans une 
certaine relation d'etre»* 7 7 
La totalité de mes possessions réfléchit la to-
talité de mon être. Je suis ce que J9sJL*176 
In psychoanalytic terms, what the subject wants is ig. 
h&ve the phallus, a project which, as noted by Lacan, re-
fers to the closure of the originary ontologicai rift 
^hich is opened as desire. But the phallus is merely a 
signifier and, what*s more, a signifier for nothingness. 
Thus, originary desire can only be symbolically satisfied 
by incorporating or appropriating objects which are meto-
nymicaily related to the real object — that is, the for-
itself can only appropriate partial objects. appropria-
tion is, therefore, the symbol of the attainment of the 
ideal of the for-itself — «un en-soi qui, en tant que 
1 7 5
 Ifri-d»T P* 159. 
1 7 6
 Ifritf., P* 670. 
1 7 7
 XfeJUt-t P* 678. 
1 7 8
 Ibjtf. y P* 680. 
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pour-sol, serait son propre f o n d e i e n f " » — and this re-
lation of the for-itself possessing and the in-itself 
possessed can only be symbolic: "on ne saurait trop in-
sister sur le fait que cette relation est svmPPUgue et 
idéale. Je ne satisfais pas . . • «on désir originel d'-
etre à moi-même mon propre fondement . . • Par l'appropri-
ation." 1 8 0 
. . ^ _*_=i= »nd Freud's theories The balance that weighs Sartre's and 
, ,. .._„, i « «. more precise fashion: 
of desire can now be calibrated in a «ore v 
(In Freud/Lacan) 
TENDENCY OF BEING U M 
Our reading of Freud against Sartre draws to a close. 
We have discovered that at the two moments when Sartre 
seems most at odds with the Freudian system, the diver-
g e between Freud's depth psychology and Sartre's pheno-
l l v a o irreat as it appears 
nenological ontology is not realty so s* 
at first glance. Sartre denies the notion of a systematic 
, 1 - ^ «-P "originary bad faith" 
unconscious, but posits a kind of orx K 
. .„.. ontological project can 
(our term) by which the origin»1 onxot
 fc 
. . a c + . t i o n as empirical ten-
only be known through its manifestation 
_«* +« failure, although 
dencies — a project which is doomed to fax 
oositive value on the 
the subject cannot help but place a v 
• î* Regarding the libido 
consciousness which manifests i^« 
^ + c ï u a U t y does not earn the 
theory, we have observed that sexuatixy 
1 7 9
 Ibjp>, p. 682. 
1 8 0
 IbJLot. 
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originary status in Freud that Sartre claims. It is 
«propped» on an instinctual force and, if the notion of 
the phallus as signifier is employed as a mediating term, 
we can conclude that human reality — for both Sartre aal 
Freud — arises through a nothingness at the heart of be-
i n g . ' " Furthermore, we have seen that, once beyond the 
primary ontological considerations with which he is con-
cerned, sexuality plays a cardinal role in Sartre's system 
as well. In fact, he maintains that the for-itself is 
• *-, +v.» world of the Other, 
sexual in its very upsurge into tne 
•K«-t although Freud and We mi6ht conclude, therefore, that atxno « 
Sartre are not in complete accord, they seem to present 
for the most part two points of view which complement and 
i _4«*st the importance of 
supplement one another. Keeping in mind xn 
/.#.t«0 + the for—itself the originary ontological dilemma (that 
^ _j~v*4 0ve a plenitude 
strives to be its own foundation and achiev 
of being - a project the goal of which is foreclosed to 
human reality due to the very nature of the for-itself), 
court; a.o approach toward a 
we can utilize a more or less Freudian ap P 
+ K « «subject1 s attitude yjs-ftr 
Psychanalyse d^s. £]&&&£.' t o T x n e 
n i manifest what is prima-
vig the world and its objects will manifes 
i„on its appearance as majii.-
rily a choice of being, but, given its aPF 
• - n v sexual in structure. festatiop. will be fundamentally sexu 
i ex 
close to developing his 
Sartre, in fact, comes very ... i«Le désir est man-
own notion of ptavage. He wr ~'
 q u e t e l , L\ est 
que d'etre, nous I ' avons vu. * ^ ^
 - a n q u e „ ( u_-
directement Ç O X I Ê SliC ^ être
 e B p h a s i s ). 
Etre et Le ûÊftnjt, p. 664, Sarxr 
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Sexuality is the child of Being and Nothingness. 
We are now in a position to respond to the question: 
"Why should one desire a reified thought, a reified con-
sciousness, a food which refuses to be digested?» The 
urge to possess concrete objects, or to concretize ab-
stract, nebulous forces, is an off-shoot of the for-it-
s e l f s fundamental project: to have itself as in-itself. 
As we have observed, the mode ftY^iX i* basically ontologi-
*_ ~~ «tteaot to achieve a 
cal and appropriation represents an atTeap* 
particular manner of being. Moreover, each manifest ob-
ject of one's desire must be understood as a displaced ob-
ject with regard to the originary ontological urge. Thus 
we see that such goals as the relocation of thought and 
_~rt the same enterprise) and 
consciousness (virtually one and the saw 
the ingestion of a food which will somehow not he consumed 
are modes of appropriation which merely sxmhS^LZ^ the 
««.itself as a free founda-
for-itself's real goal: to be in-itsen 
tiont to be Grod* 
^ ^nt-itself^ fundamental pro-
As Sartre notes» the for-itsen 
*_ ii~ «nrf ideal status» is 
Ject, due to its necessarily symbolic and 
doomed to failure. Roquentin's inquir ng 
~+ *nd. his Jonah com-
less fondling of trash in the street, and n 
I-*».»* & more fundamental, 
Plex are all charades which manifesx 
+ + p p a b l e tendency of his being, but forever latent and unutterable 
^ + thpre are times when he 
It is not surprising, then, that there ar 
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goes so far as to destroy the papers by tearing or burning 
them, for, as Sartre points out, the urge to destroy a de-
sired object is a logical and appealing consequence of the 
failure to find satisfaction in its possession: 
C'est précisément la reconnaissance de l'impos-
sibilité qu'il y a à posséder un objet qui en-
traîne pour le pour-soi une violente envie de le 
tfillMJxa. Détruire, c^est résorber en »o , c -
est entretenir avec l«etre-en-soi de l'objet de 
truit un rapport aussi profond que dans la cre-
ation. Les flammes qui brûlent la ferme a 
laquelle J'ai mis le feu réalisent peu a peu la 
fusion de la ferme avec moi-même: en s'anean-
tissant, elle se change en uSiL' D? c o u p ' «£ ** 
trouve la relation d'être de la creatxon, mais 
inversée: Je gu^s. le fondement de la grange qui 
brûle; je s ^ cette S " * * ^ ^ » ! Je de_truis 
son être. La destruction realise ^ p ^ 
plus finement que la création — l ftpîT0^ 
tion, car l'objet détruit n'est P>«- l* f j £ . .t 
montrer impénétrable. Il a l'impénétrabilité 
la suffisance d'être de l'en-soi qu il ft Ê £ Ê 
ii M l'invisibilité et la 
mais, en même temps, il a i iuv*=» . __., iii 
translucidité du néant que Je suis, puisqu 
n ' e g t p V y t g . 1 8 2 
~«».»aa." the subject at— 
Thus, through this "creation in reverse, 
tempts to produce an object which will resemble the ideal 
~ +%>**+ will manifest 
object of his ontological desire: one that 
both the impenetrability and plenitude of being in itself 
and the translucency of the for-itself, an object that, as 
emanation of the subject's consciousness, will be its own 
, + e o l f . Of courser this foundation while remaining in-i*seti. 
strategy of appropriation is condemned to fa 
~4**e it functions in a 
for, like other empirical tendencies, 
*~A «prelv represents the 
symbolic mode. The object destroyed merely 
1 8 2
 Uil£t. t P. 683. 
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reai aim of the for-itself•s urge* What's more, once the 
object is destroyed, it no longer exists as a concrete 
plenitude to be possessed — except in the past; in the 
present, it exists merely as the translacency of memory» 
We see, then? that Foquenti^s habit of picking up 
discarded scraps of paper represents? in its detailed 
structure, an effort to have the phallus, to be what he 
is. Through a lengthy analysis of his description of the 
papers and the manner in which he treats them, we have un-
covered an expansive network of data which contributes to 
our understanding of the individual consciousness — Ro-
quentin's — as this particular for-itself manifests the 
outward signs of its universal signifying project. al-
though one can say that the fundamental project of all 
consciousnesses is to become God, the specific strategy 
that each consciousness employs towards the icfe£ realiza-
tion of this goal is unique in its specificity. It is at 
this level that one can begin to speak about personality 
and complexes. 
It is clear that Roquentin's descriptive preamble to 
his relating of an "event," a fragment which is situated 
in the entry of "mardi 30 janvier," is a dense and reveal-
ing piece of discourse. As we have shown, several aspects 
of Roquentin's psychic leanings seeoi to surface in this 
Passage. If this is so, then our analysis should reveal 
something about the rest of the journal — Roquentin's 
Psychological crisis and his decision to write a novel. 
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We suggested earlier that what Roquentin does, 
essentially, is "play with fire." How are we to under-
stand this notion of playing, its relation to avoir and 
fitr5 and, on the other hand, the intense seriousness with 
which fcoquentin views his existential dilemma — a situ-
ation which, in part, gives rise to his sudden and appar-
ently inexplicable incapacity to pick up a piece of lined 
school stationery from the sidewalk in front of the Hotel 
Printania? 
Chapter III 
TO PLAY OR NOT TO PLAT 
est, somme toute, une image assez ressemblant 
de la vie, Ch e 
cun de nous, gajQLS. atftTE frtfl £ttt£ 
£ Ê Jojxex (quels que soient les beaux prétextes 
Çu il
 8 e donne), assemble, selon son caprice, 
selon ses capacités, les éléments que lui four-
nit l'existence, les cubes multicolores qufil 
trouve autour de lui en naissant. Les plus 
doues cherchent à faire de leur vie une con-
struction compliquée, une véritable oeuvre 
art. il
 f a ^ t tacher d'etre parmi ceux-là, 
pour cyue la récréation soit aussi amusante que 
possible... (Martin du Gard, fc£fe Ifclè&iiJLi, Vol. 
7
» P. 283). 
We have remarked that the various facets of Roquen-
s behavior with regard to the paper he picks up from 
r e e t h i s touching, his staring, his mouthing and 
destroying — in some way constitute an activity that 
U S t b e c
°nsi dered play. "Comme font les enfants,11 Ro-
q U e n t l n
 adopts a pattern of behavior that mimicks, that 
"-enacts actions of what we shall call a more "serious'1 
"*• As our psychoanalytic inquiry has revealed, the 
e r
^ying significance of Roquentinfs rather off-beat in-
v e s t i s couched in the relation of this interest to a 
°«bination of paradigmatic childhood events, mythical 
erwise, which serve as a framework for a later struc-
e
 în which these childhood moments are re-created meta-
°^icaily. In addition to the infantile tendency to put 
un-
or 
« ero_ 
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found objects into his mouth (a reproduction of the 
breast-feeding scenario ), Roquentin also shows us evidence 
of the Actaeon complex, a structure that» as we have dem-
onstrated, is related to the scopophilic moment o&f exce].-
1 ence in which the child discovers the fundamental anatom-
ical difference between the sexes while peeping on a 
member of the opposite sex, who is perhaps urinating or 
defecating. In Roquentin's hydra complex, we noted (by 
following a thread left by Freud) an extension of the Pro-
metheus complex, a mode of behavior whose early prototype 
is the scene of the child fs theft of matches, in spite of 
parental prohibition, in order to play with fire with 
his/her friends in some secluded spot. Thus, the Jonah, 
Actaeon, Prometheus and hydra complexes, as well as the 
activity which Bachelard terms "la curiosité agressive," 
can all be understood as forms of repetition of a child-
hood moment of some import, a repeating "comme font les 
enfants": play. We shall now turn our attention to an ex-
amination of this behavioral strategy, the playful element 
of which is sometimes readily apparent, but often times 
not. 
After completing his discussion of the Actaeon and 
Jonah complexes and the appropriât!ve nature of knowledge, 
Sartre acknowledges that the apparent gratuity of play and 
sport present a stumbling block to the progress of his 
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universal reduction of human activity to having, and ulti-
mately to being. In what sense can Is. lÊtt be construed as 
a form of appropriation? 
First of all» Sartre notes: 
•. • _-_-<- à i iBSDplt de sérieux» 
le jeu, en s1 opposant a l esprit <* 
semble l'attitude la moins possessive, il enlevé 
au réel sa réalité. H y a sérieux quand on 
part du monde et qu'on attribue plus de «••»lJ*« 
au monde qu'à soi-mSme, à tout le moins quand on 
se confère une réalité dans la mesure ou on ap-
1 fi 3 
partient au monde» * 
an opposition is constructed between L E ±*» and the e^oxli 
Ite sérieux. The drawback inherent in the latter is its 
tendency to confuse the brute, contingent reality of the 
world with aspects of the for-itself. The Êfifitil ÛS. fiir.-
i * « views freely chosen attitudes as contingent necessity 
« ~„~ the freedom with which 
and, in so doing, manages to ignore the ire 
he/she participates in a given situation. 
world were dictating an attitude to the effPr* »» 
, , „ c r f u c e for the for-itself s 
furnishing not only a playing surface 
i
 OC5 Q-f *the game» Such 
projectst out also imposing the rule 
-for* the Qgorit && ggrietf2> is not really the case, however, for the espn*. 
. M g oerspective. Further-
has, at bottom, merely chosen this persp 
4« the Sartrean sense of le. 
more, this is hardly a game, in 
* ~+ »hat it feels is 
IS*, for the "serious mind» acts out of 
. __ The attitude of the 
necessity — it is following orders. 
~+ «lav. but rather 
ssnrit de. sérieux, then, is not one of p W , 
i~ +.ct. It is also in bad 
one of work — slave labor, in lacx. 
1 6 3
 Sartre, I-'Etre fit ±£. nlftûl» P» 6 6 9 # 
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faith, because, as Sartre points out: «l'homme sérieux 
enfouit au fond de lui-même la conscience de sa li-
berté.» 1 8 4 
But how are we to understand Sartre's postulation 
that the esorit is. sÂl±£M& manifests itself when "on at-
tribue plus de réalité au monde qu'a soi-même," if we keep 
in mind that such a perspective is also characterized by a 
furtive denial of one's ontological freedom? In other 
i 4>K*n the world? Or do 
words, is freedom somehow more real than 
^ r tiAtP reality as a kind of freedom and brute contingency promote r e a u j 
fifty-fifty enterprise, with each factor more or less 
sharing the responsibility for establishing the parameters 
and factual ramifications of a given situation? 
As we remarked above, the e&ZZLL && £Ê£iÊU£ tends 
j+ooi-f with those of the in-it-
confuse aspects of the for-itself wixn 
+ *,«• -for the thinking subject, 
self. This is not to say that, for xne 
*_ ^—^^« ««-He for-itself and 
there is a radical separation between the 
- m.i«t be classified on one 
the in-itself whereby phenomena musx 
side or the other- Rather, phenomena represent for the 
-* - itself with the in-it-
subject an interaction of the *or-xi» 
self. The world ^ . . . in-itself. Consciousness, 
through its very upsurge, brings nothingness into the 
^irtcrical void its bag-
world and along with this phenomenologica 
w i^* value, meaning- One at-
gage: negation, freedom, choice, 
-l ri than to oneself when 
tributes more reality to the world than 
* IfcLU* 
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one neglects the input of this nihilating program, rhen 
one credits the in-itself for directing an enterprise that 
only the for-itself could manage. This project of the 
for-itself is accomplished through the work of the for-it-
self's Manifestation as freedom on the raw material of the 
world. Attributing such aspects as value and meaning to 
the world in-itself is to deny the input of consciousness 
with regard to a given project. 
An example is perhaps in order here. In speaking of 
"le coefficient df adversité " — that is, the degree to 
which things appear as obstacles in the various paths of 
human endeavor — Sartre remarks: "le coefficient d' ad-
versité des choses, en particulier, ne saurait Ztre un ar-
gument contre notre liberté, car c'est p_ax OSXk&f c»est-à-
«ire
 p a r I a position préalable d'une fin que surgit ce 
coefficient d'adversité." 1 8 5 He then points out that a 
c
^ g (ua rocher) would present itself as a powerful obsta-
cle to one rho has decided to try to displace it; but, on 
the other hand, the same crag would be of great use to one 
*ho is in search of an elevated vantage point. Conse-
quently: "En lui-meme — s'il est même possible d'envisag-
er ce qu'il peut être en lui-même -- il est neutre, c'est-
à-dire qu'il attend d'etre éclairé par une fin pour se 
manifester comme adversaire ou comme auxiliaire." Fur-
1 8 5
 XkL£., p. 562« 
1 8 6
 Ibitf. 
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thermore, if
 o n e w e r e t o t r y t o c l i B b t h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Promontory would be constituted as an obstacle only
 i n 
terms of the very project to climb it. Thus, if a climber 
fails to reach a crag's summit, it can hardly be said that 
he is defeated by the rock in-itself. but rather by cir-
cumstances which are the direct consequences of his ini-
tial project to climb the crag: "c'est donc notre liberté 
=tui constitue les limites, qu'elle rencontrera par la 
suite.«187 T* . 
it is not, then, the world in-itself that de-
eats us, or allows us to succeed. The world merely sup-
es us with the raw material through which we can defeat 
O UrSÊ L Vetc 
^ves, or arrange for our own success» The esprit ^ 
^Cie-iU. refuses to comprehend this. 
aking into consideration the foregoing remarks* we 
an now understand how it is that the esprit pte serieu^ 
**c ions as a mode of appropriation. By conferring con-
equentiality and meaning on the world in-itself, the e_fi-
^^i-i SîÊ ggrjeua seeks to deny the freedom which is consti-
ive of its very consciousness (of) that world. The 
o u s
 mind wants to make the for-itself a mere chip in 
ante of the game which it feels the world is playing. 
u®t as we have cited above, "on se confère une realité 
n s
 la mesure où on appartient au monde." Moreover, in 
S
 attempt to deny its freedom, the egprjt £e_ ëÂz±.&\l& 
8 h e s
 *° constitute itself as an object, as in-itself: 
1 8 7
 i&id.. 
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"l>homme est sérieux quand il se prend pour un objet, "ise 
ï* is in this desire for objectification that we recogniz, 
*he appropriative tendency of the aaoxil te fiixHaux., for 
the subject wishes to reify his consciousness, to become 
in-itself that would be its own foundation (for he must 
a ariorl choose this attitude, aate. of the for-itself an 
in-itself). 
P l a y
'
 o n t h
« other hand, consists in not taking 
$ h i , n g a s
«»«-iously. it is an attitude that is fundamentally 
aware of itself as freedom: 
Des qu'un homme se saisit comme libre et veut 
user de sa liberté, quelle que puisse être d'-
ailleurs son angoisse, son activité est de jeu: 
il en est, en effet, le premier principe, il 
échappe à la nature naturée, il pose lui-même la 
T a e u r e * lfts règles de ses actes et ne consent 
a payer que selon les règles qu'il a lui-même 
posées et définies. 1 8 9 
J "t i 2 
8 l mPortant to bear in mind that one who is at play 
°
e S n o t v r i t e off the world as inconsequential — or 
°**se. as unreal. Rather, the "esprit çie Jeu" (a term 
a
 Is not Sartre 96, but one that we shall propose to de-
C r i b e
 *hat attitude which seems in opposition to the e^-
^ A £ £e_ fiérjeux.) understands the world in terms ot its 
°ntingency and the freedom brought to bear upon it by the 
^itself. Meaning, value, and consequences are under-
°od in terms of the for-itselffs project and not, as in 
e
 case of the esprit de sérieux* as qualities inherent 
th 
i&id», p. 669. 
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to the in-itself. Nor does the esprit glfe ,*eu take itself 
as an object to be manipulated by the circumstances of its 
situation, for the esprit de Jeu comprehends itself as a 
free subjectivity through which the circumstances them-
selves are infused with their value qua circumstance. It 
is precisely in this focus on its existential freedom that 
the esprit de Jeu appears to escape the appropriative ten-
dency which is fundamental to the various attitudes we 
have thus far examined in this study. The playful con-
sciousness seems to be little concerned with possessing 
itself as in-itself: "Il semble donc crue lf homme qui 
Joue, applique à se découvrir comme libre dans son action 
elle-même, ne saurait aucunement se soucier de gpffgetfer un 
être au monde." 1 9 0 
At this Juncture, however, we must raise the question 
of how we are to understand the for-itself's project-as-
Play in terms of the conclusions drawn earlier from such 
claims of Sartre's as: «le projet originel d'un pour-soi 
0-Ê Peut viser <xue s^û fttre."191 If the original project is 
appropriative, how can the esprit £e_ ifeu. escape this ori-
ginary bias. 
The fact of the matter is that it does not. First of 
a U t we note that in his exposition of his notion of le. 
ÔÊUt Sartre goes on to say: "Son but [i.e., the goal cf he 
1 9 0
 IhLû*» PP. 6 6 9 - 6 7 0 . 
1 9 1
 Ihisi'f P. 651 ( q u o t e d a b o v e , Ch. l i t P* *28 >. 
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who plays], qu'il le vise à travers les sports ou le mime 
ou les Jeux proprement dits, est de s'atteindre lui-même 
comme un certain être, précisément l'être qui es* en ques-
tion dans son être." 1 9 2 Thus, the project of the esorit £e_ 
JJÊU. has being as its aim, as is the case with the other 
attitudes we have thus far presented» The nature of this 
being towards which the esprit de Jeu strives is distinct-
ly different, however, from the ontological objective of 
"the esprit de sérieux. The being which the esprit 1& d&M 
wants to attain is not precisely "un être au monde" — a 
being by which the subject can exist in the world as an 
object — but rather a being "qui est en question dans son 
être": the for-itself as relentlessly free subjectivity 
and çbpgeq as such (i.e., as non-être). If the esprit 4§L 
ge
*»*g^K seeks to constitutes itself as an object, which it 
is not, in order that it might have itself, the esprit £tfe 
J^U seeks to accept itself as the free subjectivity, which 
it is, in order that it might not be had. In this sense, 
because it refuses to deny its responsibility for its at-
titudes towards the world, the playful consciousness can 
be said to be in "better" faith than the esprit £& &&£-
Second of all, although the notion of play carries 
*i*h it the sense of an action which is gratuitous, non-
acquisitive, and non-serious, the apparent irreducibility 
1 9 2
 XkiOt P. 670. 
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of .tajre to avoir, with regard to the playful attitude, 
does not hold up under closer scrutiny» As Sartre ob-
serves: "il est rare que le jeu soit pur de toute ten-
dance appropriative*" 1 9 3 Drawing from the realm of sports 
for his examples (although expanding the pool of examples 
to include all playful activities in general would do 
nothing to undermine the foundation of the argument which 
he is in the process of developing), Sartre points out 
that the desire to perform well in competition, to win, to 
break a record, or even the wish to be considered gpprtit 
all manifest the desire to appropriate oneself objectively 
through one 1s being-for-others* Of course, it could be 
contended that all forms of Ijg. Jeu do not hetray these 
supplementary qualities. Nonetheless, there is no manner 
o t
 Play which is free from at least one appropriative com-
ponent: "Le sport est en effet libre transformation d•un 
milieu du monde en element de soutien de l«action. De ce 
fait, comme l«art, il est créateur." 1 9 4 The solitary dart 
Player, although he/she may have little or no interest in 
competitive dart throwing and may not care one way or an-
other what others think about this activity, is still en-
Raged in an enterprise ay which the world and the objects 
in it are transformed according to the actions of his/her 
9 3
 là±&. Although he states that such an activity is 
"rare," the remarks that follow would seem to suggest 
that a form of play that would not include an appro-
priative aspect is more than rare, it is impossible. 
1 9 4
 Xfcitf. 
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throwing hand* As we pointed out earlier» games, along 
with such activities as scientific research and art, mani-
fest the for-itself»s attempt to achieve a synthesis of 
self and not-self through which consciousness1 relation to 
an object can be characterized as possessive (see above, 
Ch. II, pp. 90-91). While the object of such creative ac-
tivity (that is, the brute reality of the world, which is 
to be transformed) retains the "opacité" and "indiffér-
ence" of the en-Bo). the role of the cour-goi in shaping 
and sustaining the meaning of this "ailieu du «onde" al-
lows consciousness to enter into a "double rapport" with 
the situation in question: consciousness both conceives 
*he situation and encounters it.195 
Thus, le. Jejj is creative in that it transforms the 
*orla into a backdrop which receives its qualitative fac-
ets f r o m t h e f r e e p r o J e c t of the for-itself. The for-it-
e elf uses its freedom to shape the world and, for this 
reason, play must be considered a gesture of appropria-
tion. 
It is easy to see, then, how the playful attitude — 
li
*e all the other tendencies we have thus far investigat-
e d
 — is an attempt on the part of the subject to "s'ap-
^ o P r l e r l e n o n £ f e evrabolicIaement." Consciousness cannot 
Possess the world as in-itself, but, through its investing 
°* meaning and value into the world, it can possess the 
1 9 5
 See
 L..gtre ej: JU nkinlf P- ° 6 5 ( * l 8° &t>0^ C h" " ' 
PP* 90-91). 
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world as situation, as representation, as a symbolic mani-
festation of itself. Consequently, the esprit de Je_y., 
like other fundamental attitudes, constitutes an attempt 
on the part of the subject to master the situation in 
which he finds himself: a situation which is both within 
his grasp — because it is through consciousness that 
meaning comes into the world — and beyond him — because 
the for-itself cannot sidestep the contingent factors pre-
sented by the world in-itself, nor those presented by the 
body which it "has to exist" (see note *91f p. 85), nor 
those presented hy the for-itself1 s own facticity (i.e., 
the inescapable necessity for consciousness to be free to 
choose )• 
Leaving Sartre's ontology to one side for a moment, 
l e t u s once again turn our attention to Freudian consider-
ations. 
In fiejEao^ xh& Pleasure principle, Freud undertakes 
what is perhaps his most extensive examination of the e_fi-
&Tlt st& J Ê U in its most "normal" manifestation: children's 
p l a y . As an example of such an activity, he cites the 
case of a small boy of one and a half who often threw one 
°
r
 another of his toys across the room, into a corner or 
under the bed while emitting the drawn-out syllable "o-o-
°-o." This sound was thought toy the boy's mother to be 
the baby talk equivalent of the word £oft («one, away). 
5 e r
 theory was confirmed by a later, more extensive ver-
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sion of the child's game in which he used a bobbin with a 
string tied around it to play "gone." The child would 
fling the reel over the edge of his bed, thus making it 
disappear, and would accompany this practice with the usu-
al "o-o-o-o." Then he would pull the object back into 
sight hy means of the attached string and would welcome 
the bobbin* s reappearance with the sound "ia." (there). 
Thus, the game's complete cycle encompassed the polar val-
U e s
 £firt-da, disappearance and return. 1 9 6 
It is important to note that, as a rule, the child 
°nly played the game through its first stage, that is, 
Without retrieving the cast away object. It was evident, 
however, that the second stage, announced by the gleeful 
£â» provided the boy with the greater pleasure. Freud 
Points out that, in general, the boy iras quite well-be-
haved and that he was very attached to his mother, who had 
hreast-fed him herself and who had more or less taken care 
°* him by herself with little outside help. It is thus a 
somewhat remarkable fact that the hoy never cried when his 
mother departed for a few hours. These considerations 
e a d
 Freud to the following conclusion: 
1 9 6 The fort-rf* game and its role in Beyoptf IhS, ELÊASLUXÊ. 
Princ|pl f T a s a whole, is an informing factor for much 
of the work of both Laplanche and Lacan. In addition, 
it is examined extensively in Jacques Derrida's L& 
£*XtÊ Postale: j£e Socrate l EnejàSt fet au-tfela (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1980). See also Julia Kristeva's Là B&VQ.-
iutiûû eu langftge p o é n w e : L-1 P^nt-garçle a. 1& tLu Oil 
iûmeiiviàae siècle, LfcU&CftftOftOl fil MaUftrme (Paris-
Editions de Seuil, 1974), A, lit 3 ("La Négativité 
transversale au jugement thetique1* )• 
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Th. interpretation of the «a.e ^ ^ s t 
ous. It was related to the child»s gre***st 
cultural achievement - the instinct«^ J « J £ { -
ation (that is, the renunciation of ^ î n f h î s 
satisfaction) which he had made in alio n Is 
mother to go away without P " * " * ^ « ' " J ^ â e -
pensated for this, as it were, by J 4 - « l * • * £ „ 
ing the disappearance and return of the objects 
within his reach. 1 9 7 
This re-enactment of the scene of the disappearance and 
subsequent return of the mother is carried out by the 
«_ W W J « One might wonder why 
child through the use of the bobbin. One mxg 
,^.r.o the distressing circum-
the child would wish to re-produce the 
T-P the explanation is 
stances of his mother's absence. n 
~* ±H& bobbin must neces-
ventured that the throwing away of the 
* ~+ its retrieval» this 
sarily precede the joyful moment oi 
^ « U h the observation that 
interpretation can be countered wx*n 
.é-u. -fîr^ st stage only —""" 
the game is often played through the 
, 1 U -«-enacts the mother» s 
the fort stage in which the child re ena 
+« «ake her return» Con-
disappearance without attempting to 
, l o g . w h y does the child wish 
sequently, the question remains. 
* ^,,-elv have caused him 
to repeat an experience which must surely n 
displeasure? 
•wat it is difficult to draw 
Although he is aware thax 
! 4„ns from an isolated example 
convincinR universal conclusions 
. K.i.cc uses this case 
such as the fort-da game, Freud nonetheless 
tion of the effects of 
*s a kind of paradigmatic manifes a 
i *„n to repeat» (gifrrferho-
*hat he will call a "compulsion 
~«+ of this notion by i i « t^i « development oi ^"* 
k n g s a ^ n g h Re begins his aev« 
1 9 7
 Freud, fiej^î U * £ 1 * * * ^ EriOXl^» P-
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pointing out three possible interpretations of the small 
boy" s behavior. First of all, Freud notes that the fort> 
ââ game constitutes a repetition of an earlier event in 
which the child played a passive role» By repeating the 
experience on his own terms» the boy succeeds in trans-
forming his initially passive part into an active one. 
This strategy, Freud claims, "might be put down to an in-
stinct for mastery that was acting independently of wheth-
er the memory was in itself pleasurable or not.» 1 9 8 The 
idea that such behavior might be related to an "instinct 
for mastery" C Bemachtigun^strieb) is reinforced when we 
recall Freud»s initial analysis of the fprt~£ft game: the 
child's play compensates for the renunciation of instinc-
tual satisfaction — his failure to protest his mother1s 
absence — i n that he, himself, stages the disappearance 
and return of "objects within his reach" (grreichfrftren £fc~ 
ggnstgn^n t.
 W e a r e rcillino:ed of the Prejftrjefr, that urge 
in the child which drives him to reach out and grab 
things, an attempt to master a situation which is, as we 
discussed previously, at its origin the primordial ontolo-
*ical rift on which desire lays its foundation (see above, 
C h
. I, pp. 41-42). Thus, the absence of the mother, a 
situation the significance of which is highly charged ow-
ing to the mother's role as one of the original objects of 
the baby's drives, is easily understood as an instigating 
9 8
 ifeiot-t p. 1 0 . 
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factor in the manifestation of the Greiftrieb. given this 
drive's dependence on the more inclusive Bemacht i ?m^g-
Secondly, Freud hazards the hypothesis that the game 
«ight represent for the child a means of expressing the 
same hostile impulse that he suppressed in refraining from 
emitting a direct protest in regard to his mother1s ab-
sence. The fort-da «ame, or more precisely the fort- only 
version of the game, would then function as a kind of sym-
bolic revenge on the part of the player: "In that case it 
[the game] would have a defiant meaning: 'All right, 
then, go awayi I don't need you. I'm sending you away 
myselft #MX9 9 Consequently, the apparent paradox that the 
child would derive enjoyment from the repetition of an un-
pleasant experience is resolved, because given the venge-
ful implications of the tossing about of his toys, "the 
repetition carried along with it a yield of pleasure of 
another sort but none the less a direct one.» 2 0 0 
The third consideration which Freud calls to mind is 
°ne that comes to bear not only on the specific example of 
£°-Z^Lda (which in fact seems to be only marginally in-
formed by such a motif), but on children's play as a genre 
°* activity. Children wish to be grown-up and, conse-
quently, often play at being an adult. Although Freud 
199
 HO*. 
200
 utu. 
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does not make the connection, one night attribute this 
wish to the instinct for mastery as well, because, in a 
child's eyes, it is the adult who seems to be in control 
of the world in which the child finds himself playing a 
passive role. This aspect of children's games, in which 
the child imitates the behavior of the adult, is only in-
directly manifested in the throwing away of his toys by 
_i- rt is. however, strlk-the small boy in Freud's example. it is, 
— «.«* «M-io ff&sie *to which ingly present in another version of the ga 
Freud alludes in a footnote: 
One day the child's -«>«»•' j £ n * ; ~ %?Jf?* the 
several hours and on her r t ^ ^ t incom-
words 'Baby o-o-o-ol' w h J £ ~ J
 h o w e v e r , 
prehensible. It sooned * « ™ e d ° ^
 £ t u d e t h e 
that during this long period of s o u 
child had found a method of making J J - » ^ ^ 
appear. He had discovered his r 
full-length mirror which did not « £ * ^ l d n a k e 
ground, so that by crouching down he 
his mirror-image 'gone.' 
iko-ic: disappearance by disap-
The child imitates his mother's disapp 
^«•a not yield the dis-
Pearing from himself. The game does not y 
eal event, however, since 
tressing consequences of the re 
^ i „* the circumstances of his 
the child is in full control of tne 
reappearance. 
•^..«tlottSi at work either 
All three of the above considerations, 
ther serve to illumi— 
together or independently of one ano 
-r «.11 playful bahavior, if we 
nate the general motivation ol an-
* * Freud's theoretical discus-
call to mind the elements of Freua 
rf what is "beyond." A 
sion of the pleasure principle ana 
201
 Ibid.,
 P. 9. 
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brief sketch of these mechanisms is in order. 
The lental apparatus, Freud contends, is under the 
dominance of the pleasure principle and its "subsidiary," 
the reality principle. The pleasure principle ( dag Ij^gi-
£Tin? ) u ) can best be understood as an economic pre—dispo-
sition of the psyche to constantly endeavor to reduce the 
amount of freely-floating energy in the apparatus by re-
leasing it. This release of energy is accomplished 
through instinctual satisfaction or wish-fulfillment, the 
accomplishment of the aim of a desire which finds its 
**oots in the unconscious. This strategy, otherwise known 
as the "primary process,91 is thus a rather primitive pro-
cedure by which drives are satisfied without reflection on 
°
r
 concern for the consequences of this satisfaction. In 
t h e i r
 simplest form, then, unpleasure (Unlust) corresponds 
t o
 an increase or overabundance of mental excitation, and 
Pleasure ( Lust 1 corresponds to a reduction or stabilizing 
°f mental excitation — a state usually achieved, at least 
as far as the pleasure principle is concerned, through the 
S atisfaction of an unconscious instinct or drive. 
The pleasure principle is not the whole story, how-
e v e r
» for, as Freud points out: "If such dominance exist-
ect> the immense majority of our mental processes would 
h
*ve to be accompanied by pleasure or to lead to pleasure, 
Whereas universal experience completely contradicts any 
-170-
o un-
, U C h C O n C l U S l o a
'
, , 2
°
2
 Consequently, it is important t 
C t e r S t a n d
 *
h e
 P l e * 8 " ~ Principle as a tendency
 l n n e n t a l 
**e» rather than as an omnipotent force. In support of 
this limitation of the pleasure principle's dominance, 
r e U t t C l t e e t h e
 effects of what he terms the «reality 
P^inclnl^tf /-*__ « , . •• 
l f l & £
 geftl>jt»tgprinr,jp)f a mechanism which actu-
ly functions in the service of the pleasure principle: 
t.
 S
 • • • Principle does not abandon the inten-
n o t
 ultimately obtaining; pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the 
Postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of 
a number of possibilities of gaining satisfac-
on and the temporary toleration of unpleasure 
a S a
* n ^ e p o n t h e l o n « indirect road to pleas-Ure »^"3 
reality principle is thus a reflective gesture, a move 
consciousness to control and direct the blind reckless-
of the primary process in view of the data received 
nterpreted by the system Cs« This second principle, 
nown as the «secondary process,11 therefore appears 
function of conscious life and thus has little to do 
control or mastery of those drives which are re-
sed. Obviously, we have still not rendered the whole 
* with regard to the LttgtpringJP» 
What is beyond the pleasure principle is the compul-
°
n
 to repeat. First of all, let us note that the free-
IV" *•» •& 1 
owing energy i n the unconscious cannot always achieve 
C
*-^Scha.T*j»x» w 
e e
 because of the barrier of repression which dams 
* Û 2 
ièid*, p. 3. 
£*>!£•, p. 4. 
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its path* Consequentlyt these unconscious impulses which 
seek resolution can only pass through the censorship 
through symbolic transformation — representation by way 
of such mechanisms as displacement and condensation* If 
the energy attached to a particular unconscious idea is 
strong enough, it will become absolutely necessary for it 
to pass through the censorship in one way or another * be-
cause of the unhealthy quantity of unpleasure generated 
through the struggle of the repressive mechanism (which 
requires a certain level of energy of its own to effect 
its task) and the instinctual impulse which seeks dis-
charge. The free charge of the unconscious idea must be 
"bound" in some way, controlled before it is allowed to 
Pass the censorship and subsequently mastered in its al-
tered conscious form. This binding and mastering of the 
overly-charged impulse comprises both the displaced and 
condensed representation of the impulse (its symboliza-
t i o n ) , as well as the compulsion to repeat — for the im-
pulse can only temporarily be mastered and will continue 
to strive for discharge* The importance of this procedure 
cannot be overlooked: 
A failure to effect this binding would provoke a 
disturbance analogous to a traumatic neurosis; 
and only after the binding has been accomplished 
would it be possible for the dominance of the 
Pleasure principle (and of its modification, the 
reality principle) to proceed unhindered. Till 
then the other task of the mental apparatus, the 
task of mastering or binding excitations, would 
have precedence — not, indeed, in opposition to 
the pleasure principle, but independently of it 
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and to some extent in disregard of it. 2 0 4 
Thus we see that the repetitive aspect common to 
children 's play is in two senses an indication of the 
Player's attempt to control the level of mental excitation 
to which he is subject• First, there is the repetition of 
an activity for purely pleasurable reasons — an attempt 
to control freely-flowing energy through its discharge, 
thus reducing the quantity of unpleasure in the mental ap-
paratus which results from a surfeit of unbound impulses* 
Second, there is the repetition of an activity that one 
would normally consider unpieasurable (Freud's case of the 
young boy repeating his mother's departure, kids playing 
doctor, etc. ). i n this second case, the child attempts to 
aaster the unconscious impulse through binding and repeti-
tion in an effort to neutralize the unpieasurable effects 
of the repressed excitation* This enterprise is carried 
out, as we suggested above, through the symbolic realiza-
tion of the aim of the impulse* 
Finally, we might mention a few comments of Lacan 
*hich are pertinent to the foregoing considerations of the 
£2JZ±=:S£S, game and of children1 s play in general* In his 
•'Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychana-
lyse," Lacan remarks that in the exemplary case cited by 
Freud: " i e sujet n'y maîtrise pas seulement sa privation 
e
*> l'assumant, tais . . . il y élève son désir a une puis-
2 0 4
 ifei£*T p.29. 
sance seconde,» 2 0 5 In its simplest sense, the raising of 
the subject's drive to a second power can be understood as 
the replacement of one drive by another, with the latter 
desire dependent on its mere primary manifestation for the 
driving force of its impulse* In terms of fort-da. the 
boy has replaced the desire for his absent mother (D 1) 
*ith the desire to play the game ( D 2 ), an interest of a 
second degree which nevertheless remains informed by the 
first degree, or primary urge: to instigate the return of 
the mother* We are reminded here of Laplanche's notion of 
propping, in which the source, impetus, aim and object of 
the instinct provide the source for the «trive — desire 
raised to the second power, as it were (see above, Ch. II, 
P* 131). in fact, the fort-da game, being a play of pres-
ence and absence, of have and have-not, repeats the origi-
nary moment at which desire appears as a wish for closure, 
a leaping of the ontological gap that was opened with the 
emergence of consciousness» 
But the ramifications of this squaring of the origi-
nal variable are more complex and extensive than the mere 
supplementing of one desire for another. Lacan continues: 
Car son action [i.e., the action of the player 
°* fort-da] détruit l'objet qu'elle fait appa-
raître dans la provocation anticipante de son 
absence et de sa présence. Elle négative ainsi 
le champ de forces du désir pour devenir a 
0 5
 Jacques Lacan, "Fonction et champ de la parole et du 
langage en psychanalyse," in Ecrits I (Paris: Editions 
de Seuil, 1966), p. 203. 
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elle-même son propre objet.2 
If the first power drive (DM — source, impetus, aim, and 
object — provides the source for the second power drive 
CD*), it can also be said that the aim-object package of 
D» (the return of the mother) serves as the informing ob-
^ ._».j~ .nrf its disappearance and ject of D* That is, the bobbin and its axs vi 
i„ «qoectively) in the system 
retrieval (the object and aim, respectif 
.*.-, ; r% A mftchanisin which D* appear only as incidental parts in a mecnan 
**.«. -.turn of the mother. has, as its actual function, the return 
The game becomes an object of desire in itself ("pour de-
venir elle-.Sme son propre objet"), because (1) it nihi-
lates the object of its Informing drive by replacing it 
^ Ol it neutralizes the attrac-
with a symbolic object, and (2) i* ne 
^ *~~ it is precisely in the 
tion of the bobbin as object, for 
* this object that the aim of D* is 
presence and absence of this ooj 
found. in this way, the player's action «negative ainsi 
le champ de forces du désir" in binding the anxiety-pro-
n f Dl, a process that Freud 
voking, free-flowing energy of u » 
t h e y» • P T f f î r h«lungt i f : " > < i n g ' t h e 
terms, as we have just seen, the HIT^TT- — -
compulsion to repeat. 
trace a path from Lacan back to 
At this point, we can trace 
* »n object lacking to the 
Sartre. If the symbolisation of an o 
,.
 + h i S object in the raising 
subject in some way "destroys" this 
then a connection appears be-
of desire to a second power, " e B 
^
 +. f fi e B, creation and de-
tween the two appropriative strategi 
-175-
struction. The young boy who plays the fort-dft game is 
engaged in a creative actt for (whether the game was in-
vented hy the player himself or learned) this "sport" is 
en effet libre transformation d'un milieu du monde en él-
ement de soutien de l'action» De ce fait, comme l'art, il 
est créateur." 2 0 7 The boy's desire is foiled hy the ab-
sence of his mother, a situation whose coefficient of ad-
versity is understandably quite strong, given his profound 
attachment to her* The youngster wiggles out of the 
clutches of this anxiety-provoking reality, however, by 
re-shaping the world according to the demands of his own 
freedom. In playing fqrt-da» it is he who initiates the 
comings and goings of the object of his desire and, 
through the utilization and affirmation of this creative 
freedom, he gets the sense of escaping the prison that is 
the world in-itself and the freedom of the other (a limit 
°n the subject's own freedom)* 
Of course, this maneuver succeeds only through the 
destruction of the original object, a violence which is 
carried out through the metaphorization of the original 
desire and the symbolisâtion of the original object. Re-
terring back to Lacan's essay, we note further: "le sym-
b o l e se manifeste d'abord comme meurtre de la chose, et 
cette mort constitue dans le sujet 1 ' éternisation de son 
2 0 ? S a r t r e , L ' E t r e £ t le . nâ&Ot, p . 670 ( s e e a b o v e , p . 
1 6 1 ) . 
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desir." 2 0* The original desire, rather than achieving sat-
isfaction, is merely neutralized through the subject1s 
creative destruction of the object which is lacking to 
him* Thus, the activity provides relief only while it is 
being performed and it must therefore be relentlessly re-
peated according to the demands of the W^ederholungszwang T 
the product of "I f éternisation de son désir • " 
The esprjt de Jeu* then, as an attempt to appropriate 
for itself the world symboliçuemeot* fails, as do other 
means, to satisfy the for-itself's fundamental urge to be 
its own foundation. In not taking "things" seriously, the 
for-itself only plays at appropriating, at devouring, at 
becoming in-itself* The esprit otg. ,feu constitutes a sort 
of acceptance, as it were, of the necessity of the for-it-
s
*lf»s freedom* Realizing the limitations of the opaque 
and contingent being-in-itself of things which refuse to 
°e incorporated, realizing the limitations imposed upon it 
*>y the other 1s freedom which refuses to be controlled, the 
^âarJJt o^ g. Je^i freely creates its own game, its own rules, 
its own attitude towards the things which can potentially 
defeat it and, in so doing, becomes to itself its own mas-
ter* 
2 0 8
 Lacan, "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage 
en psychanalyse," p# 204* 
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At this point, we shall propose that Roquentin's 
i*eosyncrat i c use of the scraps of paper he picks up from 
the ground constitutes a game that he plays "comme font 
l e S o n
* * » * -
M
 I* is, thus, not only a tendency to bring 
he objects to his mouth that can be considered a gesture 
the gffprlt jje. Jeja, but also his handling, scrutinizing 
and destroying of the trash. We might say that Boquen-
e game is a somewhat more elaborate, less clear-cut 
o n o f f
°rt~da. Drawing on our earlier analysis of 
* qualities of the objects and the nature of his ae-
ons, we note that the hypothetical informing factors of 
d e n t i n ' s behavior -- the grgiftriefrt the C O B D U ^ &, 
**ûftfi» ScJiajiiiigjt and the Wisstrieb. as well as the Prome-
neus and hydra complexes — all suggest highly-charged. 
Potentially anxiety-ridden moments that call for tempo-
ra
**y, but repeatable resolution through the Wiederfrg-
^ R g P r w P n c , These paradigmatic instances of childhood at-
empts to master freely-flowing instinctual impulses, even 
their earliest manifestations, reveal a structure which 
S r e m iniscent of fort-da; gone / there, have not / have, 
unpleasure / pleasure, an instinctual impulse driving for 
r elease / instinctual satisfaction* They are desire 
serf -to a second power through a transformation of the 
r iginary urge to one which is metaphoric and appropria-
l v
^ in nature* Roquentin's repetition of a host of these 
Paradigms in a game with a single object thus appears 
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as a re-transformation of the original impulse, a re—cre-
ation of the childhood structure, an adult version of the 
fort-rfa game, if you will. We see then that Roquentin's 
activity is an attempt to master a situation, to "s'appro-
prier le monde symboliquement,M to give more reality to 
the use of his freedom than to the world in-itself. 
But if the notion of play is so all-encompas6ing, if 
it can be applied to an activity which is at heart appro-
priât ive, which is based on a childhood paradigm, and 
which is ultimately an attempt to satisfy a primordial de-
sire (to be for-itself-in-itself ), then what kind of be-
havior is o^l Play? 
We need only recall our discussion of the esprit &§. 
Sé rieu& to shed light on this potentially shadowy area. 
The esprjt £e sérieux and the e_gRrJL± &&_ dfiU are attitttrfggy 
not particular modes of behavior. When one is acting on 
the grounds that what one does is the result, is the very 
choice of one 1s freedom to transform the medium of the 
*orld in-itself into a «meaning-fall" construct which is 
the product and responsibility of the for-itself's own en-
leaver, then one is at play. I*t on the other hand, one 
is acting on the grounds that one has no choice in the 
matter, that the world is dictating the rules by which 
W a n i n g and value appear as such, then the subject is 
abandoning all responsibiIty for and consideration of the 
r
°le which his freedom is playing in his choice not to 
choose. This is the esprit d£ £grigUX» 
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It is with this difference of attitude in cuind that 
we shall now speculate on the importance of the paragraph 
we have extensively dissected in relation to Roquentin1s 
existential anguish» the nausea which appears as the cen-
tral concern of the novel• 
The journal entry of "mardi, 30 Janvier" continues 
*ith the relating of the so-called "événement" which Ro-
ctuentin was so reluctant to mention earlier on in his 
Piece of writing for that day» It is 8:15 in the morning 
and, while exiting from the Hotel Printania where he cur-
rently resides» Roquentin spies the boots of a military 
officer» His narration of the event runs as follows: 
Donc, aujourd'hui, je regardais les bottes fau-
ves d'un officier de cavalerie, qui sortait de 
la caserne. En les suivant du regard, j'ai vu 
un papier qui gisait à coté d'une flaque.^ J'ai 
cru que l'officier allait, de son talon, écraser 
le papier dans la boue, mais non: il a enjambe, 
d'un seul pas, le papier et la flaque. Je me 
suis approché: c'était une page réglée, arrachée 
sans doute à un cahier d'école* La pluie l'a-
vait trempée et tordue, elle était couverte de^ 
cloques et de boursouflures, comme une main brû-
lée. Le trait rouge de la marge avait déteint 
en une buée rose; l'encre avait coulé par en-
droits. Le bas de la page disparaissait sous 
une croûte de boue. Je me suis baisse, je me 
réjouissais déjà de toucher cette pâte tendre et 
fraîche qui se roulerait sous mes doigts en 
boulettes grises... Je n'ai pas pu. 
Je me suis resté courbé, une seconde, j'ai lu 
"Dictée: le Hibou blanc," puis je me suis re-
levé, les mains vides. Je ne suis plus^iibre, 
je ne peux plus faire ce que je veux. 
Sartre, La. Nausée» p. 23. 
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Perhaps the most logical cruest ion we might ask is: 
vhat, if anything, is different about this particular 
situation, about this particular scrap of paper, about Ro-
quentin's state of mind at this particular moment, that 
renders the simple act of picking up a piece of paper (al-
beit in Roquentin1s case, as we have demonstrated, such an 
a c t i s
 not really so "simple") impossible? First of all, 
let us proceed by highlighting those aspects of Roqaen-
tin fs description of the event which seem most pertinent» 
We note first (as does Roquentin) the "botte fauves" 
of the cavalryman» There seems to be no relation between 
these tawny boots and the piece of lined paper, except for 
the fact that the path of the boots1 movement serves to 
Point out the scrap of paper in the first place* Thus, 
Koquentin's perception of the soldier1s boots gives way 
immediately (that is, without mediation) to his perception 
of the object of his unusual interest. The boots them-
selves recall a seemingly unrelated reference, which oc-
curs earlier in the journal entry for "30 Janvier," to an 
°ld man who used to sit in a sentry-box in the Luxembourg 
gardens when Roquentin used to play there as a child. The 
°ld man frightened the young Roquentin and his friends, 
because they sensed he was alone ("nous sentions qu'il 
«tait seul") and also "qu'il formait dans sa tête des pen-
sées de crabe et de langouste." 2 1 0 At one point, he is de-
a i
° Xfeio;., p. 2 1 . 
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scribed as having "une pantoufle" on one foot and "une 
tepttipe" on the other* 
As for the position and surroundings of the paper, we 
detect nothing of major significance. It is lying in the 
street "à coté d'une flaque," a spot which should be of 
little or no concern to Roquentin who likes to handle pa-
pers whether they are dry enough to crumble or wet enough 
that burning them "ne va pas sans peine." Moreover, 
whether they are yellowed, mud-stained, or new and white 
as swans is equally of little importance to Roquentin, as 
*e have seen» Along this same vein, we are hard-pressed 
"to discover any importance in the fact that the soldier 
strides over both the paper and the puddle, and therefore 
avoids crushing the morsel with the heel of his fawn-col-
ored boot. Roquentin enjoys his prizes whether they are 
Intact, or crushed and crumbling» 
The paper itself is a lined sheet, "arrachée sans 
doute à un cahier d fécole." It has been rained on and is 
currently "trempée" and "tordue." None of these details 
Q
**ZgeBi: an attitude other than Roquentin1 s formerly play-
ful attraction to pieces of paper on the street. The fact 
*hat this particular sheet is "trempée" and "tordue" seems 
t o
 make it a prime candidate for torching or inquisitive 
s
*aring. Roquentin compares it to "une main brûlée" be-
cause of the blistered appearance and puffiness of the 
sheet's surface, and because of the pink tint which 
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splctches it as a result of the running of the red ink of 
the page's margin. The ink (of the student's writing, we 
must presume) has run also. The bottom of the page is 
hidden "sous une croûte de boue," a condition which, one 
suspects, can only add to the appeal of the sheet to Ro-
quentin. In fact, he is already rejoicing in anticipation 
of the prospect of touching this tender and fresh "pate" 
("paste" or "batter"), of rolling it into gray "boulettes" 
("little balls" or "meatballs" - note the food imagery in 
Roquentin's delectable vision, a description of qualities 
which, "pour un peu," would in the past have tempted Ro-
quentin to put the scraps into his mouth), when he is sud-
denly unable to carry out the act: "Je n'ai pas pu." 
^ * +KO lined sheet draws our atten-
One final aspect of the tinea 
tion - the title of the pupil's written exercise is still 
legible: "Dictée: le Hibou blanc." Is there something 
about the topic that somehow relegates this particular 
Piece of paper to the category of those scraps wh-ich, for 
L u 1 « T* We focus our attention on Roquentin, are untouchable? i* 
+o first that this creature is 
the image of the owl, we note firsx 
n n f, t. n t des aigrettes" ( Lfc Efe-
a "oiseau rapace, nocturne, portanx 
it i* most likely a snowy owl 
ill Robert) > An "hibou felfeûc/' i s moBX 
~+ «. soecies of large white 
<Nyçtea gcantfjaca), a «ember of a sp 
^ **~~ In ancient Greece, ac-
owls found on the Arctic tundra. in 
~ «flcnciated with Athena, 
cording to r o l l e r ' s , "the owl was associât 
^ -the bird came to symbolize wis-
the goddess of wisdom, and the BIT 
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dom." 2 1 1 Drawing from such seemingly innocuous trivia, 
Catherine Savage Brosrnan, in her study of the zoological 
imagery in ta. Nausée « reaches the rather hesitant conclu-
sion: "Might the white owl suggest wisdom? purity? night 
watching?" 2 1 2 Perhaps, hut one would he hard-pressed to 
discover the origin of Roquentin's existential paralysis 
in such an interpretation. 
Another observation, however, casts a faint glimmer 
of light into this obscure cvil-fte-sac (where, no doubt, 
only such species as the owl can see without difficulty): 
the term "hibou," in a now out-dated, figurative sense, 
denotes an "homme triste, solitaire" ( L E fgti* Rofrert >• 
Whether Roquentin is exactly "triste" or not is something 
which is open to debate, but he is certainly "solitaire": 
"Moi, je vis seul, entièrement seul. Je ne parle à per-
sonne, Jamais; Je ne reçois rienf Je ne donne rien. L'Au-
todidacte ne compte p a s . " 2 1 3 Neither, apparently does 
Françoise, the woman who runs the Rentfey-vpqg &S& ChSMk" 
U££g and with whom he occasionally has sexual relations. 
l
*i then, the owl reminds Roquentin of himself, so be it 
— we are still unable to find a way beyond the dead end 
*hich bars us from the answer to our question: why can't 
Herbert Dei gnan, "owls," in Collier's gncycIppetfifrt 
Vol. 18 (New York: Kacmillan, 1973), p. 262. 
2 1 2
 Catherine Savage 3ros«an, "Sartre's *»**«•«• ^ " * l J»" 
a Res in L E Nausée," in SyWPPgitfP 31f P* 1 2 4 (footnote 
#33). 
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Roquentin pick up the paper? 2 1 4 
Roquentin describes his inability to carry out this 
simple act — a gesture which is, moreover, normally a 
pleasurable one —— as a loss of freedom: "Je ne suis plus 
libre," j e ne peux plus faire ce que je veux." This loss 
of freedom (or, more precisely, this sense of a loss of 
freedom) seems to be related in some way to Roquentin's 
perception of inanimate objects on the morning in ques-
tion. He continues: 
Les objets, cela ne devrait pas fQttçfrext pu-
isque cela ne vit pas. On s'en sert, on les 
remet en place, on vit au milieu d'eux: ils 
sont utiles, rien de plus. Et moi, ils me 
touchent, c'est insupportable. J'ai peur d'-
entrer en contact avec eux tout comme s'ils ét-
aient des bêtes vivantes. 
Maintenant je vois, je me rappelle mieux ce 
que j'ai senti l'autre jour, au bord de la^mer, 
quand je tenais ce galet. C'était une espèce 
2 1 4 Although we have failed to discover the source of Ro-
quentin's existential paralysis in the preceding ob-
servations concerning owls, there is, however, an owl 
at one of the sources of ffartre's existential phi \>Q&£>~ 
fiitt> In Hegel's preface to his PhilftgPPfry &£ EifeJblt 
we read: "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only 
with the failing of the dusk" ( G.W.F* Hegel, Ifce_ Efci-
I O S O O ^ Y ûi Right, trans. T.M. Knox. London: Oxford, 
1942, p. 13). Hegel is referring to his earlier as-
sertion that "philosophy • • • always comes on to the 
scene too late to give it" (p. 12 )• In other words, 
Philosophic wisdom always appears only after actuality 
has been well-established. If indeed Hegel's preface 
is an informing factor in Sartre's text (masking as 
the text of Roquentin), its connection can only be 
seen as a reference to the incapacity of thought to 
keep pace with the world, of thetic consciousness to 
master the in-itself. This realization that the 
thinking individual can never become master of the 
world fin a "serious" sense) does reinforce the inter-
pretation that Roquentin is being menaced by "counter-
appropriation" on the part of the en-go*, an interpre-
tation we are about to put forth. 
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d'ecoeurement douceâtre* Que c'était donc dés-
agréable! Et cela venait du galet, j'en suis 
sur, cela passait du galet dans mes mains* Oui, 
c'est cela, c'est bien cela: une sorte de nausée 
dans les mains. 2 1 5 
Roquent in feels that objects have begun to touch back» It 
is not clear whether he is repelled hy the very idea of 
picking up the piece of composition paper just before he 
grasps it, or whether he actually touches it, experiences 
its counter-caress and immediately lets it go, although no 
evidence is available to indicate the latter and, what's 
«ore, his statement, "J'ai peur d'entrer en contact avec 
eux," suggests the former. 
This "fear" of a double contact is not mere whimsy, 
however, for, as Roquentin goes on to explain, he had just 
such an experience some days earlier while handling a 
small stone at the seashore. His narration of this inci-
dent appears in the "feuillet sans date." After remarking 
*hat in the "histoires de samedi et d'avant-hier . . . il 
n'y a rien eu de ce qu'on appelle à l'ordinaire aa araofe-
ftSûi'tZie __
 a n a p o l o g y yhich anticipates the nearly iden-
tical disclaimer that appears in the entry of "30 janvi-
e
**»
M
 just before Roquentin's recounting of the paper 
incident — the text reads: 
Samedi les gamins jouaient aux ricochets, et je 
voulais lancer comme eux un caillou dans la mer. 
A ce moment-la, je me suis arrSte, j'ai laisser 
tomber le caillou et je suis parti . • • Voila 
215 Sartre, ta. Causéef p. 23. 
2 1 6
 XkXé^t P* 11t emphasis added. 
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pour l'extérieur. Ce qui s'est passe en moin a 
pas laissé de traces claires. Il y avait quel-
l e chose eue J'ai vu et qui -'*-«•»*•• £ i S 
je ne sais plus si Je regardais la mer ou le 
.alet. Le galet était plat, sec sur tout un 
cSté, humide et boueux sur l'autre. Je le te 
nais par les bords, avec les doigts^tres 
écartés, pour éviter de me salir. 
At a glance, we note nothing about this incident that 
should cause Roouentin any displeasure, much less an "éco-
» .«.« not mentioned among the 
eurement." Although stones are nox 
-. ., +„ nick up and handle, the 
small objects that he likes to pic* up 
.^ * r>+ the "Hibou blanc" 
rock's condition, similar to that oi 
+ cnouentin, who admits to fragment, should in no way daunt Roquenxm, 
+ lo.ct. the look and feel of 
having enjoyed, in the past at leas , 
some pretty disgusting bits of trash. 
+ rfnuceStre» and the "nausée Thus, the «écoeurement douceaxre 
-«l.tlvely recent reaction to dans les mains" constitute a relatif 
0„„...tttin pleasure. Something 
objects which formerly gave Roquentin P 
i„ the objects or in Roquentin. 
indeed has changed, either in the ooj 
So ends the entry of "mardi, 30 Janvier. 
r-* a eood bit of commentary has 
As one might suspect, a go 
„«d origin of this nausea is 
appeared in which the nature and orig 
4„- for the moment, Sartre's own 
examined. Leaving aside, ior 
_.».». J .-.«. let us glance 
«•f this condition, «-e^  ««» m Phenomenological theory of tnis 
«tive readings which concern 
at a few of the more informative re 
themselves with Roquentin's illness. 
2 1 7
 lfcitf., PP. 11-12-
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ïn the essay by Catherine Savage Brosman, which we 
have already mentioned, the author examines the function 
and effect of "some 77 similes and metaphors in which an 
object or the human body — usually the latter — is com-
pared in part or in whole to an animal or part of an ani-
mal #"218
 R e r cti s c u s si o n i s both applicable and revelatory 
in the 
present instance* not only because of the title of 
the schoolchiId»s dictation exercise which serves to name 
the object and place it in a zoological category, but also 
because Roquentin often sees his desired papers as 
"cygnes" (another bird), and he regards the terrifying 
scrap of January 30th as one of those objects which seem 
like "betes vivantes" to the touch. Brosman notes that 
the use of the zoological analogy, which is so prevalent 
in Sartre9 s novel, is for the most part pejorative and "in 
short, animal imagery is used to convey a feeling of nau-
sea inspired in part by the very existence of the organ-
ic. "219
 T h i s c o n c l u s i o n hinges on the opposition between 
that which is hard, unmoving, non-changing, and inorganic 
— that is, en-soi — and that which is soft, flabby, 
slippery, protean, and organic ~ not exactly the cauxr 
£SU, which is "empty, free and «néant', " but rather the 
human body. The body is problematic, because, although it 
exists as a thing-in-the-world, egrs&l' ** i s a l s o t h a t 
2 1 8
 Brosman, "Sartre's Nature: Animal Images in L& £&U-
sée«" p. 107. 
2 1 9
 XtLLo!., p. 110. 
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sabstance which consciousness has to "exist" (see above, 
Ch. II,
 p # 85f footnote #91) and is therefore neither to-
tally opaque and hard, nor totally transparent and intan-
gible for the consciousness which has to inhabit it» 
Thus, according to Brosman 1s argument, those images of the 
organic (and especially those of animals) serve to remind 
the perceiver of "existence at its most physiological: 
Pure, viscous flesh, wj tfrou* even the PPggifriUtE fc£ C£-
y^lt- agaj P ?+ protoplasmic i d e n t i t y " 2 2 0 This restriction 
by the physiological, although Brosman does not put it in 
so many words, refers to a real or imagined limitation on 
one 1s existential freedom that is imposed by one*s own 
body, and, for this reason, such a perception of the or-
ganic is experienced as unpleasurable, even nauseating, by 
the perceiver. 
This opposition between hard and soft, and its nau-
seating effect on Sartre 1s protagonist, is discussed at 
length in an earlier piece by Jean Pellegrin, an essay 
*hich is influential in Brosman's article, as well as in 
some studies by other writers. 2 2 1 The gist of Pellegrin's 
ftr
^»ent is that Foquentin's palaise is provoked by vari-
° !£!£•? p. 108, emphasis added. 
2 2 1
 Among these are Georgiana Colvile^s "Eléments surréal-
istes dans L& Nausée: Une hypothèse de l'écriture," 
i n
 L-'Egprjt Créateur 17(1977): pp. 19-28, and Gerald^ 
Prince's "L'Odeur de la nausée," also in L'Esprit £rl-
âJt^ux 17(1977): pp. 29-35, as well as his "La Main et 
la menace de l'en-soi dans l'oeuvre romanesque de Sar-
tre," in Romance Notes 10(1968): PP* 7-10 (discussed 
below). 
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ous objects which he experiences as "double-faced." The 
first symptom of this "maladie étrange" is, of course, the 
incident with the fiat stone; the second is Roquentin's 
inability to grasp the piece of paper. Relating the two, 
Pellegrin notes: 
L'analogie entre le feuillet et le galet est év-
idente: objets à deux faces, l'une sèche, 
lisse, luisante, l'autre sombre, mouillée, 
souillée. Le feuillet nous apporte en outre un 
renseignement nouveau: la face inférieure est 
inseparable de l'autre, elle est constitutive de 
l'objet» S'il est possible, en effet, de net-
toyer le galet, au contraire le papier sali, le 
papier-boue ne peut — "ce qui ne va pas sans 
peine" — qu'être brûlé et détruit entière-
ment. 222 
Sometimes the two faces of the object are inseparable and 
unalterable, other times it is possible "en effet" to im-
prove the condition of that side which is "sombre, mouil-
l e e
» souillée." Other objects which fall into this two-
*aced category are, for example, the sea, a hand, certain 
city streets, and a bench on the tramway — all highlights 
in Pellegrin's analysis, which lead the writer to a more 
general description of the nature of the two sides of the 
objects in question: 
En l'occurrence, l'une des substances sera sol-
ide, minérale, métallique, sèche et lisse au 
toucher, éclatante et nette pour la vue, ou 
transparente, éclatante encore, éventuellement, 
pour l'ouïe. L'autre, liquide, mais d^une li-
quidité menacée de solidification, végétale, 
sombre, et, selon le mode de perception, 
32 Jean Pellegrin, "L'Objet à deux faces dans "L& H A ^ -
S Ê Ê , " in Revue des pciences feWUftingg #113 (1964), p. 
87. 
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gluante, fade, floue.223 
These two groups of traits Peregrin labels ..compact" and 
••visqueux," respectively, drawing on the terminology of 
LIBIT. *i 1* « i « l . H. Points out that at times "le vis-
queux se livre contre le compact," and at others, the re-
verse is true.22* He also remarks that the general terms 
"compact" and "visqueux" can be understood in terms of 
other dichotomies: stasis / movement, appearance / reali-
225 A H this is quite interesting ty, value / antivalue.22  All this is H 
and, as we shall see presently, indicative. There are, 
however, two difficulties in Pellegrini argument that we 
j A First of all, Pellegrin 
must be careful to keep in mind. rxr 
* „<+h things, the eji^ efii; he tends to equate the compact with thing 
~„« «.s representative of 
views the other "face," the viscous, as r P 
, Now, as Brosman later points 
consciousness, the apUtr-PP*-» w o ' 
i ~ Pelleeria's inexacti-
out (without, however, mentioning Pellegri 
. n l, 8 n e s s depicts the aSii£=. tude), Sartre's notion of consciousness 
*
 +^nscendin« nothingness, a kind of 
aai as a transparent, transcenam* 
„ hurdlv be construed as 
intangible clarity. This being can hardly 
^i - *hat "la conscience est 
viscous. Pellegrin's deduction that 
.,..
 o f the line: "Les pen-
visqueuse" stems from his reaaing 
,. -»_ Plus fade encore 
sees, c'est ce qu'il y a de plus fade. Plus 
>,• &s Roquentin reflects on it, 
que de la chair." Thought, as Koq 
3 2 3
 Xfcid.., p. 89. 
2 2 4
 Ifei££.» P- 91. 
2 2 5
 IfeiiJ., pp. 91 ff. 
- l & l -
*ay at its horizon be the pre-refiective cogito, 
transcendent consciousness, but in its present context of 
being neflect?rf-yrT it is posited as an object for con-
sciousness, almost en-9o|. as it were. It is "plus fade 
encore que de la chair," for it lacks the flesh1s material 
presence while, at the same time, it lacks the for-it-
self«s sharp translucency. Thus, "les pensées" can indeed 
*>e seen as "visqueuses," but not completely as Dour-Rfî] f 
since the reflective nature of Roquentinfs meditation in-
dicates an interplay of both the for-itself and etre-^tfr-. 
frtttrviit which, to be sure, is a kind of subspecies of the 
gPttr-froj, but nonetheless a dimension that radically 
clouds consciousness1 crystal clarity. 2 2 6 Without this 
qualification of Pellegrini statement, we risk a serious 
misunderstanding of the relationship between the opposi-
tions that he sets up. 
Secondly, Pellegrin fails to inform us as to why an 
acute awareness of double-faced objects, of the viscous as 
opposed to the compact, should suddenly render fioquentin 
2 2 6 
We mention the role of being-for-others here, even 
though this dimension of the for-itself may not seem 
to be directly at work in Roquentin's statement. It 
is, however, the very mechanism which allows the sub-
ject to reflect on himself at all, since he must take 
a position as pther in order to secure a point of view 
on himself. Thus, self-reflexivity presupposes an 
awareness of the existence of the Other and, conse-
quently, a being-for-others. 
This speculation on our part, however, does not to-
tally resolve the question of the Quality of feeJug of 
the viscous and its phenomenological ramifications, as 
Sartre sees them — an analysis we shall examine a bit 
later (see below, pp9 202 ff•)• 
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existentially ill. Slime can make someone nauseated, true 
enough, but why after repeatedly enjoying shit- and mud-
stained, perhaps peed-on, decomposing, worthless scraps of 
junk that he finds in the street, does Sartre's protago-
nist suddenly lose his stomach for such endeavors? 
+ „ +T-v to answer this question, we 
Before moving on to try T O 
*.s+«= «f critical data supplied 
should mention two more bits of cri^x 
~~ the novel, information 
amidst the wealth of commentary on the nove 
.. a i l B i g of Brosman and Pel-
which bears on the preceding resumes 01 
^ 3 J.i^^ "The Ose of Colour in Lft legrin. In an article entitled The us 
„ . «Lecture colorée" of the 
HaUÊÊfe," D.J. Fletcher proposes a lecxu 
, **. +„*t. He maintains that deep, 
objects and images in the text. 
-» —«rt have a stabilizing 
dark colors such as black and blood-red have 
_ +.i- and pink, especially 
effect on Roquentin, while pasteus 
in his "La Main et la 
- are upsetting."/ Gerald Prxnce, in his 
H oeuvre romanesque de Sartre," 
menace de l'en-soi dans l'oeuvre 
- La seule partie du corps qui 
points out that "la main est 
.11- main peut se présenter comme 
soit «à deux faces'," for "*-* m a i D P 
elle est osseuse, dure et 
paume ou comme surface convexe, 
„ „ l l e et moite de l«au-
sèche d'un coté, et charnue, moite 
, • -that this exclusivity of the 
tre."228
 0 n e mi Kht object that 
_~ there are other body 
hand is not entirely valid, because ther 
« tcind of two-sidedness: the 
Parts that manifest this same kina 
„f Colour in ta HftiiaÊÊ," in 
2 2 7
 D.J. Fletcher, "The Use °f Jot
 3 7 0 - 3 8 0 . 
M o ^ r a LjuxguisS- E^viSS 63(1968). PP 
^o L'en-soi dans I'oeu-
2 2 6
 Prince, "La Main et la menace de 
vre romanesque de Sartre,' P-
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foot , for example* Such an objection would be correct and 
justifiable if it were not for the ontological signifi-
cance of the "objet à deux faces" and for the particular 
*ay in which the hand manifests this value. 
Prince points out that, according to Sartre, the 
body: 
• • • est la facticité du pour-soi — nais-
sance, race, nationalité, structure physiologi-
que, passé — et, par ses affinités avec l'en-
soi, il représente un piège redoutable pour la^ 
conscience, Menaçant à chaque instant de l1empâ-
ter, de l«engloutir, si elle ne le dépasse pas 
par l'acte libre» 2 2 9 
Now, it is Just such a trap into which the potfr-goj might 
fall that is suggested by both the animal imagery in the 
text and the theme of the "objet à deux faces": the ep-gpi 
threatening to invade, as it were, consciousness itself 
and engulfing it, transforming it into something which is 
neither material nor free, but a soft, flabby, pasty muck* 
Such a state can be surpassed, through the utilization of 
one's freedom, one's capacity to freely choose an attitude 
towards one's facticity (the body, for example). But it 
is at this point that we discover the cogency of Prince's 
argument, for the hand, while appearing as an "objet à 
«eux faces," while being in fact a part of the body, is at 
*he same time that part of the body which is capable of 
the greatest degree of instrumentality. As Prince puts 
it: 
Xfeid», p. 7. 
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• • • la main est d'habitude admirablement 
Humaine et expressive, toute proche d'un instru-
ment perfectionné, parce que loin d'être chose 
parmi les choses, elle aide l'homme à découvrir 
les choses* La menace que représente l'en-soi 
est alors d'autant mieux mise en valeur qu'elle 
se manifeste là où on l'attend le moins, dans la 
partie la plus spirituelle — ou presque — du 
corps humain. 2 3 0 
Thus, the hand, lay which we can normally surpass the fac-
icity of our consciousness through an "acte libre," re-
veals itself to be not only the very flesh that we wish to 
neutralize, but also, as an "objet à deux faces," an la-
a
«e, a reminder of this two-faced situation itself* 
Hence, the exacerbated horror provoked by images of the 
hand* 
These last two critical points of view bear directly 
on our consideration of the "Hibou blanc" scrap* In addi-
tion to the general information they supply us with regard 
*o the "objet à deux -Paces," which we now understand to be 
a
 kind of instigating factor for Roquentin's palajge, they 
*lso supply us with two observations yig-ft-vjg *he sheet 
°* Paper that Roquentin cannot bring himself to play with. 
T h e
 fed margin on the sheet has both run and faded and now 
appears as "une buée rose *" Moreover, the "cloques" and 
"boursouflures" that cover the scrap give it the appear-
ance of M u n e n a i n bï.Siee," Thus, the "Hibou blanc" page 
i s
 not only an "objet à deux faces" itself, but its weath-
e r e d
 condition also reminds Roquentin of the double-faced 
ifeJLo:*, p* 9. 
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object par excellence* the hand, and its pink tint 
suggests another intermediate zone between the bright, 
durability of red and the clear emptiness-of-color with 
which the red of the margin has been combined» 
We have discussed at length the appropriative nature 
of Roquentin's occasional interest in playing with paper 
debris, and how his attempt to appropriate these objects 
Is, at heart, based on a universal human urge for con-
sciousness to become its own foundation: the for-itself-
in-itseif. We have also remarked that, because the arojjtfeJLê 
rappp r+ 0 f t n e possessive relationship — that is, the 
perceived status of the object as both mine and not-me — 
ctoes not in any real and lasting fashion satisfy the wish-
e s of that being whose desire is to become God, the appro-
Priative project is doomed to failure. The object of the 
for-itselft s desire is only related in a symbolic sense to 
*he real object of this drive to achieve a closure of be-
i n
« : an object, unfortunatelyf that is intangible, incon-
ceivable, and forever absent from the for-itself's realm 
°* Possibilities. Thus, any appropriative strategy on the 
Part of the subject produces only a limited satisfaction 
in an allegorical mode, much like the results of wish ful-
fillment in a dream: 
Toutefois, on ne saurait trop insister sur le 
fait que cette relation est fityrcfrpUffue et itf-
âaie.. Je ne satisfais pas plus mon désir origi-
nel d'être a moi-mSme mon propre fondement, par 
l-appropriation que le malade de Freud^ne satis-
fait son complexe d'Oedipe lorsqu'il rêve qu'un 
-196-
soldat tue le Tsar (c'est-à-dire son père)» 2 3 1 
The inability to realize the desired form of ontolo-
gical appropriation can result in four main forms of fail-
ure. First of all, the object-to-be-possessed is never 
discovered to be unsatisfactory for the aims of the for-
itself«s fundamental project, since the symbolic object 
itself is nevBT appropriated: for example, the sparkling-
new, white Cadillac El Dorado that the migrant farm worker 
wishes to own* In this case, the object remains so radi-
cally intact and outside of the for-itself's engulfing 
tactics that it does not in any way become a part of the 
appropriative relationship as it has been defined» Sec-
ondly, there is the frustrated wish of the Jonah complex 
that seeks an object that would remain intact even after 
it has been devoured. Such a failure is best exhibited 
through the s u b j e c t s desire to consume (food, drink, 
Charrain bathroom tissues, etc.). We note that in both 
these cases the object is eliminated from the appropria-
tive relationship, either from the start or along the way. 
The third and fourth forms of failure are a bit more 
Poignant. There is the case of the subject who begins to 
feel possessed by his objects. The middle-class, white-
collar worker overspends himself, succeeds in owning a 
sparkling-new, white Cadillac El Dorado, and then must 
*ake on a second job, scrimp and save and worry, risk a 
2 3 1
 SartrBf L'Etre g.t lé flgftflt, P* 682. 
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collapse of his family life — ail in order to support 
this glimmering piece of steel, glass and rubber» The ob-
ject has gotten uppity. And there is finally the case of 
appropriation in which the object is indeed owned, kept 
intact and causes no problems whatsoever for the posses-
sor» A young executive purchases a sparkling-new, white 
Cadillac El Dorado and, as time passes, the initial thrill 
of possession gives way to a more matter-of-fact, somewhat 
discontented point of view regarding the meaning of the 
object: "Yeah, it1 s a nice enough car, but now what?» 
The object begins to lose the magical qualities through 
*hich the object's possessor confers upon it its value* 
The effect of the meaning-producing aspect of the for-it-
self has reduced the car to a rather trivial significance, 
*or the value initially given to the Cadillac has only a 
marginal connection with the thing in-itself (status, suc-
cess [i.e., the meaning of owning the car] < > a piece 
of expensive painted steel, glass and rubber>• As the 
meaning / value of the ohject becomes more familiar and 
commonplace to its owner, the object1s thingness once 
again begins to display its bared fangs. 
These examples, which focus on appropriation in terms 
of material ownership, may seem, at first glance, out of 
p l
*ce in a discussion of Antoine Rocjuentin's rather ab-
stractly defined relationship with the objects in tkL& 
world. He is, of course, hardly a materialist: 
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• • • je ne demande qu'a m1apitoyer sur tes en-
nuis des autres» cela me changera* Je n'ai pas 
d1ennuis» j'ai de l'argent comme un rentier* pas 
de chef, pas de femme ni d'enfants; j'existe» 
c'est tout. Et c'est si vague» si métaphysique» 
cet ennui-là» que j'en ai honte. 2 3 2 
Nonetheless» the concrete nature of such examples may help 
us to clarify why it is that the objects in Poquentin's 
world seem to touch back* It is particularly in the third 
and fourth instances of the failure of appropriation that 
such a perception is likely to occur» Indeed» it is pre-
cisely an intensified awareness of these last two aspects 
that is at work in L& Nausée, for in both circumstances we 
note a kind of invasion of consciousness by the hard» min-
eral» immutable in-itself» which the for-itself is trying 
to possess* This change» then» that Roquentin attributes 
at first to the objects themselves» is actually a result 
of his intended relationship to these objects. The un-
pleasant sensations» the nausea» seem to emanate from the 
objects only because they are revealing themselves / are 
being revealed ( jge_
 r ? v ? l e n t ) i n t h e i r thingness» which 
consciousness struggles to overrule as a result of its 
tendency to bring meaning into the world. 
What suddenly triggers these sensations for Roquentin 
is difficult to determine precisely» although his experi-
ence with the stone — given that it is the first instance 
that is brought up in the journal ~ narks the onset of 
the crisis that would perhaps have begun with the "Hibou 
2
 Sartre» l& ttausee» p« 136. 
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blanc M scrap had Roquentin never tried to skim stones with 
the kids at the beach (in other words» Roquentin's crisis 
begins with a realization about "objets à deux faces" in 
general, and not with the discovery of a equality which is 
peculiar to a given object in particular)» The onset and 
development of this condition, which the diarist terms 
"ecoeureaent," as well as "nausée»" can be understood as a 
kind of two-staged satori• The first "kick in the e y e " 2 3 3 
on his way to existential enlightenment occurs when Ro-
quentin handles the partially muddy» partially clean 
stone. His nausea signals an awareness of the radical 
distinction between the en-soi and the relentless urging 
of the dreadful freedom that defines ail the parameters of 
human reality. The initial epiphany» however» takes place 
on a pre-reiexive level — that is, Roquentin is conscious 
of his realization (if we may risk a tautology) without 
actually knowing what it is he realizes* 2 3 4 Because Ro-
quentin fails to understand» to grasp (and, thus, t& tt*£-
£££ to some extent) the nature of this ontological in-
sight, the source of his anguish, he is kicked over and 
over again through his perception of apparently demonic 
objects: the glass of beer» the autodidacte hand, the 
2 3 3
 At least according to Jack Kerouac, th s is * J**** 
rendition of the Japanese term for this kind of sudden 
illumination. See his £ô£°xi ia EftXiS (New York. 
Grove Press, 1966), p» 7• 
" • The point of distinction between non-thetic and thetic 
consciousness — see above, Ch. II, PP- 108-110. 
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o 
par-
to 
»s 
the 
piece of paper, Adolphe1s suspenders. The second stage of 
Roquentin 1s satori occurs in the park, on a bench, with 
the celebrated chestnut tree root at his feet. This sec-
ond epiphany, in which Roquentin gains an understanding of 
what he has only sensed intuitively signals a turning 
point, as it were, in his struggle to overcome his fear of 
objects. This knowledge will eventually lead Roquentin t 
his decision to write a novel, the culmination of the 
ticular series of appropriât!ve gestures which serve t 
map out the terrain that is Roquent in's life story. 
Before «oving on, we should pause to note Sartre• 
own contribution to the notion of 1& Oftug^e and to t 
idea of the «objet a deux faces," with regard to the fail-
ure of the tactics of appropriation. 
T ^* + Ttc + r»» et le néant that is devoted 
In the section of L çtre " *•*- u^^" 
.i. , i~ c»«»+«*otfi ohenomenological on-
to the role of le_ corps in Sartre s P n c u w •» 
tology, we read the following: 
Cette saisie perpétuelle par "* , ~ ^ " 1 * ' ™ 
goût fto. et sans distance qui » a c C o m * a f ° e J ^ 
lue d t n T m e s efforts pour - e n délivre et ,ui 
~^ • „+ -*» axiB nous avons décrit est B Û Û gout, c'est ce que n ^ ^ 
ailleurs sous le nom de HAUfiÊfe. vu 
* j. wi« «ivèle perpétuellement 
crête et insurmontable révèle r ^ ^ 
«on corps a ma « • " f a " ? ^ l # i 0 « l. douleur phy-
nous '•ch.rchio». l ^ J J J ^ * ^
 d e 6 q u e lft 
sique pour nous en deuvrert _ „ _ 
* •* —.+ Avictes oar ta con^ douleur ou l'agréable sont « * ^ « s P
 fia f f t c t l . 
science, ils manifestent a leur ^ ^ 
cité et sa contingence et^c esx 
sée qu'ils se dévoilent. 
2 3 5
 Sartre, V Etre fel 1 Ê niaûlt P- 4 0 4 * 
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Nausea is a taste that we have ( "qui est mon gout" ), and 
*t Is the direct, unmediated apprehension of the body, as 
it is "existed" by consciousness* In other words, nausea 
is the revelation of one aspect of the facticity of con-
sciousness: its necessary connection with the en-soft — 
the body. 2 3 6 The fact that consciousness must "exist" the 
body constitutes a limit, as it were, on the for-itseif'e 
radically free posture (see above, Ch» II, p. 85, footnote 
#91); more precisely, we should say that consciousness re-
mains free JLû spite of the body, which posits it, for oth-
ers, as an object in the world» Sartre is clearly making 
a direct reference to his novel here ( "ce que nous avons 
décrit ailleurs sous le nom de Causée" )« and we note a 
connection of this reference to Brosmanfs essay, in which 
she understands the extensive use of animal imagery in La. 
Nausée to be a reminder of the role of "viscous flesh" as 
revelatory of the facticity of consciousness. 2 3 7 
But as the arguments of other commentators, as well 
as those of our own investigation have intimated, it is 
not merely those organic substances, which are directly 
suggestive of one»s own flesh, that can potentially insti-
gate the perceiver's nauseous apprehensions. There are 
*Iso those "objets à deux faces," those objects that are 
2 3 6
 The other aspect being the impossibility for con-
sciousness pot ±si be. free. 
2 3 7
 Brosman, "Sartre's Nature: Animal Images in Lfc &a_u.-
fijie.," p . 1 0 8 . 
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both hard and mushy* that can reveal the for-itself's 
facticity of freedom to the apprehending consciousness 
and, consequently, result in nausea* 
It is not so much the hardy dry durability of the up-
per side of the object that causes discomfort for its per-
ceiver, but rather the sudden contact or apprehension of 
the object's mushy, or otherwise sluggishly inconsistent 
flip side» Sartre's pardigmatic example of the substance 
of such an object's "underbelly" is le_ visaueu#. the vis-
cous, or slime. 
It is important to understand, first of ail, that in 
his existential analysis of objective qualities as revela-
tory of certain states or concepts of being, Sartre sees 
the solid state as normally suggestive of brute existence, 
the en-soj - Consciousness, on the other hand, contrary to 
the reading Pellegrin gives us of the vjgguetfg (see above, 
PP« 190-191), is symbolized most precisely by a clear, un-
clouded liquid — water, for example: "l'eau est le sym-
bole de la conscience: son mouvement, sa fluidité, cette 
solidarité non solidaire de son être, sa fuite perpét-
uelle, etc., tout en elle me rappelle le Pour-soi."238 
Hictway between these two extrems of solid and liquid is a 
no-man's land of viscosity: slime. 
2 3 8
 Sartre, L'Etre et le. JQÊÛûlf P# 7 0 2 # 
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"Le visqueux est l'agonie de l'eau," says Sartre, who 
continues: 
• • • il [ le visqueux] se donne lui-même comme 
un phénomène en devenir, il n'a pas la perma-
nence dans le changement de l'eau, mais au con-
traire il représente comme une coupe opérée dans 
le changement d'état. Cette instabilité figée 
du visqueux décourage la possession* L'eau est 
plus fuyante, mais on peut la posséder dans sa 
fuite même, en tant que fuyante» 2 3 9 
Slime 2 4 0 i s thus a becoming: a becoming which never be-
comes* It is neither the fleeing fluidity of liquid (the 
constant becoming of the for-itself), nor is it the hard, 
unchanging stability of solids (the brute contingency of 
the in-itself )• It is a substantive quality that by its 
very nature "décourage la possession." 
This unsuitability of the viscous object as an object 
to-be-appropriated can be explained as follows. The for-
itself» s original project, as we have seen, is an appro-
Priative enterprise: the for-itself wants to be its own 
foundation, to create and subsequently hftYv itself, as it 
were. Given this a„ priori consideration, Sartre describes 
the encounter with the viscous in the following manner: 
2 3 9
 Ihlsi.f p. 699. 
2
*° We shall make liberal use of Hazel Barnes' translation 
o f
 1 Ê visoueux as "slime" or "the slimy," for at times 
it seems to communicate the sense of Sartre's term in 
a more striking and, indeed, palpable way . . . an ef-
fect that is preferable to the rarer and more abstract 
"viscous," as the term is usually rendered (quite cor-
rectly, of course, since Sartre himself chooses the 
abstract term in lieu of the more oozily concrete 
v a ^ e ) . At other times, however, we shall go with the 
term "viscous" if the quality in question is something 
other than the slimy per ££• 
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• • • ie surgi ssement du pour—soi a l'être 
étant appropriatift le visqueux perçu est "ris-
queux à posséderfM c'est-à-dire que le lien ori-
ginel du moi au visqueux est que Je projette d'-
être fondement de son étret en tant qu'il est 
moi—même idéalement» 2 4 1 
The for-itself is an appropri ati ve being in its very up-
surge and* consequentlyf sees the irorld and those objects 
in it as possible foundations for its own being — on an 
ideal level, of course, since the for-itself must somehow 
project an image of itself into the object and play at fee.-
comipff this object without ever really achieving this im-
possible ontological goal* Thus, the temptation to appro-
priate the slimy is irresistable for the pottr-soj, since 
there is no other manner in which it can, at heart, treat 
an object. Sartre describes this encounter with the yJLfi-
OU&&2. and its overall effect: 
Cette viscosité est donc dLiÀ 7- dès l'appari-
tion première du visqueux — réponse a une de-
mande, déjà o^n £S* Êûiî le visqueux paraît comme 
déjà l'ébauche d'une fusion du monde avec moi; 
et ce qu'il m'apprend de lui, son caractère de ^ 
VÊOlpji^ auJL ffil&SÊir^t c'est déjà une réplique a 
une interrogation concrète; il repond avec son 
être même, avec sa manière d'etre, avec toute sa 
matière* 2 4 2 
I seek my ideal being in the slimy, *n atte.pt to »«•ap-
proprier le «onde sy«boIiquerent» through the intercession 
o± the object of my attention, but lo and behold, the de-
»on object sucks at my soul like a leech, exacting pre-
payment for my wild, presumptuous wish, which, in the end, 
2 4 1
 Sartre, L'Etre e_£ L E ûâfiUi, P« 697. 
2 4 2
 JLfcid.., pp. 697-698. 
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it will never grant: 
Le visqueux est docile» Seulement, au moment 
même où je crois le posséder, voila que, par un 
curieux renversement, c'est lui qui me possède 
• • • voici que le visqueux renverse les termes: 
le Pour-soi est soudain compromis» J'écarte les 
mains y je veux lâcher le visqueux et il adhere a 
moi, il me pompe, il m'aspire» 2 4 3 
Thus it is that \j& visqueux "décourage la possession, " be-
cause of the threat of counter—possession• "Le visqueux, 
c'est la revanche de 1'En—soi•" 2 4 4 
Nonetheless, "il y a comme une fascination tactile du 
visqueux»" 2 4 5 Like the tempting lure of the snake, which 
both attracts and repulses the consciousness that encoun-
ters it, ie_ visqueux provokes a certain unease in the per-
ceiver, who perhaps views the object with such distaste 
only in proportion to the attraction he/she experiences 
towards the oozing g o o » 2 4 6 The subject undergoes a kind of 
vertigo vis-à-vis the viscous: "il [le visqueux] m'attire 
en lui comme le fond d'un precipice pourrait m'attir-
e r . " 2 4 7 
2
*
3
 IfriçU* P* 700. 
2
*
4
 Itoitf. 
2 4 6
 We might point out that a person's fear of snakes is 
often characterized by the illusion that the skin of 
the snake is slimy to the touch» 
2 4 7
 Sartre, \. ' Et r* &± 1$- néftnt, p.700. 
-206-
Sartre continues: "Je ne suis plus le maitre df 
rreter le processus d'appropriation." 2* 8 What is at stake, 
then, in one's encounter with le_ visgueux is the individu-
al's freedom» The appropriative situation, as an attempt 
at mastery on the subject's part, seems to be turned top-
sy-turvy by objects of questionable consistency» The fear 
of the viscous is the fear that consciousness might be 
dissolved in it, that freedom itself might cease to remain 
the perpetual flight that it is and become more or less 
imprisoned by limits which are ill-defined» Le_ vjsgueux 
menaces the overly acquisitive for-itself with a being, 
the dimensions of which are muddied and slowly shifting» 
Time oozes, space is a blob» 
But like the for-itself 1s fantasy that appropriation 
of the world through a particular object will satisfy its 
originary urge to be its own foundation, the threat (or 
insidious attraction) of the viscous suggests a being that 
is equally unattainable: 
C'est la crainte non de la mort, non de 1•En—soi 
pur, non du néant, mais d'un typB d'etre partic-
ulier, qui n'existe pas plus que 1'gn-spj-pour-
soi et qui est seulement représenté par le vis-
queux» Un être ideal que Je reprouve de toutes 
mes forces et qui me hante comme la valeur me 
hante dans mon être: un être idéal où l*En-soi 
non fonde a priorité sur le Pour—soi et que nous 
nommerons une Antivaleur» 2 4 9 
2 4 9
 ifcié.t P. 703. 
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In striving to be its own foundation ( in-itself-for-it-
seif), the for-itself brings value into the world, putting 
a premium of meaning on that which it encounters and, nec-
essarily, tries to appropriate» To be its own foundation, 
value par excellence» is thus the endlessly elusive goal 
of the for-itself a^ freedom» antivalue is the opposite 
extreme: it is an ideal being in which the foundationless 
in-itself ("l'En-soi non fonde") takes control of the 
for-itself. The for-itself becomes stymied by this inva-
sion of the in-itself and, as a result of this neutraliz-
ing of the foundational aspect of the for-itself (its cre-
ative force), consciousness is no longer free* Thus, at 
the positive extreme, there is both foundation (freedom) 
and being; at the negative extreme, there is being without 
foundation; in between these two ideal states, there is 
foundation and non-being (the being of consciousness)» 2 5 0 
we see, then, that what is at stake in the encounter 
with ie. visqueux is not really the for-itself1 s freedom, 
but only an illusion of this loss of freedom» 
2 5 0
 In case this notion of consciousness is not yet alto-
gether clear with regard to this study, we include at 
this point Hazel Barnes 1 working definition of Being— 
for-itself: 
The nihilation of being-in-itseIf; con-
sciousness conceived as a lack of being, a 
desire for Being, a relation to Being» By 
bringing nothingness into the world the 
For-itself can stand out from Being and 
Judge other beings by knowing what it is 
not» Each For-itself is the nihilation of a 
particular being (Being and Nothingness» p« 
800)» 
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Nausea arises, therefore, as an intuitive or knowing 
awareness of one of two contingent existants that pose a 
threat to the for-itself's freedom. There is one's own 
body, an in-itself which consciousness has to "exist," and 
there is the viscous, an object which by its very quali-
ties threatens to engulf the consciousness that encounters 
it. In summary, we might say that it is the threat of the 
pour-soj» being bogged down by the en—soj that causes this 
particular brand of existential sickness* 
But, one might object, this revulsion in the face of 
the slimy is hardly universal. Kids play with slimy 
things, don't they? Mudpies, frogs in the pocket, faintly 
disguised delight at things that are "gross"? True enough 
• • • and, furthermore, adults manifest a whole gamut of 
reactions and attitudes towards the viscous. What kind of 
person are you if you like the slimy? 
If you give in to the "demonic" attraction of an ob-
ject with an unstable consistency, you are "comme font les 
enfants" engaged in playful activity. In much the same 
way as the esnrit fte Jeu refuses to concede more reality 
to the world than it does to itself when faced with a sol-
id, stable object — an object which attracts with the 
lame and unsubstantiated promise of ideal appropriation, 
value par excellence — this attitude refuses as well to 
be ensnared by the false possibility of the appropriâtive 
nightmare: antivalue. The esprit de Jeu realizes its 
-20&-
freedom (perhaps not without an occasional flinch) in both 
situations? since it does not consider being-in-itself as 
a limit on this freedom, but instead as raw material for 
the undertaking of a creative act* Now, in response to 
the question of why someone likes the slimy and chooses it 
over some other object for playful appropriation (a ball 
or a stick, for example), we should recall that play, like 
other modes of appropriative behavior, represents an at-
tempt to master a situation* The selection of an oozing 
object for tactile playfulness would indicate a strategy 
to overcome the very threat posed by the visqueux ~ the 
invasion of the pour— soi by the en-sojL * The subject, 
feeling menaced by circumstances in which his freedom is 
apparently in jeopardy, uses this freedom to re-create the 
situation, but in such a way that, in repeating allegori-
cally the dangerous circumstances, he re—affirms the effi-
cacy of his freedom to pursue the course of his original 
project• 
It is just such a situation in which Roquent in finds 
himself* Originally, such games as ducks and drakes and 
the fondling of chestnuts, rags and paper were played with 
a certain amount of pleasure, a surpassing of the objects 
themselves through a creative use of freedom, a striving 
towards the metaphoric satisfaction of a drive, the origi-
nal object of which is unknowable for consciousness* But 
at a certain point, Roquentin fs attitude changes* He be-
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glns to see objects as they are — contingent pieces of 
non-conscious world* be ing-in-itself * existants which are 
a. priorjL void of meaning. Suddenly* the metaphor col-
lapsest signification is vaporized* Roquentin can no 
longer appropriate the objects, symbolically or otherwise» 
since the objects have become more real to Roquentin than 
his own perspective on them* The objects seem to touch 
back in a plot of counter-possession, an insurgency of the 
en-soi « Roquentin finds himself in a crisis of paranoia 
brought on by his willingness to adopt the esprit && ser-
This is why Sartre's character writes with horror: 
MJe ne suis plus libre, Je ne peux plus faire ce que Je 
veux." Tt is bad faith to believe that the contingency of 
the en-soj. constitutes a real limit on one's existential 
freedom. But it is easy to see thatf if I adopt the atti-
tude that objects take priority over the PO^IJV-soi» my re-
flective consciousness ( 1 A conscience thetiqyte ) would mis-
takenly apprehend that I am trapped by the world» 2 5 1 
Roquentin is afraid of being absorbed by the en-soi» 
He is denying his freedom» He is in bad faith* for he is 
attributing more reality to the world than to conscious-
Once again* we should point out that the world can in 
dieted limit us physically — that isf it can impose 
limitations on our bodies? which we are condemned to 
exist* It imposes no real limitations on our atti-
tudes* however* nor on our ability* our necessity* to 
constantly choose ourselves in terms of the world in 
which we find ourselves» 
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nessi 
We shall now look at what happens when Roquentin's 
game is turned into a vomi tous nightmare • • • when his 
toys come to life* 
Earlier, we described how Roquentin's handling of the 
papers is a kind of elaborated bastardization of the para-
digmatic children's sport of fort-da (see above, p» 177)» 
We noted how the playing out of Roquentin's various com-
plexes through his childish habit was a repeated attempt 
to master freely-flowing instinctual impulses — the com-
plexes themselves, which arise as a result of the course 
taken by an individual consciousness1 original project to 
become in-itself-for-itself through a symbolic appropria-
tion of the world. At this point, we can add that if the 
subject begins to sense that the world is turning on him, 
is engaged in a campaign of counter—possession, his strat-
egy of play breaks down* His complexes, as defenses, as 
freely created networks to insure the subject's capacity 
to continuously transcend the contingency of the gn-sol 
towards the fulfillment of his originary desire, do not 
hold the fort. The in-itself seems to take their very 
structure and invert it» 
For instance, we have noted how Roquentin's pleasure 
in touching the papers manifests an off—shoot of an infan-
tile Greiftrieb. As Roquentin's playful attitude towards 
objects yields to the esprit de ^ f ) e u x t however, it is 
the objects that begin to grasp him: 
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Les objets» cela ne devrait pas toucher« puisque 
cela ne vit pas* On s §en sert* on les remet en 
place» on vit au milieu d'eux: ils sont utiles» 
rien de plus* Et moi» ils me touchent» c'est 
insupportable» 2 5 2 
Roquentin feels that he is no longer free» because the 
very existence of objects seems to prevent him from freely 
transcending: their contingency towards a project supported 
by their utility. 
In like manner» we would suspect a reversal of the 
terms of Roquentin 1s Jonah complex» his desire to realize 
self-appropriation through -the swallowing and incorporat-
ing of an object that will remain intact even after being 
devoured* We find evidence of an opposing reaction to 
this drive in the fact that Roquentin describes his revul-
sion to what he perceives as changes in the objects he en-
counters as a nausea; normally» the urge to regurgitate* 
Moreover» in the later scene in which Roquentin is walking 
in the street with a (news—)paper in his hands» having 
just given up working on his book on Rollebon and read the 
account of a young girl's being raped» he suddenly fears 
being engulfed by the houses that surround him as he might 
be engulfed by a mountainous wave of water in the shape of 
a swan: "les maisons se referment sur moi sur le papier 
en montagne de cygne*" 2 5 3 As we pointed out earlier (see 
above» Ch* I» ppm 22* 46-47)» this scene bears a strong 
2 5 2
 Sartre» Lfik Nft\*g£e, p. 23* 
2 5 3
 Ifritf». P. 130. 
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connection with Roquentin's description of his paper 
gathering* both because there is a paper in his hands at 
the time of the halluciantion and because of the recurring 
image of the swan* The later scene, then» can be con-
strued as another manifestation of the en-soi ' s apparent 
turning of the tables on Roquentin. This fear of being 
devoured by a colossal, watery swan — a species of "water 
monster" — also underscores the inefficacy of Roquentin1 s 
hydra complex in neutralizing the threat of the in-it-
self*s invasion* He does not, at this point, arrogantly 
set fire to the watery image, but flees it in terror* 
Thus, Roquentin*s change in fundamental attitude results 
in a reversal of the hydra complex as well* 
The threat posed t>y the hydra, like that of the Medu-
sa's head, is one of castration (see above, Ch* I, PP» 
71-72 )• From a somewhat elementary and purely sexual 
point of view, the castration complex in men centers 
around the discovery that women lack a penis, or at least 
that the one they have is very s m a l l * 2 5 4 Consequently, the 
view of the female genitalia, the domain of the absent 
penis, functions as a trigger mechanism for an onset of 
castration anxiety* The resemblance of the head of the 
Medusa to a hair—encompassed vagina is clear enough; the 
connection of the hydra to the castration complex is a bit 
2 5 4
 See especially Freud 1s "Analysis of a Phobia in a 
Five-Year Old Boy," in The Standard Edition» Vol* X 
(London: Hogarth, 1953), pp* 3-149* 
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nore abstract and hinges on the hydra's role as avenging 
angel for man's stealing of the phallus from the fatherly 
Zeus* But the fact that the hydra is a creature of the 
watert and thus (we might expect) wet and somewhat slimy, 
suggests a tactile relation of the viscous hydra to the 
vaginal surfaces* 
Indeed, at one moment in his theoretical presentation 
of the notion of le, visqueux* Sartre speaks of the threat 
of the slimy in these terms: "son mode d'etre • • • c'est 
une activité molle, baveuse et feminine d'aspiration, il 
vit obscurément sous mes doigts," and a few lines further, 
"c'est la revanche de i'En-soi* Revanche douceâtre et 
feminine*" 2 5 5 This image of a soft and slobbery, sucking 
surface, which menaces the pour—gtp j. with engulf ment, can 
also apply to the mouth, but the repeated qualification of 
the viscous as particularly feminine points elsewhere in 
the anatomy* If the fundamental ontological representa-
tion of the threat of the in-itself is the v^?oueux« then 
the fundamental sexual representation of this threat is 
the vagina* 
By extension, we see how Roquentin's w]ggtrelb is 
also Jeopardized* If the Visstreib is rooted in sexual 
curiosity, and if sexual curiosity finds its paradigmatic 
strategy in childhood Schaulust • then the yjfsfstreib (the 
"drive to know") is always potentially threatened with a 
2 5 5
 Sartre, L'Etre et le û£&nj£t pp« 700, 701 (emphasis 
added )• 
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reainder of the primary discovery of gchaulust: the ana-
tomical distinction between the sexes* Thus, the Wjlg-
strieb/Schaulust aspect of Roquentin's attempt to appro-
priate objects backfires, if the viscous begins to tppfc 
back* 
Sartre 1s description of the mode of being of the vis-
cous as "une activité molle, baveuse et feminine d 1aspira-
tion," which lives obscurely "sous mes doigts," is broadly 
encompassed in the scene of Roquentin 1s reading of the 
newspaper account of Lucienne 1s rape» We have already 
signaled some of the more significant passages, for our 
purposes, in this scene's recounting, but a few more 
pieces of Roquent in vs description are worthy of attention* 
Roquent in 1s sensation of the hyper-existence of ob-
jects reaches him through the newspaper that is "sous ses 
doigts": 
L'enfant a été violée* On a retrouvé son corps, 
ses doigts crispes dans la boue* Je roule le 
journal en boule mes doigts crispés sur le jour-
nal: odeur d'encre; mon Dieu, comme les choses 
existent fort aujourd'hui* 2 5 6 
The viscosity of the object is not readily apparent and, 
indeed, it is probably Roquentin's overly—aroused sensi-
tivity to objects in general (a condition which was initi-
ated by the viscous at such moments as that of his han-
dling of the stone and his fear of picking up the "Hibou 
blanc" scrap) that is at work here. But what viscosity is 
2 5 6
 Sartre, LflL Naugge* P- 130. 
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lacking in the newspapert Roquentin supplies with his 
tell—tale description of and reaction to the rag* It 
seems as if his contact with the object itself sends Ro-
quentin off into a nightmarish identification with the 
raped girl» His hands clutch the paper as hers clutch the 
earth. Moreover, the critical locus of the violent attack 
is undoubtedly the child's vagina, the soft and viscous 
feminine surface. If we may call attention to the hand of 
Sartre behind the hand of Roquentin for a momentT we note 
that the viscous term baveuse* whose feminine form Sartre 
uses in the passage we last quoted from L'Etre e_£ \j& 
néant• was also employed as a slang substantive» during 
the period of the First World War, to mean "newspaper." 2 5 7 
The object's attack of counter-appropriation begins to re-
veal its tactical bias. 
The extent of Roquentin's identification with the vi-
olated girl becomes more and more evident as his narrative 
goes on: "Elle a senti cette autre chair qui se glissait 
dans la sienne. Je . • • voilà que je • • • Violée*" 2 5 8 
The girl's flesh is invaded by another being and Roquentin 
begins to sense his implication in the event. It is not 
clear yet whether he feels himself to be in the place of 
the violator or the violated: both are suggested. MJe 
2 5 7
 Joseph Marks, Harrap1 s French-English PictiPtlftry ûl 
Slang &-**£ Colloquialisms (London: Harrap, 1970), p. 
25. 
2 5 8
 Sartre, J^ a. Nausée « p. 130. 
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lache ce journal. La Maison jaillit, elle existe." 2 5 9 He 
can no longer hold the paper, appropriate it; things begin 
to mount an overwhelming attack. The engulfing water-swan 
houses threaten; they spurt with existence. Roquentin de-
fends himself with desperate phallic insistence, but his 
very counter-attack leads him deeper and deeper into the 
overpowering folds of the feminine viscous: 
Est-ce que je vais... caresser dans l 1épa-
nouissement des draps blancs la chair blanche 
épanouie qui retombe douce, toucher les moiteurs 
fleuries des aisselles, les elixirs et les li-
queurs et les florescences de la chair, entrer 
dans l'existence de l'autre, dans les muqueuses 
rouges à la lourde, douce, douce odeur d'exis-
tence, ^ me sentir exister entre les douces lèvres 
mouillées, les lèvres rouges de sang pale, les 
lèvres palpitantes qui baillent toutes mouillées 
d'existence, toutes mouillées d'un pus clair, 
entre les lèvres mouillées sucrées qui larmoient 
comme des y e u x ? 2 6 0 
No, this caressing, phallic, possessive entry into the 
viscous — the terms of Roquentin's counter-attack against 
the invading en-gpj -- fails, and he makes up his mind to 
flee the world's sweet encompassing, only to be caught by 
the in-itself "from behind": 
• • • l'existence prend mes pensées par derri-
ère et doucement les épanouit par derrière; on 
me prend par derrière, on me force par derrière 
de penser, donc d'être quelque chose. 2 6 1 
2 5 9
 Ibid. 
2 6 0
 Ifrjtf., p . 1 3 1 . 
2 6 1
 Xkié*t P. 132. 
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Roquentin has his worst fears realized during these sexual 
hallucinations» He is being overcome by the viscous and 
iSf consequently, becoming himself visqueux ("Toucher au 
visqueux, c'est risquer de se diluer en viscosité" 2 6 2)• 
He has become a victim of a rape by the en-soi « has become 
like little Lucienne*s soft, mucous-coated, bloodied vagi-
na — penetrated by the hard, unyielding in-itself» Ro-
quentin imagines his consciousness violated like a woman 
under attack, a hole which is penetrated» In Roquentin1s 
case, as a male, this hole must be the so—called "demo-
cratic" orifice, the gap in his derrière • • • raped from 
behind by existence, the for—itself as anus» 2 6 3 
As an addendum to our discussion of the souring of 
Roquentin 1s pleasure in handling paper objects, let us 
point out that the mud, which is often caked on to the 
surface of these morsels, as well as the urine and excre-
ment that are occasionally found there, also serve to 
qualify these scraps as "objets à deux faces»" The vis-
cosity of mud and excrement are readily apparent, ancî the 
fading yellow tint of dried urine can be classified as one 
of the "viscous" colors in the spectrum of Fletcher's 
2 6 2
 Sartre, j,* Etre e_t Lfe néant, p. 702. 
2 6 3
 An extensive and intelligent reading of this scene ap 
pears in Alexander Argyros1 unpublished thesis, "The 
Question of Truth in Sartre, Heidegger and Derrida," 
Diss» Cornell University, 1977; see especially pp* 
28-32. 
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lecture colorée» 2 6 4 Moreover» urine and excrement, as 
"gifts" of the child to its surrounding environment, as a 
"don du soi»" return hauntingly as counter-possessive be-
ings to the ontologically paranoid esprit gte_ gerj.eux« as 
detached parts of a body, as things-in-the-world untran-
scended by consciousness and, as slimy objects, with a 
bestowal of a being which is viscosity itself» Roquen-
tin's recounting of the surprising terror tactics of the 
stone on the shore, his uneasy narration of the struggle 
now involved in the simple, appropriative game he used to 
play with objects in the street, and his violent, horrify-
ing description of the hallucinations provoked by the 
newspaper account of the rape of a young girl, all serve 
to encapsulate the symptomatic universe of the first stage 
of Roquentin fs existential crisis* 
The second stage of this nauseatingly paranoid en-
counter with the en-gpi occurs at the moment of his epi-
phany in the park, at the moment when lfle voile se dé-
chire" and he glimpses the in-itself stripped clean of 
words and meaning* Along the way leading up to this turn-
ing point in Roquentin 1s condition, the reader encounters 
other moments of nausea, other moments of uneasiness in 
the face of the threatening in-itself* There is the sin-
ister glass of beer in the Café Mably, Adolphe1s suspen-
ders, the foggy morning and M* Fascruelle's flu, to name a 
2 6 4
 Fletcher, "The Use of Colour in La. Nausée*" 
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few of these instances* But an analysis of these scenes 
would yield very little new information for our purposes» 
and we shall therefore dispense with their study in the 
present work» Our contention is that the stone and the 
papers» and Koquentin's rapport with them» mark the whole 
gamut of psychological data needed to shed light on Ro-
quentin's dilemma and identify it as one of a certain 
failure of appropriation» and we shall limit ourselves to 
the demands of this hypothesis* 
The chestnut root episode is immediately preceded by 
a full-scale bout with nausea. Roquentin is having lunch 
with the siimily humanistic Audtodidact» whose soft» suck-
ing attitudes threaten to reduce one's ideas to "une 
lymphe blanche et mousseuse»" if "on Joue son Jeu*" 2 6 5 The 
restaurant is filled with people of one kind or another» a 
fact that is of little comfort to the already uneasy Ro-
quentin» who imagines one of the diners to be a traveling 
salesman dealing in "la pate dentifrice Swan" 2 6 6 (i#e*» 
white» pasty swans)* A combination of the Autodidact fs 
oozing banter» Poquentin's perception of his surroundings» 
and the look and taste of his "poulet froid" and "camem-
bert crayeux" lead the diarist to the point of vomiting: 
Une belle crise: ça me secoue du haut en bas* 
Il y a une heure que je la voyais venir» seule-
ment Je ne voulais pas me l1avouer* Ce gout de 
fromage dans ma bouche • • • L'Autodidacte 
6 5
 Sartre» La. Nausée# p* 151* 
2 6 6
 Ibld*» p. 143. 
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babille et sa voix bourdonne doucement a mes or-
eilles* 2 6 7 
We note that one of the points attacked in Foquentin's 
battle with the world is once again his ears (recalling 
"Un doux désir sanglant de viol me prend par derrière» 
tout doux» derrière les oreillesy les oreilles filent der-
rière m o i " 2 6 8 )• Koquentin grasps the knife that flanks 
his plate and senses its meaningless* unpresuming exis-
tence in—itself : "à quoi bon toucher quelque chose? Les 
objets ne sont pas faits pour qu'on les touche. Il vaut 
bien mieux se glisser entre eux»" 2 6 9 Objects cannot be ap-
propriated; they are not there to be appropriated; they 
are merely there» Roquentin drops the knife andf in a 
narrative prelude to the momentous disclosure of Being 
soon to comet we read: 
C'est donc ça la Nausée: cette aveuglante evi-
dence? Me suis-Je creusé la têtel En ai-Je éc-
rit! Maintenant Je sais: J'existe — le monde 
existe -- et Je sais que le monde existe. C'est 
tout • • • C'est depuis ce fameux Jour ou Je 
voulais faire des ricochets* J'allais lancer ce 
gaiety Je l*ai regardé et c'est alors que tout a 
commencé: J'ai senti qu«il existait» Et puis 
après çat il y a eu d'autres Nausées ? de temps 
en temps les objets se mettent à vous exister 
dans la m a i n » 2 7 0 
2 6 7
 l&LÛ'f p . 1 5 5 . 
2 6 8
 ItLLé.f P. 1 3 0 . 
2 6 9
 Ifritf . t PP- 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 . 
2 7 0
 Jfrirf.f P . 1 5 6 . 
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Roquentin leaves the restaurant without giving any 
explanation to his dinner companion for his oddf preoccu-
pied behavior» He boards a tram* only to have the world's 
stark existence continue to exhibit itself before him: 
"J'appuie ma main sur la banquette» mais je la retire pré-
cipitamment: ça existe." 2 7 1 He tries to master the seat's 
arrogant is-ness through a new tactic: an appropriation 
by means of language? an attempt to neutralize the ob-
ject's alien menace by naming it, and thus rendering it 
meaningful and knowable and fit for appropriation. Like 
the enunciated "fort/da" of the playful childf Roquent in 
begins to name names in order to condemn 9 and hopefully 
convict and have incarcérâtedr the horrifying being which 
has run amok: "Je murmure: c'est une banquettef un peu 
comme un exorcisme." 2 7 2 The tramway seat's demonic reality 
is too greatt however* for Roquent in 1s serious mind andY 
unlike the gambit of the fort-da player who derives at 
least temporary satisfaction from his creatve gestures* 
Roquentin's stab at magical incantation fails: "Mais le 
aot reste sur mes lèvres: il refuse d'aller se poser sur 
la chose." 2 7 3 
2 7 1
 Tt>itf«f P. 1 5 9 . 
2 7 2
 Ibltf . 
2 7 3
 Ibltf . 
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Roquenti^s image of the seat is one of a viscous an-
imal, dead bloated flesh, a dead donkey: "Cet énorme ven-
tre tourné en l1air, sanglant, ballonné — boursoufle avec 
toutes ses pattes mortes, ventre qui flotte dans cette 
boîte, dans ce ciel gris, ce n'est pas une banquette» Ça 
pourrait tout aussi bien être un ane mort»" 2 7 4 What Ro-
quent in is seeing hardly resembles a "banquette,M that is, 
the name of the thing. The word fails to define and de-
limit what is slowly overflowing the seat, the oozing blob 
of existence* Attempts to appropriate the thing fail and 
Roquentin's fear of being possessed himself by the threat-
ening object, of being invaded and dissolved by the rot-
ting belly of the ass corpse, of the pour-soi becoming 
viscous, is exacerbated* We note that this vision of the 
bloated stomach, an example of a Jonah image, indicates 
through its now threatening appearance the reversal of Ro-
quent in1 s earlier appropriative complexe pie. JLo.aft.2., what, 
at this point, Bachelard terms lf anti-Jonas* 2 7 S Moreover, 
there are aspects of the Medusa image present in Roquen-
tln's vision of the seat: "Elle reste ce qu'elle est, 
avec sa peluche rouge, milliers de petites pattes rouges, 
en l'air, toutes raides, de petites pattes mortes*" 2 7 6 The 
fleecy, red shag, made up of thousands of stiff paws, 
2 7 4
 Ibid* 
2 7 5
 Bachelard, Lô. Terre ejt les rgveries û^ à repps, P» 169. 
2 7 6
 Sartre, La. Nausée • p. 159* 
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calls to Rind the structure of the Medusa's head — a 
hairy and, in this case, bleeding vagina, around which the 
reassuring presence of thousands of erect penises is mani-
fested. But this multiplicity of phallic presence is not 
enough to allay Poqucntin's primordial fear in the face of 
the banouette. 
The description of the tramway bench serves as a pre-
lude to the second moment of the protagonist's "sudden il-
lumination ," his satori» Roquentin bounds off the tram, 
but cannot escape the sensation of counter—appropriât ion» 
It is not just the banquette that threatens to pervade his 
freedom, but être—en-soi in general: 
• • • l'existence me pénètre de partoutf par 
les yeux? par le nez } par la bouche • • • 
Et tout d'un coup* d'un seul coupt le voile 
se déchire9 j'ai compris, j'ai vu» 2 7 7 
The "racine du marronnier" itself presents us with nothing 
new in the way of significant information pertaining to 
Roquentin's crisis* It is a somewhat viscous object, al-
though , like the tramway seat, far more solid than Roquen-
tin's other nemeses. To Roquentin, it resembles a "grosse 
patte rugueuse," this metaphor suggesting a mobile, animal 
nature, one that grasps back» The root is capable of fas-
cinating, as well, and we are reminded of the compelling 
nature of the viscous' sly threat of counter-possession 
(see above, p» 205): "Noueuse, inerte, sans nom, elle me 
fascinait, m'emplissent les yeux, me ramenait sans cesse a 
2 7 7
 IhL&.i P* 160. 
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sa propre existence." 2 7 8 The root seems to take over Ro-
quentin's eyes with its own very being* He tries a count-
er—attack of appropriative mumbo-juobo» but» as in the 
case of the banquette « he cannot exorcise the ontological 
demon: "J'avais beau répéter: fC'est une racine1 — ça ne 
prenait p l u s " 2 7 9 — "that no longer worked / no longer 
took hold (prenait )»" Even the black color of the root, a 
hue which is normally reassuring for Roquentin, 2 8 0 loses 
its stability at the height of his visionary rambling: 
Ça ressemblait a une couleur mais aussi • • • a 
une meurtrissure ou encore a une secretion, a un 
suint — et à autre chose, à une odeur par exem-
ple, ça se fondait en odeur de terre mouillée, 
de bois tiède et mouillé, en odeur noire étendue 
comme un vernis sur ce bois nerveux, en saveur 
de fibre mâchée, sucrée» 2 8 1 
The wet ("mouillé"), luke-warm ("tiède") ooze ("suint") of 
the blackness of the wood unmistakably qualifies the root 
as a potentially hard, stable object that is "varnished" 
with slime: an "objet à deux faces." Moreover, this vis-
cous odor of the wood, 2 8 2 as well as what Roquentin su-
2 7 8
 lh±&'f P* 164. 
2 7 9
 Itoitf. 
2 8 0
 On the stabilizing function of black, see Fletcher's 
"The Use of Colour in Lô Nausée" and Pellegrini "L'-
Objet à deux faces dans fLfi. Causée 1•" 
2 8 1 Sartre, La. Naupée• p. 166« 
2 8 2
 Odors in general are seen as "objets à deux faces" by 
Gerald Prince, who in the wake of Pellegrin's analysis 
wri t es : 
L'odeur aussi est à deux faces. L*odeur est 
métamorphose. C fest une présence absente, 
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spects to be its sweet taste» 2 e 3 reinforce the multi-sen-
sory, threatening messages emitted from the object» 
But there is something different about this encounter 
that distinguishes it from other run-ins Roquentin has had 
with beastly objects* Roquentin has caught a glimmer of 
the in-itself's contingent nature: "Exister? c'est gtre-
1& simplement." 2 8 4 He feels that he now understands the 
implications of the world's simply being theret that exis-
tence is prior to essence 9 and that without essence (the 
quality of being that is brought into the world by con-
sciousness )? there is no differencef no distinguishing 
factor or factors that would serve to define things as 
qui change en se répandant, qui flotte dans 
l'air tout en se posant lourdement sur les 
choses? qui adhère à l'objet tout en s'en 
détachant* Elle n'a pas de limites? elle ne 
les connaît pas? elle les défie* Volée? 
flasque? informe et qu'on ne saurait conten-
ir? son origine et sa fin se confondent avec 
l'air qu'elle parcourt et qu'elle alourdit 
(Gerald Prince? "L'Odeur de la nausée?" p* 
35 ). 
2 8 3
 The relation of taste to the slimy occurs precisely in 
this notion of sweetness? according to Sartre* After 
describing the vismieux as the "revanche de l'En-soi" 
and a "revanche douceâtre et féminine?" he goes on to 
say that this revenge 
• • • se symbolisera sur un autre plan par 
la qualité de ^ucré* C'est pourquoi le su-
cre comme douceur au gropt — douceur indélé-
bile? qui demeure indéfiniment dans la 
bouche et survit à la déglutition — com-
plète parfaitement l'essence du visqueux* 
Le visqueux sucré est l'idéal du visqueux 
CLLEÎXÊ. Ê± le. néant?
 P. 701). 
2 8
* Sartre? La. Nausée, p. 166. 
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sucht Existence is plenitude of being, the 
undifferentiated» overflowing is—ness of matter whicht for 
the existential visionary» threatens from time to time to 
flood the nothingness which is consciousness: 
L 1existence n'est pas quelque chose qui se 
laisse penser de loin; il faut que ça vous en-
vahisse brusquement» que ça s'arrête sur vous» 
que ça pesé lourd sur votre coeur comme une 
grosse bête immobile — ou alors il n'y a plus 
rien du tout» 2 8 5 
Roquent in cannot sustain this intuited intimacy with the 
eP~gPÎ for very long* The spell of the ontological rape 
is broken as quickly as it attacked his imagination in the 
first place: "Il n'y avait plus rien du tout, j'avais les 
yeux vides et je m'enchantais de ma délivrance^" 2 8 6 It is 
primarily through the eyes that the root's invasion takes 
place» for in contrast to the "yeux vides" which signal 
the withdrawal of the onerous en-soi « we recall the "yeux 
emplis" of Roquentin's initial fascination* In this epi-
sode» Roquent in confronts his reversed scopophilia» his 
recent SCOPO-phobia, and stares the Medusa down* He is 
temporarily overcome» but his viscous attacker suddenly 
withdraws harmlessly* 
This "kick in the eye" by the en-soi has left Roquen-
tin with a further understanding of the nausea — an in-
sight pertaining to the notion of appropriation: "je C O D -
2 8 5
 Ifritf-f P- 167. 
2 8 6
 Ifrjtf* 
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prenais la Nausée, je la possédais»" 2 8 7 If we recall that 
appropriation is a relation between the for-itself and an 
object» in which I search for support for my being in an 
object that is mjLUÊ-t but not jag.» we can well understand 
how this strategy is insufficient for the realization of 
the pour—soi's fundamental appropriative project: to have 
itself in the sense of being its own foundation* But Ro-
quent in remarks in his preamble to the narration of the 
chestnut root incident that "La Nausée ne m 1a pas quitte 
et je ne crois pas qu'elle me quittera de sitôt; mais je 
ne la subis plus* ce n'est pas une maladie ni une quinte 
passagère: c'est moi•" 2 e e Has Roquentin succeeded in 
founding his own being in the nausea that he possesses? 
Can he revise the Cartesian çpgitp to read: "Je vomis, 
donc je suis"? 
In response to these questions, we should first of 
all recall the two points of view on this existential 
sickness that we examined earlier» There is the nauseous 
response to the viscous, the horror of the "objet à deux 
faces" that seems all of a sudden to touch back, and there 
is the nausea which Sartre describes as "Cette saisie per-
pétuelle par mon pour-soi d'un gout fatfe et sans distance 
qui m»accompagne jusque dans mes efforts pour m'en 
2 8 7
 Xfeiot.» P* 166. 
2 8 8
 Ibid» « p» 161, emphasis added» 
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délivrer et qui est mop gout»" 2 8 9 The former is actually 
related to the latter in that the true terror of the vis-
cous as antivalue is that it reminds one of one's own 
flesh, the en-soi which cannot he escaped* Thus, the dis-
gusting taste of the sweet viscous, the horrifying feel of 
the slimy viscous, and the unpleasant sight of the oozing 
instability of the two-faced object, all provoke a non-
thetic consciousness of the body: the insipid taste of sa-
liva, the feel of one's soft, moist, meaningless mouth, 
the sight of one's hand as a contingent appendage* Ro-
quentin seems to no longer be threatened or frightened by 
the root itself* Once he feels that he possesses the nau-
sea, he discovers that existence is something f,qui [ne] se 
laisse [pas] penser de loin11 ("un gout fade et sans dis-
tance"), which "s'arrête sur vous • • • comme une grosse 
bête" ("qui m'accompagne"), and which eventually releases 
its grip ("je m'enchantais de ma délivrance" / "mes ef-
forts pour m 1en délivrer"). The object has apparently re-
leased its hold on Roquentin, but the nausea, which is his 
consciousness (of) his own facticity, remains* 
Thus, this intuition of existence, as a sense of in-
vasion by the undifferentiated in-itself, includes that 
element of the en-soi that one does possess in a way, *hat 
one is always related to in a context of mine, but not-me: 
the body. Although I can say that my body is me, it is 
2 8 9
 Sartre, L'Etre ejt 1& péant, p* 404 (quoted above, p. 
200). 
-230-
certainly not me from the point of view of the nour-soj 
which must "exist" the body as a contingent being-in-the-
world. For the ppur-pojy the body is something it ÙAÊ* 
Consequently, the statements "la Nausée, je la possédais" 
and "La Nausée • • • c'est moi" indicate an understanding 
of a highly intimate relation of appropriation* The for-
itself finds a foundation in the in-itself, which is its 
body» This is still not the ideal appropriation of which 
the for-itself dreams, however, for in having a body that 
is both mine and not me ( in a sense), I am still not my 
own freely constructed foundation — that is, I do not 
create my ideal pour-so1-en-soi • My body is not my own 
creation; it is a given, as contingent as the racj.flE #u 
• • • aucun être nécessaire ne peut expliquer 
l'existence: la contingence n'est pas un faux 
semblant, une apparence qu'on peut dissiper; c 1-
est l'absolu, par conséquent la gratuité par-
faite. Tout est gratuit, ce jardin, cette ville 
et moi—même» 2 9 0 
We note that, although Roquent in has now achieved a 
relieving insight into the origins of his distress, his 
attitude is still one that reflects the egprit Û&. sérieug. 
at one point we read: 
Je raclai mon talon contre cette griffe noire: 
j'aurai voulu l'écorcher un peu. Pour rien, par 
défi, pour faire apparaître sur le cuir tanné le 
rose absurde d'une éraflure: pour Jouer avec 
l'absurdité du monde. Mais, quand je retirai 
mon pied, je vis que l'écorce était restée 
2 9 0
 Sartre, L& Nausée» p. 166. 
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noire. 2 9 l 
Roquentin's feeble attempt to play with the world's 
absurdity leads him to the tacit conclusion that this tree 
root cannot be played with» But if the success of the 
game is measured by the extent to which the root's bark 
can be peeled — an end that Roquentin seems to imply — 
then any child with a pocket knife would have no trouble 
disproving Roquentin 1s contention that you cannot play 
with existence» Roquentin has yet to adopt an attitude by 
which he can counter-attack the threat of the en-soj with 
his creative freedom* 
His counter-offensive is not long in coming» however* 
We note that his raastery of the threatening situation 
through an understanding of the object is first accom-
plished intuitively! then otherwise: "A vrai dire je ne 
ne formulais pas mes découvertes. liais Je crois qu'à 
présent [i.e., at the moment of writing] il me serait fa-
cile de les mettre en m o t s " 2 9 2 • • • which brings us to a 
mode of appropriation that is peculiar to Roquentin, as 
well as to those others who engage in such logging of the 
course of their investigative self-reflection. 
Roquentin decides to keep a journal, we are told in 
the "feuillet sans date," in order to see clearly, to un-
derstand the changes which seem to have taken place in the 
2 9 1
 Tfrjot* « p. 165, Roquentin's emphasis. 
2 9 2
 IfrJLtf't P* 1 6 6 . 
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objects he encounters: 
Le mieux serait d'écrire les événements au jour 
le jour. Tenir un journal pour y voir clair 
• • • Il faut dire comment je vois cette tablet 
la rue, les gens? mon paquet de tabac, puisque 
c'est cela qui a changé* Il faut déterminer ex-
actement l'étendue et la nature de ce change-
ment. 2 9 3 
He announces his intention to describe "events" as they 
occur from day to day, as well as the objects themselves, 
in order to measure quantitatively and qualitatively how 
his world has changed. It is quite surprising, then, that 
in the entry of "30 janvier" Roquentin hems and haws at 
the prospect of writing about the piece of paper he could 
not pick up. Such an odd occurrence, especially given its 
similarity to the incident on the beach with the two-faced 
stone, seems quite worthy of narration* But "ce n'est 
même pas un événement," 2 9 4 Roquentin maintains, in much 
the same way as he disclaimed the eventfulness of the 
stone episode in the "feuillet sans date": 
Naturellement je ne peux pas plus rien écrire de 
net sur ces histoires de samedi et d 1avant-hier 
[a story we are, in fact, never given], j'en 
suis déjà trop éloigne; ce que je peux dire 
seulement, c'est que, ni dans l'un ni dans l'au-
tre cas, il n'y a rien eu de ce qu'on appelle a 
l'ordinaire un événement. 2 9 5 
2 9 3
 IhlÛ.f P. 211. 
2 9
* Ibltf.. p. 22. 
2 9 5
 Ikld.t P. !!• 
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This exclusion of his encounters with the en-soi on the 
basis of their uneventfulness seems paradoxical in the 
light of Roquent in1s anxious confrontation with the world» 
for it is precisely these incidents (if not events) of 
nausea that he is trying to order and classify through his 
writing project» But here* in the heart of the paradox* 
lies the key to its resolution* One writes or speaks of 
events; they are not lived except through reflection* as 
Roquentin points out in a later entry: ,f • • • il faut 
choisir: vivre ou raconter." 2 9 6 Events do not exist in 
themselves* but are the product of some kind of narration 
from a certain temporal and reflective distance estab-
lished by consciousness* If it is existence itself that 
Roquentin is trying to come to terms with» then we can un-
derstand the difficulty he has in describing the object of 
his paranoia* if existence "n'est pas quelque chose qui se 
laisse penser de loin*" Thus, the narratability of such 
an occurrence is problematic* A threatened invasion by 
the en—goj» is not an event* because one of the terms of 
the encounter is radically unthinkable* and therefore un-
namable* The en—soi is simply there and naming it serves 
to mask its contingency* 
Of course* Roquentin çoulft narrate the incidents* and 
he does in fact* after a good deal of hesitation* His re-
luctance to appropriate the non-event through writing (the 
2 9 6
 iPit.f P * 5 7 . 
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rendering of eventfulness to the epiphany) can perhaps be 
explained by the esprit de sérieux» Why should Roquentin 
want to repeat a situation in which the threat to his be-
ing appeared so real? Here we are reminded of one of the 
objections to Freud's interpretation of the jPprt-da game: 
why should the child want to repeat an incident which 
caused him unpleasure in the first place? The answer is 
in the compulsion to repeat, the technique of re—playing 
the incident again and again in a metaphorized or regres-
sive (i*e*, hallucinated or dreamed) fashion in an effort 
to bind the strong unconscious impulses pressing for dis-
charge* The use of this psychological tactic implies the 
presupposition of the narratability of the unpleasurable 
situation* In Roquentin 1s case* what is happening to him 
is taking place beyond the range of narratability, and he 
senses, even at the inception of his writing project, that 
the relating of these encounters somehow betrays their 
very nature* Roquentin is unwilling to master the threat-
ening situation, to assume the esprit tfe Jeu» because he 
is overwhelmed by his pre—reflective awareness of the en-
suit a manifestation of being to which he gives more real-
ity than to his freedom to recount, interpret, and thus 
"transcend the objects 1 être-là» It is through appropria-
*ive action, however temporarily efficacious it may be, 
that the threat of the ep—soj can be countered* 
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Roquentin fs esorit ge. sérieux is manifested in his 
very notion of the purpose of his writing project» He is 
on the verge of being at play» since he shifts mediums in 
order to appropriate that which is lacking to him — that 
1st he intends to move from living to relating in order to 
get a hold on the world, much like the child uses the bob-
bin and the vocables "fort/da" to letaphorize and thus 
temporarily harness his instinctual energy and master the 
situation in which the lack is exposed* But Roquentin is 
not content with mere symbol!zation• He strives for an 
impossible precision in which signifiers express exactly 
corresponding signifieds* His refusal to recount (and 
thus appropriate ) the threats of the en—soi as "événe-
ments" is indicative of this attitude* One wonders how 
RoquentJn manages to write anything at all while haunted 
by beings which balk at signification* 2 9 7 He is reluctant 
to allow any free—play in his narration and his project 
seems doomed* 
This desire for signification that would rigidly re-
Produce a signified, a wish of the esorit de gérjeux» does 
Condemn to failure Roquentin's book on Rollebon* We note 
early on in the journal Roquent in 9s abhorrence of his own 
aPpropriative tendencies with regard to the history of the 
marquis: 
Indeedf some days he is very nearly paralyzed by his 
serious attitude* The entry for the Tuesday after 
Mardi Gras, for example, reads: "Rien* Existé" (L& 
Nausée, p* 133)* 
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Eh bien, oui: il a pu faire tout çaf mais ce 
n'est pas prouvé: je commence a croire qu'on ne 
peut jamais rien prouver» Ce sont des hypoth-
èses honnêtes et qui rendent compte des faits: 
mais je sens si bien qu'elles viennent de moi , 
qu'elles sont tout simplement une manière d 1uni-
fier mes connaissances* Pas une lueur ne vient 
du coté de Pollebon* Lents, paresseux, maus-
sades, les faits s'accommodent à la rigueur de 
l'ordre que je veux leur donner; mais il leur 
reste extérieur* J'ai l'impression de faire un 
travail de pure imagination* Encore suis-je 
bien sur que des personnages de roman auraient 
l'air plus vrais, seraient, en tout cas, plus 
plaisants* 2 9 e 
Roquentin sees his desire to write and, by extension, his 
wish to write a book on the Marquis de Rollebon, as an at-
tempt to "unifier (s )es connaissances*" As a result of 
our theoretical study, we can conclude that this unifica-
tion of what he knows is a goal supported on the wish to 
possess oneself through one's knowledge, the underlying, 
originary foundation of the Wisstriefr and its informing 
Schaulust* But as Roquentin observes so perspicaciously? 
the manifestation of this drive -- the history that he is 
writing — does not reproduce the truth of Rollebon's 
life, or rather, it reproduces only the truth of the al-
ready narrated facts about Rollebon's life* It is a his-
tory of the signification of Rollebon's life, an ordering 
and classifying of signifiers* The signified has been ex-
cluded; the en-soi• of which Roquentin has become overly 
aware, does not raise its hydra's head against the back-
drop of Rollebon's documented past* 
2 9 8
 Sartre, La. NftUgée, P* 27. 
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It is not until a bit later that Roquentin 1s esprit 
gte sérieux allows the en— froj. to completely overwhelm his 
Rollebon project. On the Monday following his visit to 
the Bouville museum, Roquentin succombs to existential pa-
ralysis* a numbing of his drives» and undergoes an exten-
sive attack of nausea* The diary entry begins with a dec-
laration of resignation: v,Je n'écris plus mon livre sur 
Rollebon; c'est finit je ne peux plus l'écrire»" 2 9 9 Remi-
niscent of his recounting of the "Hibou blanc" incident» 
Roquentin 1s present statement reflects his impotence in 
the face of the en—soi (in this case* Rollebon 1s past) 
which seems to resist appropriation* But this laying down 
of his arms exposes Roquentin to the very threat of count-
er-possession that he fears so much* He stops writing» 
holds his pen in the air* in retreat* and stares at the 
sheet of paper before him: 
• • • comme il était dur et voyant• comme il 
était présent* Il n'y avait rien en lui que du 
present* Les lettres que je venais d'y tracer 
n'étaient pas encore sèches et déjà elles ne m'-
appartenaient p l u s * 3 0 0 
The paper itself has begun to take over his words* his 
means of appropriation» 3 0 1 He is being disarmed* What's 
2 9 9
 Xfcié*. P* 123. 
3 0 0
 Xfeli-f P* 124. 
3 0 1
 This particular illusion is not new to Roquentin» the 
writer* We recall that in his hesitation over record-
ing the "Hibou blanc" incident, he notes that the idea 
that he is no longer free — the manifestation of his 
fear of being possessed by the ejx PP^ — "[lui] a 
dicté les pages qui précèdent" ( La. {T^usee» p. 2 2 ) . In 
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more, Roquentin suddenly finds himself in a very dangerous 
posi tion: 
Je prig ses lettres £&&& m&& frftîngy j ^ leg Bfii-
pajy avec une espèce de desespoir • • • ces mots 
[de Rollebon] n'avaient plus de sens* Rien d1-
autre n'existait plus qu'une liasse de feujLHes 
Jaunes que je pressais rfftng meg Bfrjn^*302 
Roquentin is holding yellowed papers? caressing them in-
quiringly, repeating the formerly pleasurable, appropria-
tive gestures he used to make with an esprit de Jeu» He 
is no longer playing* however, and he grows afraid of the 
papers' imposing being* He tries to play dead: "Surtout 
ne pas bouger, Û Ê pas bouger • •• ah* Ce mouvement d'é-
paules, je n'ai pas pu le retenir. 3 0 3 The in-itself has 
spied him and attacks like a viscous beast of preyl 
La chose, qui attendait» s'est alertée, elle a 
fondu sur moi, elle se coule en moi, j'en suis 
plein* — Ce n'est rien: la Chose, c'est moi* 
other words, it is Roquentin's idea that he is being 
appropriated by objects that dictated to him the pages 
during which he resists the narration (and thus an at-
tempt to appropriate) his confrontation with the 
threatening scrap* Thus, it is as if Roquentin's 
journal writing is being taken over by the very world 
that he is trying to order through this form of docu-
mentation* 
We might also note at this point that, in his ini-
tial description of the objects that he likes to pick 
up, Roquentin mentions his interest in "des bouts de 
journaux," translated by Alexander as "remnants of 
• • • newspapers»" but which could also be understood 
as "scraps of journals*" Now that objects seem to 
have turned on Roquentin, we see that the journal it-
self may become a threatening object in much the same 
way that old papers in the street have gone from at-
tractive morsels to counter-appropriative figures* 
0 2
 Sartre, La Causée « p* 125, emphasis added* 
3 0 3
 XtLU.T P. 127. 
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L fexistence* libérée• degageeT reflue sur moi* 
J fexiste. 3 0* 
Once again, it is a revelation of the body» which the 
for-itself must existr that is provoked by the apparent 
counter-possession on the part of the object» We note Ro-
quentin's description of the corporeal sensations which 
follow: 
Tout doux, tout douxf il y a de l'eau mousseuse 
dans ma bouche* Je l'avale* elle glisse dans ma 
gorge9 elle me caresse — et la voilà qui renaît 
dans ma bouchef J'ai dans la bouche à perpétuité 
une petite mare d'eau blanchâtre — discrète — 
qui frôle ma langue* Et cette mare* c'est en-
core moi* Et la langue* Et la gorge9 c'est 
m o i . 3 0 5 
The threat of counter—appropriation by the papers gives 
way to a sense of counter—appropriation by the body* Ro-
quentin has the nauseating "gout d'existence" in his 
mouth: "Ma salive est sucrée • • • Je me sens fade f" he 
remarks a few lines later* 3 0 6 He glances down at his hand* 
which suddenly resembles a crab lying on its backf a zoo-
logical "objet à deux faces" with a hard carapace and a 
soft belly (now e x p o s e d ) * 3 0 7 In an effort to make a 
3 0 4
 Ifrltf* 
3 0 5
 Ifritf» 
3 0 6
 Ibid*, p. 129. 
3 0 7
 Images of crabs and other crustaceans abound in Sar-
tre's fiction and usually suggest threats of counter-
appropriation on the part of the en—soi• See» for ex-
ample
 r Marie-Denise Boros 1 study» "La Métaphore du 
crabe dans l'oeuvre littéraire de Jean-Paul Sartre»" 
PJiLAt Ixxxit pp* 446-450 f in which she summarizes sev-
eral of these instances and concludes: 
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change» to fight back against his own insipidness» Roquen-
tin seizes the pocket knife that is lying on the table be-
side his writing paper and stabs the palm of his crab-like 
hand. We can understand this self-inflicted wound as a 
very an-aetaphoric reaction to his fear of being overcome 
by the en—goi• which» at the moment» manifests itself in 
the creepiness of his hand* But Kenneth Douglas points 
out another consideration which should not be overlooked» 
Roquentin 1s act is one of "stignatizationj" a self—in-
flicting of stigmata in an attempt to redeem himself* At 
the same time» the stabbing is a gesture of self—penetra-
tionf of self—possession in the sexual sense* Thus» Ro-
quentin's self—mutilation can be understood as an effort 
to dispel the nausea by becoming his own gQg Cftu^a SJlit 
Cette allusion au crabe semble toujours ram-
ener 1vhomme au monde de la Physis» que le 
veritable héros sartrien tient en horreur» a 
la facticité qui entrave l'élan de sa li-
berté» à l'opacité massive de !•En—soi ( p» 
447). 
This interpretation of the crustacean metaphor sug-
gests a possible connection between the old man who 
used to frighten young Antoine and his friends in the 
Luxembourg Gardens and the adult Roquentin's inability 
to pick up the "Hibou blanc11 scrap* Earlier» we main-
tained that these episodes in Roquent in1s narration 
seem to be connected through the boot which appears in 
both instances (see above» p. 180). This apparently 
gratuitous connection takes on a certain amount of 
significance» if we see the "pensées de crabe et de 
langouste" of the old man as what Roquentin fears will 
happen to him» if he allows the en-soi to counter-ap-
propriate» In other words» the appearance of the boot 
next to the lined paper reminds Roquentin of the very 
fear which objects have begun to provoke in him: the 
fear of his thoughts becoming viscous» 
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the foundation of his own being* God» It is an attempt to 
be both possessor and possessed* 3 0 6 
Roquentin rests his hand against the whiteness of the 
blank page before him* and watches as blood flows from his 
self-inflicted wound and forms a small pool on the predom-
inantly unwritten page* "Il faudra que j'écrive au-des-
sous 'Ce jour—là* j'ai renoncé à faire mon livre sur le 
marquis de Rollebon*•" 3 0 9 He announces his idea to under-
write the residue of the stabbing» immortalizing the act 
with eventfulness by narrating what is $ie_ nouveau (ff0hf 
nothing • • • but I've stopped writing my book on Rolle-
bon")* having already sealed his act with the mark of the 
en—sol• the stain of his blood* This is Roquentin's in-
tention* but he makes no mention of carrying out this 
idea* 
Instead* he rises from his tablet leaves his room* 
and enters the street* buying a newspaper as he walks 
along* As he holds the paper ("tandis qu'il jjent JLfi. 
Journal" ) * Roquentin reads the account of the rape of Lu-
cienne and the cornucopia of nightmarish associations be-
gins to spill over him* The paper itself* the smell of 
its ink* Roquentin's vision of the rape* the blood* the 
watery swans* all point back to his love of handling dis-
carded paper* the "Hibou blanc" scrap ( a bleeding hand* a 
0 8
 Kenneth Douglas* "Sartre and the Self-inflicted 
Wound," in Yale French Studies 9(1952): %>%>• 123-131. 
3 0 9
 Sartre* La. Nausée* p* 129* 
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tableau he has just reproduced in his room by allowing his 
hand to bleed on to the lined paper before him) and Ro-
quentin's writing project — possession through writ-
ing. 3 1 0 The blitz of counter-appropriation that Roquentin 
undergoes is precisely the battle he wishes to fight with 
his diaryf the very reason for which he is keeping a jour-
nal ( "pour laquelle Al tient un Journal") in the first 
place* 
As we suggested earlier* the tide begins to turn for 
Roquentin after his encounter with the root* The fact 
that "a present il me serait facile de les [mes décou-
vertes] mettre en mots" signals the realization of the an-
nounced goal of Roquentin 9s journalistic project, as he 
expressed it in the "feuillet sans date»" He is now will-
ing to recount these ontological events * to appropriate 
them through writing» to play with them* Roquent in1 s at-
titude is changing* sliding from the esorj.t <Jtp ggrieux to-
wards the esprit de Jeu* One might argue that this trans-
formation is not at all conscious* not at all intentionait 
and Roquentin 1s sudden decision that he can signify that 
which defies precise signification is a result of Mauvaise 
foi or repression* This objection does not hold* however* 
for we recall that Roquentin* in the second stage of his 
Alexander Argyros provides a splendid account and 
analysis of the metaphoric and métonymie progressions 
of the images that haunt Roquentin 1s project: the 
ink* mud* blood* hand progression* in particular* Se 
his "The Question of Truth in Sartre* Heidegger* and 
Derrida*" 
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satori, has seen* has understood the radical , unnaraable 
being of the en-poj. and, consequently, has intuited the 
distinction between the en-soj and opur-soi « between brute 
contingency and freedom* Putting his discovery into words 
does not constitute a pure, transparent translation of the 
in—itself 1s counter—appropriative threat* It is the rais-
ing of this encounter to a second power, the metaphoriza-
tion of a drive through the Wj. eder ho \ un ffs^wan g • the trans-
formation of an encounter with the world into an event* 
This project is not in bad faith* for Roquentin now under-
stands the difference between the world and its recount-
ing* His putting into words of his conscious life repre-
sents an existence for him, which is beyond the 
contingency of the body* He has not been swallowed up by 
the en—soj. » only threatened* The storm has passed* 
Roquent in decides to write a novel, logically enough, 
to utilize his re-discovered freedom* He can once again 
pick up (writing-)paper and act out his various appropria-
tive strategies in a creative way, through a fiction, a 
raising of his BverydLay encounters and ideas to a second 
power, to the status of events* There is no need for 
truth in the telling, for words will never be adequate to 
relate the experiences that one has lived or that someone 
else (Pollebon, for example) has lived: "des personnages 
de roman auraient l'air plus vrais, seraient, en tout cas, 
plus plaisants." Roquentin wants to play, as the pianist/ 
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composer of "Some of These Days" played» as the singer who 
renders the song on the old» scratchy disk played. It is 
not a question of transcribing reality» but of çre&ting 
reality through a medium which does not touch back» is not 
slimy» is not two-faced. It is a use of freedom in the 
face of a threatening world of being-in-itself» a wielding 
of a fiery consciousness which cannot be extinguished by 
the viscous. Roquentin wants to create a being that will 
be "dure comme de 1 • aci er »,f 3 i l phallic as can bel It is 
once again he who will "s'approprier le monde symbolique-
ment»" and not the other way around. 
Thus» in the end» Roquentin's hydra complex wins out. 
He will overcome the hydra and avenge Prometheus by play-
ing with fire» by playing at being God himself. He will 
create his own world» a new world» with words and» through 
his creation» try to found himself in an object that he 
will possess in the double rapport of "mine» but not me." 
This project» like other appropriative enterprises» is 
doomed to failure» as we have demonstrated extensively in 
this study. But it is a failure that is inescapable» an-
other facticity» as it were» of the pour—soi. "L'homme 
est une passion inutile»" as Sartre states near the con-
clusion of L'Etre et le néant» 3 1 2 but if we are condemned 
to be existentially free and» consequently» to fail in our 
3 1 1
 Sartre» L& Nausée, p. 222. 
3 1 2
 Sartre» L'Etre ejt Lfe néant, p. 708. 
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gestures of appropriation (our acts themselves)» then we 
might just as well act in our best symbolic interest — 
that is» in creating a being for ourselves which will lead 
to the neutralizing of unpleasure» the binding of our 
over-zealous instinctual energy» a mastery of ourselves 
and the world. It is better to play games with the world 
than to be paralyzed by it6 immutability and silence* Ro-
quent in is better off (i.e., "healthier") playing with 
dirty scraps of paper» than allowing himself to be haunted 
by them* The small child is better off playing fort-dat 
than catatonically suffering his mother's absence* 
"Quand un avion pique du nez» il vaut mieux être le 
pilote qui essaie de le redresser qu'un passager terror-
i s e " 3 1 3 • • • even if one only pretends to know how to 
fly the plane* 
3 1 3
 Henri» in Simone de Beauvoir 1s Les Mandarins (Paris: 
Gallimard» 1954)* p. 571. 
CONCLUSIOK 
Much has been made of Roquent in9s proposal that one 
might be able to justify one's existence through a cre-
ative project» As the final strains of the final playing 
of "Some of These Pays" resound in his ears, Roquentin 
wonders if perhaps art is not a possible means to achieve 
existential salvation: "La Négresse chante* Alors on 
peut justifier son existence? Un tout petit peu? • • • 
Est—ce que je ne pourrais pas essayer?" 3 1 4 The main focus 
of the critical debate concerning the novel's conclusion 
is aimed at the viability of the "creative solution»" 
Maurice Cranston and Hazel Barnes , for instance, find Ro-
quentin's sudden artistic commitment a splendid cure for 
what ails this waif of being» 3 1 5 Others, such as Iris Mur-
doch* George Bauer and Richard Kamber, find this "solu-
tion" to be a mere pipe-dream and predict, hypotheticaliy» 
Roquentin's forthcoming realization of his project's fail-
u r e » 3 1 6 What is primarily in question in all of these 
3 1 4
 Sartre, L& Nausée« p» 221» 
3 1 5
 Maurice Cranston, Sartre (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1966), pry 20-21» Hazel Barnes, ftyimanistic £XJ.g!ejr-
tlallsm: Ike literature a£ PvPgifriUty (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1959), pv>» 193-206» 
3 1 6
 Iris Murdoch, ftartre; Romantic Rationalist (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 7-14. George Bauer, 
Sartre and the Artist (Chicago: University of Chicago 
_0;HL_ 
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works is whether existence, for Roquent inT can be Justi-
fied or not* 
But to what "problem" is Roquentin 1s proposed cre-
ative entreprise a "solution"? Has Soquentin been unable 
to justify his existence* try as he may» throughout the 
earlier pages of his journal* only to stumble on to the 
key to existential success as he is about to board the 
train for Paris? 
In the foregoing pages* we have examined Roquentinfs 
sickness as a condition based on an infection which is es-
sentially appropriative in nature* Soquentin* like anyone 
else* leads his life by engaging in one appropriative ven-
ture after another* We investigated the grasping* oral» 
scopophilic» and destructive aspects of Soquentin 1s par-
ticular appropriative tendencies* and we discovered» 
through a reading of Freud against Sartre» that such mani-
festations of desire are symptoms of a universal human 
psychology* Roquentin's peculiar habit of picking up pa-
pers is» at its root» not so unusual and hardly a reason 
to call the man "sick*11 
Roquent in ijg sick» however — he has bouts with nau-
sea* This illness» as we have shown» in the manner of 
earlier readers» results from Roquentin's sense that the 
Press» 1969)» p* 43. Richard Kamber» "The Creative 
Solution in Nausea* " in Suscruehanna P njyersity Sfrudje.g, 
9 (1974): pp. 227-242* The Kamber article contains an 
excellent recapitulation of the debate on the viabili-
ty of the creative solution for Roquentin» a summary 
from which our own summary is drawn. 
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objects of his appropriâtive urges have begun to touch 
back* This "revenge of the en-soj" we termed counter-ap-
propriation» and we attributed this fear of being engulfed 
by the in-itself to a change in Roquentin's attitude» It 
is his esprit pte serieuy that permits this imagined inva-
sion of his beingt an attitude in which one allows more 
reality to the world than to one's own freedom to tran-
scend the being—of—the—world» The esprit tfg J6 V** o n the 
other h&ndf is an attitude which is based on a point of 
view that is just the opposite of that of the "serious" 
mind» With the esprit de Jeu» the for-itself seeks to ap-
propriate itself through the use of its freedom» ijû te^ms 
©_£ its freedom — a freedom which brings value into the 
world and simply will not permit the world to bring anti-
value into consciousness» Roquentin 1s "problem*M then» 
lies in his serious attitude» The "solution" to this di-
lemma appears with his adoption of the esprit US. «i£U* 
Whether Roquentin's existence is justifiable or not 
becomes a superfluous consideration» The very fact that 
Roquentin thinks he can justify it, seeks to justify it, 
even pretends to justify it, indicates that he is giving 
more reality to his consciousness than to the world» If 
we are to ask the question of whether Roquentin 1s project 
to write a novel will satisfy those vague, but persistent 
yearnings of his fundamental desire to be 1n-itself-for-
itself, then our answer will be a categorical: "No»" But 
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the salvation that Roquentin is seeking is not akin to 
such an impossible goal of ontological self-becoaingt but 
rather a state in which he can "accept himself»" if only 
in the past* His goal is to have himself through the 
bringing into the world of an object which he possesses in 
the double rapport of "mine* but not met" His goal is to 
once again fondle, gaze att inquire into* be tempted to 
swallow, and set ablaze a world which is there to be poss-
essed* The fact that this aim appears to Roquentin as a 
project of creative writing reveals the specificity of 
this endeavor to his own psychological bias* But, for 
others, such a resolution may wear the guise of other ap-
propriative projects* What is important in any case is 
that the esprit de sérieux is overcome, that the counter-
appropriative attack is repulsed, and that the subject 
does not deny his / her own freedom — even if the appro-
priative strategy that one pursues is constantly doomed to 
failure* This is the solution to Roquent in9s problem* 
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